Introduction

One single nation. The United States is the only country in the world that permits juveniles to receive sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (JLWOP; Rovner, 2023). While there has been momentum at both the federal and state levels to curtail extreme punishments for justice-involved juveniles, which has resulted in a majority of states banning permanent incarceration for children, 22 states continue to permit JLWOP (The Campaign for the Fair Sentencing of Youth, 2023). Pennsylvania is among them.¹ In the nation’s mid-Atlantic region, Pennsylvania is the only state that has both retained JLWOP and also has individuals currently sentenced to it (Rovner, 2023; The Campaign for the Fair Sentencing of Youth, 2023).² In Miller v. Alabama (2012), the United States Supreme Court determined that mandatory JLWOP was a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause. However, the Court did not address whether this decision applied to the 2,800 individuals across the country already sentenced to parole-ineligible life sentences for crimes they were convicted of as minors (Juvenile Law Center, 2023). Four years later, in Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016), the Court clarified that the proscription of mandatory JLWOP extended to those already sentenced, and Pennsylvania began its resentencing hearings. At the time of Miller, the state had 520 individuals serving mandatory LWOP—the most in the nation (Juvenile Law Center, 2023).³Over the last several years, 491 individuals have been resentenced. Nearly 300 have departed prison, a part of the approximately 1,000 individuals who have been released nationally (Juvenile Law Center, 2023). Six cases have resulted in a resentencing of JLWOP in Pennsylvania.

This essay focuses on judicial rationale in five of these re-sentencing cases, and more specifically, how the appellant’s age and implied adult-level culpability were used by the judge to justify permanent incarceration. In the decision-making process, judges neglected the ample research in the areas of neuroscience and developmental psychology that indicates reduced responsibility as a result of juvenile cognitive immaturity. In light of this compelling evidence, LWOP can never be an appropriate sentence for juveniles.

Federal and State Supreme Court Decisions

Nearly two decades ago, the United States Supreme Court explicitly stated in Roper v. Simmons (2005) that juveniles do not have the same level of culpability as adults. In abolishing the death penalty for minors, the majority wrote, “The differences between juvenile[s] and adult[s]…are too marked and well understood to risk allowing a youthful person to receive the death penalty despite insufficient culpability” (pp. 572-573). In subsequent years, the Court expanded upon this rationale and applied it to death-in-prison sentences. In Graham v. Florida (2010), which prohibited JLWOP for non-homicide offenses, and in the aforementioned Miller and Montgomery (2016), the Court enumerated the bio-psycho-social differences between juveniles and adults. Among them, juveniles are more impulsive and emotionally driven in their decision-making, more focused on the short-term in their planning, and are more susceptible to peer influence. They also have less agency to escape negative environments, and because their character has yet to be fully formed, a greater capacity to change (The Campaign for the Fair Sentencing of Youth, 2018). Jones v. Mississippi (2021) is the Court’s most recent decision pertaining to JLWOP. In this case, the majority reiterated that sentencing should reflect the difference in culpability of juveniles and adults. However, the Jones majority refused to require a finding of a juvenile’s permanent incorrigibility, that they are incapable of reform (Legal Defense Fund, 2021). Its decision represents a departure from the Court’s established trajectory of limiting extreme punishment for juveniles, and as described by the dissenting justices, “guts” Miller and Montgomery (p. 1). Writing for the Jones majority, Justice Kavanaugh explained that their decision (pp. 21-22):

does not preclude the States from imposing additional sentencing limits in cases involving defendants under 18 convicted of murder. States may categorically prohibit life without parole for all…under 18. Or States may require sentencers to make extra factual findings before sentencing an [individual] under 18 to life without parole… Or States may direct sentencers to formally explain on the record why a life-without-parole sentence is appropriate notwithstanding the defendant’s youth. States may also establish rigorous proportionality or other substantive appellate review of life-without-parole sentences. All of those options, and others, remain available to the states.

Importantly, the majority determined that none of these additional restrictions are constitutionally required, and states can impose JLWOP provided that there is judicial consideration of age, as Pennsylvania judges have.

At the state level, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has interpreted and reinterpreted JLWOP based on the Court’s decisions. As the Court did not address whether Miller applied to juveniles who were already sentenced to LWOP, in Commonwealth v. Cunningham (2013), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that the Court’s decision in Miller to prohibit mandatory JLWOP did not apply retroactively. The Court later clarified in Montgomery (2016) that Miller did in fact include individuals who had already received mandatory sentences of JLWOP, re-sentencing hearings began. Pennsylvania’s next JLWOP decision was Commonwealth v. Batts II (2017), a follow-up to Commonwealth v. Batts I (2013) in which the state supreme court held that the trial court must consider age and age-related factors. In Batts II, it established the requirement of a finding of permanent incorrigibility (pp. 415-416):

To effectuate the mandate of Miller and Montgomery, procedural safeguards are required to ensure that life-without-parole sentences are meted out only to ‘the rarest of juvenile[s]’…whose crimes reflect ‘permanent incorrigibility,’ ‘irreparable corruption’ and ‘irretrievable depravity,’ as required by Miller and Montgomery. Thus, as fully developed in this Opinion, we recognize a presumption against the imposition of a sentence of life without parole for a juvenile…To rebut the presumption, the Commonwealth bears the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the juvenile…is incapable of rehabilitation.

However, last year, in Commonwealth v. Felder (2022), the state supreme court re-evaluated JLWOP based on the Jones decision and determined that “the procedural protections that we adopted in Batts II cannot stand in their current, judicially-created form” (p. 1243); consequently, it eliminated the requirement of a finding of permanent incorrigibility in order to impose JLWOP.

To determine the number of individuals who had been resentenced to JLWOP in Pennsylvania, the authors conferred with the Juvenile Law Center.⁴ As of February 2023, there were six. All⁵were males; three were white, two were Black or African American, and one was Latino. Five were convicted of first-degree murder and one of second-degree murder; each case was decided in a different county of the state. At the time of the crime, five were aged 17 and the other was 16. Their current mean age was 46 years, with two in their thirties, two in their forties, one in his fifties, and the other in his sixties. The amount of time served ranged from 12 to 45 years with a mean of 28 years. One had spent more than one-third of their life incarcerated, four had been confined for at least one-half of their lives, and the final individual had served LWOP for nearly three-quarters of their life. As a group, these six individuals had served a combined 168 years. As one individual opted not to seek sentencing modification pursuant to Montgomery, this individual was excluded from our analysis. Re-sentencing hearings and appeals occurred between 2014 and 2021, prior to the Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court decision in Felder that eliminated a requirement of permanent incorrigibility. Case documents, specifically judicial re-sentencing decisions and appeals, were obtained in the remaining five cases and were analyzed with a focus on references to the appellant’s age, cognitive development, and culpability.

The Immaturity Gap and Diminished Culpability

Beginning with the Court’s decision in Roper to ban the death penalty for juveniles, the Court has relied upon developmental psychology and neuroscience to demonstrate the reduced culpability of youth and to limit the imposition of extreme punishments for them. While a comprehensive examination of the literature is beyond the scope of this essay, a review of the research related to juvenile brain development is required.

The age of 18 is a legal default between adolescence and adulthood with little salience from a developmental perspective, as the Roper Court recognized when it stated: “The qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual turns 18” (p. 574). In fact, the maturation of the brain, including its structure, function, and inter-regional connectivity, continues into one’s mid-twenties (Kinscherff, 2022). Due to the immaturity of the brain, juveniles differ in marked ways from adults in their decision-making, self-regulation, and emotional processing. The prefrontal cortex of the brain, “which guides ‘executive functions’ such as complex decision-making, self-control, and higher-order cognitions,” is one of the last areas of the brain to structurally mature (p. 47). As executive functioning is still developing, juveniles are more “susceptible to emotionally driven decisions, impulsive behavior, and poor judgment” (p. 13) and are less able to engage in long-term planning or future-oriented decision-making, especially in emotionally charged situations (Cohen et al., 2016; Kinscherff, 2022). In short, a heightened social-emotional system not tempered by mature cognitive functioning influences juvenile decision-making (Tyler, 2015).

Subcortical regions of the brain such as the striatum, amygdala, and hippocampus work in tandem with the prefrontal cortex. “These regions are important for reward processing, processing of emotionally arousing and salient information, and learning and memory” (Kinscherff, 2022, p. 50). As a result of less connectivity between the striatum and the prefrontal cortex during adolescence, juveniles have a greater focus on immediate rewards and lack the capacity to engage in full consideration of the long-term consequences of their decisions (Kinscherff, 2022). As a group, juveniles are more susceptible to peer pressure (Berryessa, 2019) with still-developing levels of social intelligence and empathy (Tyler, 2015).

An emerging area of neuroscience relates to the effect of trauma on the brain. “There is well known evidence that early childhood abuse, exposure to violence, neglect, and other trauma have significant and lasting negative effects on adolescents’ executive functioning by damaging the developing prefrontal cortex” (Berryessa, 2018, p. 24). This line of research is especially relevant to those serving JLWOP as many have experienced traumatic and negative life events (Daftary-Kapur et al., 2022). Nellis (2012) found that: 4 in 5 had witnessed violence at home; 1 in 2 had regularly witnessed violence in their communities; and 1 in 2 had been victims of physical violence. As noted by the Court, adolescents have reduced agency over their surroundings or their capacity to remove themselves from these or other negative settings. Lastly, as the brain has greater neuroplasticity during adolescence (The Campaign for the Fair Sentencing of Youth, 2018), juveniles are more receptive to pro-social change and rehabilitative efforts. As evidence of the “transient immaturity” of youth (Roper v. Simmons, 2005, p. 573), most individuals outgrow risky behaviors, including illegal ones, by their early twenties (The Campaign for the Fair Sentencing of Youth, 2018; Monahan et al., 2015).

Judicial Rationale in Pennsylvania

Age and Culpability

In each of the five Pennsylvania cases, the judge made at least one reference to the appellant’s age at the time of the crime:

“Appellant was 17 years and some odd months so he was 17 years plus I think two or three months, if I remember correctly.” (Appellant A)

“The defendant was 17 years of age at the time and would turn 18 in less than 4 months. (Appellant B)

“Appellant committed the brutal and heinous crimes with a sexual component just 8 months before Appellant’s 18th birthday.” (Appellant C)

“I have to consider the juvenile's age at the time of the offense; he was very close to being an adult.” (Appellant C)

“The defendant was almost 17 years old. He was 16 years and 10 months old.” (Appellant D)

“Petitioner was 17 years and 7 months old when he murdered [victim], just 5 months shy of legal adulthood. (Appellant E)

In all cases, the judge provided the age of the appellant in units of years and months and/or reported how many months until they reached the age of 18. In doing so, it appears that the judge was inferring that the culpability of the individual was at or approximate to that of an adult. Two judges asserted that the individual’s age was a salient factor that worked against the imposition of a lesser punishment, as indicated in the remarks below:

“I don’t believe the age should be a factor that would militate in Appellant’s case of any kind of parole at 17 plus years.” (Appellant A)

“The court finds this [their age] to be significant in its consideration.” (Appellant B)

In Appellant E’s case, the judge determined that there was no mitigating age-related factor that would suggest reduced blameworthiness: “There is no evidence that he lacked the requisite mental capacity at the time of the murder or that he was lacking in maturity for his biological age.” The judge’s reasoning here is not in keeping with the neuroscience research described above that the juvenile’s age, and corresponding brain development, is the reason for the lack of requisite mental capacity or maturity.

In another example of the dissonance between judicial rationale and neuroscience research, the judge in Appellant A’s case implied a bifurcation between younger and older adolescents suggesting that the former had reduced culpability due to their lower age:

[In Miller and its companion case], you’re talking about kids on the lower end. You’re talking 14-year-olds, that sort of thing. [Appellant] was 17 years and some odd months… So when you look at those cases that talk about how children are different and all that, the focus on those—what made those cases maybe more compelling factually was the younger age [of the defendant].

However, neuroscience research has demonstrated that juveniles between the ages of 16 and 17 have a lesser capacity for sound decision-making than younger juveniles—not more. “The immaturity ‘gap’ between adults and juveniles is the largest around age 16 or 17. This means that 16- and 17-year-olds are the most likely to make risky decisions because of social and emotional factors not present in younger juveniles” (Berryessa, 2019, para 5). All six individuals who were resentenced to JLWOP in Pennsylvania were either 16 or 17 at the time of the offense. Rather than being at or close to an adult level culpability, which was the apparent implication of the judge, scientific findings suggest instead that they were further from their adult counterparts in terms of this particular area of cognitive development than younger youth.

The Developing Brain Literature

In only one case was there explicit mention of research on juvenile cognitive immaturity. In Appellant D’s case, a mental health professional testified on behalf of the defense and described the results of these studies, according to the re-sentencing report:

She testified about the adolescent brain which she views ranging from age 10 to 25, and how the brain doesn’t reach maturity until a later time and what some of the problems are with that. Basically, she supplied all of the background forensic information that I believe that the Supreme Court of the United States used in Miller to come to its conclusion.

The judge critiqued the expert witness’s testimony for their discussion of the development of the adolescent brain as being too general and not including an individualized analysis of the appellant:

[She] presented absolutely nothing about this particular defendant. She never tested him. She never offered an opinion about him specifically. She basically gave us the general background information that the Miller court relied on.

The judge’s assessment that this research had less relevance to the appellant than individual testing is not consistent with the Court’s stance. As explained by Carroll (2016, p. 588):

At least in the context of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, this lack of individualized accounting has not bothered the Court. As the Court noted repeatedly in the Roper line, the noted behavior and developmental trends were sufficiently consistent and well documented to forgo an individualized analysis and to permit a categorical prohibition of the considered punishments.

In summary, analysis of the judicial commentary in these five cases indicated little mention of the neuroscience research, and in the one instance that it was, it did not align with the Court’s position. As examined below, there was also little in-depth discussion of mitigation related to trauma and negative life events.

Trauma and Negative Life Events

Extant research indicates that trauma is an unfortunate reality for many individuals serving JLWOP (Daftary-Kapur et al., 2022; Nellis, 2012), and this trauma alters brain development and functioning (Berryessa, 2018). In two cases, there was an allusion to—but little specific discussion of—the trauma experienced by the appellant. In Appellant B’s and Appellant E’s cases, there were lengthier coverages of the profound trauma they experienced, among them physical, emotional, and sexual abuse, neglect, lack of stable housing and education, financial hardship, parental addiction, and discrimination. However, in both cases, no connection was made between trauma and brain functioning (Berryessa, 2018), and a LWOP sentence was re-imposed.

The judge’s rationale in Appellant A’s case warrants a closer look. They referenced the history of previous trauma with: “you have to look and think what the heck happened during those formative years that caused this to happen.” This statement might suggest that the judge’s position was in line with the Roper and Miller Courts’ understanding that youth are limited in their ability to remove themselves from a criminogenic environment. However, the judge in Appellant A’s case put the onus on the then-minor to leave the situation: “There is no indication that Appellant’s family, home or neighborhood life was so dysfunctional as to create an environment out of which Appellant could not extricate himself.” The judge indicated that despite this trauma and other mitigating evidence related to mental health and substance use, the individual did not warrant a lesser punishment: “Although this Court is sympathetic to Appellant’s unfortunate history, it does very little in the way of persuading us to impose a sentence anything other than life without the possibility of parole.”

Conclusion

In Miller, the majority of the Court maintained “that the distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile[s]… even when they commit terrible crimes” (p. 9). The crimes for which the six were convicted of were terrible, as referenced in the resentencing documents. However, in explaining their decision to ban juvenile death penalty, the Roper Court cautioned (pp. 573):

An unacceptable likelihood exists that the brutality or cold-blooded nature of any particular crime would overpower mitigating arguments based on youth as a matter of course, even where the juvenile[’s]… objective immaturity, vulnerability, and lack of true depravity should require a sentence less severe than death.

The same caution that the circumstances of the crime could outweigh considerations of immaturity, vulnerability, and capacity to change is also applicable when sentencing juveniles to other extreme sentences.

In considering the re-sentencing of JLWOP cases in Pennsylvania, our analysis indicates there was little mention of the empirical evidence pertaining to the cognitive immaturity of juveniles. When cognitive maturity research was referenced, the judge’s position was inconsistent with or contradictory to the research. In the re-sentencing documents, the judicial decision to report the youth’s age at the time of the offense in years and months and/or the number of months until the age of 18 suggests an inference that the appellants had or were close to adult-level culpability, and as a result, a resentencing to life without parole was justified.

Both the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court have indicated that the imposition of JLWOP should be a rare occurrence (see Jones, Miller, and Batts II). A resentence to JLWOP in Pennsylvania has been infrequent—as 6 of 491 individuals have been resentenced to the punishment—which has not been the case in other states such as Michigan (Zhao, 2022). However, the extant scientific evidence on adolescent brain immaturity, and their resulting reduced culpability, casts doubt on whether any juvenile should receive a sentence of life without parole.

The authors support The Sentencing Project’s general recommendation of limiting prison sentences to 20 years except in rare cases⁶ and commensurate with an individual’s cognitive maturity and corresponding culpability.

A prohibition against JLWOP is consistent with the sentencing practices of other countries worldwide (Rovner, 2023) and international law conventions. For example, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Children (1989) calls for reform at the international level. In November 2023, the United Nations Human Rights Committee recommended that the United States abolish JLWOP and impose a moratorium on LWOP sentences in general (United Nations, 2023). A moratorium is also consistent with criminological research that consistently demonstrates that individuals serving LWOP, including JLWOP, undergo profound maturation and personal transformation over the years (Johnson & Leigey, 2020) and do not pose a risk either in prison (Cunningham & Sorensen, 2006; Johnson & Dobrzanska, 2005; Sorensen & Cunningham, 2009) or upon release (Pennsylvania General Assembly, 2005; Siegel, 2016; Weisberg et al., 2011). Two studies have focused on those released from JLWOP. In a 2020 study, Daftary-Kapur and Zottoli (2020) examined the post-release behavior of 174 individuals who had been sentenced to JLWOP in Philadelphia County and were later released. Their recidivism has been extremely low. Only two cases (1%) resulted in convictions for new offenses, contempt, and robbery in the third degree, respectively. Similar findings were noted in a recent study in Louisiana of 68 individuals sentenced to JLWOP and later released. None have been rearrested (Davis & Van Gundy, 2021).

Developing brain research also has legal implications for young adults, as a growing number of jurisdictions have begun to recognize (Zhao, 2022). Some states, through either legislative or judicial action, have restricted LWOP to those beyond the age of 18. For example, Washington, Michigan, and Illinois have eliminated or limited LWOP for those in their late teens and early twenties with variation from state to state (Johnson, 2021; Nellis & Monazzam, 2023). Other jurisdictions, for instance, the District of Columbia, allow for a second look at sentences for those who were below the age of 25 at the time of the offense and have served 15 years or longer (Ghandnoosh, 2021).

The punishment of LWOP almost completely eliminates any future opportunity for sentencing modification or release for those convicted of murder (Seeds, 2023). In their arguments to the courts, the attorneys of the Pennsylvania appellants asked the judge to maintain some chance of release for their clients, as Appellant A’s attorney did when they stated:

There’s a lot of room for capacity for change, and to ask that we speculate over what might happen over the next 30, 40, 50 years is asking for a bit too much….We won’t know for certain for a long time which is why I’m asking that you do not close the door.

Given research in the fields of neuroscience and developmental psychology, juveniles are not mini-adults. Bio-psycho-social research shows that differences exist that impact the cognition and behavior of juveniles. As such, they should not be punished with such an extreme sentence as life without parole which closes the door to release almost entirely.

Summary

This essay analyzes judicial rationale in five Pennsylvania resentencing cases involving juveniles sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (JLWOP), focusing on how age and culpability were used to justify permanent incarceration. The essay highlights the dissonance between judicial reasoning and neuroscientific research indicating reduced culpability due to juvenile cognitive immaturity, arguing that LWOP is never an appropriate sentence for juveniles.

Federal and State Supreme Court Decisions

The US Supreme Court has consistently recognized the distinctive attributes of youth that diminish the penological justifications for imposing harsh sentences. The Court's decisions in Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, Miller v. Alabama, and Montgomery v. Louisiana have relied on developmental psychology and neuroscience to demonstrate the reduced culpability of youth. However, Jones v. Mississippi represents a departure from the Court's established trajectory of limiting extreme punishment for juveniles, as it did not require a finding of permanent incorrigibility for JLWOP sentences.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has interpreted and reinterpreted JLWOP based on these decisions, upholding the Miller decision's ban on mandatory JLWOP but eliminating the requirement of a finding of permanent incorrigibility for imposing JLWOP in Commonwealth v. Felder.

The Immaturity Gap and Diminished Culpability

Neuroscientific research on brain development underscores the significant differences between juveniles and adults in terms of decision-making, self-regulation, and emotional processing. The prefrontal cortex, crucial for executive functions, continues to mature into one's mid-twenties. This immaturity renders juveniles more susceptible to impulsive behavior, poor judgment, and a lack of long-term planning, particularly in emotionally charged situations.

Furthermore, trauma significantly impacts brain development and functioning, affecting executive functioning by damaging the developing prefrontal cortex. This is particularly relevant to those serving JLWOP, given the high prevalence of trauma in this population. The essay emphasizes that juveniles have reduced agency and are more receptive to pro-social change due to brain neuroplasticity.

Judicial Rationale in Pennsylvania

The essay analyzes judicial commentary in five Pennsylvania cases, highlighting a focus on the appellants' age at the time of the offense and an implicit assumption of near-adult culpability. Despite the research indicating that juveniles between 16 and 17 are most likely to make risky decisions due to their developmental stage, judges frequently emphasized the appellants' proximity to adulthood, implying an adult-level of responsibility.

The essay critiques the judge's dismissal of expert testimony on juvenile brain development, arguing that the judge's reliance on individualized analysis is inconsistent with the Court's position on categorical prohibitions. The essay also examines the limited discussion of trauma and negative life events, with judges often placing the onus on the juveniles to extricate themselves from dysfunctional environments.

Conclusion

The essay concludes that judicial rationale in Pennsylvania JLWOP resentencing cases demonstrates a disconnect with neuroscientific research on juvenile cognitive immaturity. The essay argues that the emphasis on the appellants' age and the lack of consideration for trauma and brain development reinforces a flawed understanding of juvenile culpability.

The essay advocates for limiting prison sentences to 20 years except in rare cases, emphasizing the need for a sentencing framework that aligns with cognitive maturity and culpability. The essay also calls for a moratorium on JLWOP, citing international law conventions and research indicating the low recidivism rates of individuals released from JLWOP.

The essay argues that JLWOP is an extreme sentence that closes the door to rehabilitation and future opportunity, especially for juveniles. It urges a shift toward a more just and scientifically informed approach to sentencing that acknowledges the developmental differences between juveniles and adults.

Summary

This essay examines the judicial rationale behind five Pennsylvania cases where juveniles were resentenced to life without parole (LWOP). The essay argues that the judges' reasoning reflects a misunderstanding of adolescent brain development and its implications for culpability.

Federal and State Supreme Court Decisions

The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the unique developmental characteristics of juveniles, concluding that they are less culpable than adults. However, recent decisions have emphasized the role of judicial discretion in applying these principles.

The Immaturity Gap and Diminished Culpability

Neuroscience research demonstrates that the human brain continues to develop well into the mid-twenties. This development affects crucial executive functions like decision-making, self-control, and emotional processing. The essay highlights the importance of understanding these neurological factors when assessing the culpability of juveniles.

Judicial Rationale in Pennsylvania

The essay analyzes the judicial reasoning in five Pennsylvania cases where juveniles were resentenced to LWOP. The author argues that the judges' emphasis on the juveniles' age and implied adult-level culpability ignores the established scientific evidence of adolescent cognitive immaturity.

Conclusion

The essay concludes that the punishment of LWOP is inconsistent with the scientific understanding of juvenile development and culpability. It argues that a more nuanced approach to sentencing juveniles, based on their developmental stage and the mitigating factors surrounding their crimes, is necessary. The author recommends a moratorium on LWOP sentences for juveniles, citing both scientific evidence and international legal norms.

Summary

This essay examines judicial rationale in five Pennsylvania cases where individuals were resentenced to life without parole (LWOP) for crimes committed as juveniles. The focus is on how judges used the appellants' age and implied adult-level culpability to justify permanent incarceration, despite research showing that juveniles have reduced responsibility due to their cognitive immaturity.

Federal and State Supreme Court Decisions

The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that juveniles are different from adults in terms of culpability. Cases like Roper v. Simmons (2005) and Miller v. Alabama (2012) established that juveniles have less developed brains and are more susceptible to impulsivity, peer pressure, and negative environments. However, the Court's most recent decision in Jones v. Mississippi (2021) backtracked, stating that states are not required to make specific findings of permanent incorrigibility before imposing LWOP.

Pennsylvania's Supreme Court has also grappled with JLWOP. It initially ruled that Miller didn't apply retroactively, but later reversed that decision. The court established a requirement for a finding of permanent incorrigibility in Commonwealth v. Batts II (2017), but then eliminated this requirement in Commonwealth v. Felder (2022) based on Jones.

The Immaturity Gap and Diminished Culpability

Brain development continues into one's mid-twenties, meaning that juveniles, particularly those between 16 and 17, lack the same level of cognitive maturity as adults. They are more impulsive, less capable of long-term planning, and more susceptible to peer influence. Trauma also significantly impacts brain development and functioning, especially for juveniles who often experience negative life events.

Judicial Rationale in Pennsylvania

The judges in the five Pennsylvania cases frequently mentioned the appellants' age but often inferred that they were close to adult-level culpability. In one case, a judge even suggested that younger juveniles had reduced culpability, contradicting scientific research showing that 16- and 17-year-olds are actually more likely to make risky decisions.

The judges also showed little understanding of the impact of trauma on brain development. While they sometimes acknowledged the appellants' traumatic experiences, they rarely connected this to their cognitive abilities or potential for change.

Conclusion

This analysis reveals a concerning disconnect between judicial rationale and scientific research on juvenile development. The judges in these cases frequently relied on the appellants' age to justify LWOP sentences, ignoring the substantial evidence showing that juveniles have diminished culpability due to their immature brains.

This raises serious questions about the fairness and appropriateness of LWOP for juveniles. As long as the courts continue to overlook the science of adolescent brain development, JLWOP will remain a deeply problematic sentence for those who committed crimes as minors.

The authors advocate for a prohibition against JLWOP for juveniles, as well as a moratorium on LWOP sentences in general. Research suggests that individuals serving LWOP, including JLWOP, are capable of significant personal growth and pose little risk to the community upon release.

Summary

This story is about how judges in Pennsylvania decided to keep some people in jail for the rest of their lives even though they were kids when they did something wrong. It's not fair because kids' brains are still growing and they don't always make good choices.

Federal and State Supreme Court Decisions

A long time ago, the Supreme Court said that kids can't get the death penalty because they are not as responsible as adults. They said kids' brains are still developing and they don't always think things through. The Court also said that kids who did something wrong could not be in jail forever. But then, they said it was okay if judges still sent kids to jail for life, as long as they thought about how old the kid was when they did something wrong.

The Immaturity Gap and Diminished Culpability

Scientists have learned that kids' brains keep growing until they are in their 20s. Kids' brains are different from grown-up brains, so they don't always make good choices. They are more likely to act without thinking and focus on things that are happening right now. They are also more likely to get caught up with what other kids are doing.

Judicial Rationale in Pennsylvania

Judges in Pennsylvania looked at the ages of kids when they did something wrong, but they didn't pay attention to what scientists know about kids' brains. The judges said they thought some of the kids were almost like adults, even though scientists say kids are not fully grown until they are 25. They also didn't pay attention to how kids were treated when they were growing up, which can also affect how they make choices.

Conclusion

It is not fair to send kids to jail for the rest of their lives. Kids' brains are still growing, and they don't always make good choices. Scientists know this, but judges don't always listen. The punishment of jail for life almost completely takes away any chance of getting out, which is not fair to kids who did something wrong when they were younger.