Earlier generations can jeopardise the opportunities, resources and well-being of their successors. Indeed, there is a growing unease with governments accruing large-scale public debts on a long-term basis (e.g. to recover from COVID-19) with the repayments falling on subsequent generations. Many worry that our policies and institutions are being shaped to advantage the interests of older generations at the expense of the young. In Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2019) countries, young adults have been hit disproportionally hard by the 2007 banking crisis: despite being the most educated generation in history, more than 70 million young adults living within these countries are unemployed. And if the fallout from the banking crisis were not enough, youth unemployment is set to increase dramatically due to the COVID-19 pandemic (OECD, 2020). High levels of youth unemployment create vulnerability among young adults and mean that employers can offer unstable forms of employment such as temporary or zero-hour contracts and unpaid internships.

Where young adults are accruing debt and have worse access to employment and state services than other generations, a distinct form of economic inequality is created. There is also an important sense in which these inequalities leave young adults vulnerable to specific forms of exploitation. However, much more needs to be done to explore the idea that exploitation is a threat to intergenerational relations. It does seem exploitative for one generation to design public policies and to maintain institutions that neglect the interests of its successors. It also seems morally troubling for institutions to distribute essential resources and opportunities (such as employment opportunities, state pension provisions and debt) in a way that creates important imbalances of power between generations. Such actions seem to have the capacity both to constitute forms of exploitation in themselves and to create the preconditions for further exploitative relationships.

The aim of this article is to make a case for intergenerational exploitation. I focus primarily on two questions: (1) What exactly is intergenerational exploitation? (2) What makes this type of exploitation wrong? The concept of intergenerational exploitation is relatively unexplored. Accounts of intergenerational injustice offer important insights that explain why deep inequalities between generations matter, but they do not tend to conceptualise exploitation between generations. One promising attempt is Christopher Bertram’s (2009) reciprocity account. Bertram argues that earlier generations exploit later ones if they violate a principle of reciprocity in their cooperative enterprises with earlier generations. But this account is vulnerable to serious problems. The focus of this article is to develop an account of intergenerational exploitation that can get to grips with these issues.

In developing this account, I begin by outlining contemporary transactional theories of exploitation. I argue that while these theories explain how one individual can exploit another, they are inadequate for capturing structural exploitation between groups. I then outline structural approaches that seek to identify exploitation in global relations, particularly sweatshop labour contracts. I argue that in the same way that structural injustice can be identified globally, it can also be identified intergenerationally.

One of the core concerns highlighted by structural accounts is that our political, economic and legal institutions can constrain some people and at the same time enhance the circumstances of others, and this leaves people vulnerable to exploitation. I argue that just as our background institutions cross national boundaries, so that people face a limited set of options (such entering sweatshop contracts), they can also cross intergenerational boundaries, so that succeeding generations face a limited and disreputable set of options. I argue that the intergenerational account provides a philosophically satisfying explanation of exploitation across time and explains how exploitation between generations is not only possible but in our world is likely to arise. To make this case, I examine key contexts involving long-term public debt and employment. In the former context, I show how exploitation between generations is possible, where the earlier generations do the exploiting. However, in the latter context of employment, I show how earlier generations can give rise to preconditions that facilitate the exploitation of later generations.

Exploitation

Sweatshop labour in impoverished countries is a paradigm case of wrongful exploitation. But these contracts involve a mutually beneficial consensual exchange. They improve people’s relative situation insofar as they move workers out of starvation and employers’ benefit from labour inputs. Workers also choose to enter these contracts to the extent that they prefer to move from a situation in which they are subject to dire poverty to another situation in which they are spared such hardship. Because sweatshop contracts involve a mutually beneficial and consensual exchange, one standard economic response is that it is strange to condemn these employers as exploitative. According to Matt Zwolinski, although the employer might be able to do more to help her employees, she does more than the majority of individuals who do nothing to provide any comparable benefit. If this is exploitation, then how bad can exploitation be? (Zwolinski, 2007: 710).

The form of Zwolinski’s argument is familiar to us. We know its intended implication: a sweatshop worker chooses to enter such a contract because it is the best that she can get. And we not only recognise the form of Zwolinski’s argument but instinctively feel its force: at present, plants making clothing and technology for foreign markets are essential for helping developing countries out of poverty. But intuitively, sweatshop contracts are morally defective in some respect and it is this normative consideration that drives accounts of exploitation. Accounts of exploitation seek to identify the wrong-making feature of exploitative contracts, and once revealed, this feature will undermine, destabilise or cast doubt on the legitimacy of these types of exchanges.

The most common accounts of exploitation are transactional, that is, exploitation is seen as taking place between individuals and involves unfairness and/or immoral conduct. According to these accounts, sweatshop employers are guilty of wrongful exploitation as they are taking advantage of workers’ desperate circumstances so that they consent to employment conditions that are unstable and involve very low wages, long hours per se. These accounts appeal to distributive injustice or unfairness in the transaction (Berkey, 2019; Buchanan, 1985; Ferguson, 2016; Kates, 2019; Meyers, 2004; Mulkeen, 2020; Steiner, 1984; Wertheimer, 1996). But they may also appeal to immoral conduct in the form of domination (Vrousalis, 2013), disrespect (Sample, 2003; Wood, 1995), using another as a mere means to your own ends (Kymlicka, 1989; Quinn, 1989), or in a more general sense of violating a moral duty (e.g. a duty to protect the vulnerable; Goodin, 1987) or costless rescue (Horton, 2019).

Both the fairness-based and conduct-based accounts offer a plausible defence of the intuition that sweatshop workers are wrongfully exploited by their employers. What these accounts miss is the insight that exploitation can be a structural phenomenon that is built into our political, legal and economic systems and that it can occur between groups. Although transactional exploitation is important, we cannot properly understand the wrong involved in sweatshop contracts without understanding that these are structural phenomena. They are structural because they originate in our political, legal and economic institutions, and they require the active participation of people who are subject to them, including the disadvantaged, to be maintained and authorised. Consequently, structural accounts argue that the background social construct is the real site of exploitation. It is a mistake to concentrate on the exchange between individuals because it is the condition that lies in the background of the exchange that the wrong-making feature is to be found.

While there is agreement that institutional structures matter for exploitation, there has been disagreement about the way in which they matter. Two prominent accounts have emerged in the literature. The first argues that structural background injustices produce inequalities between individuals that can facilitate the exploitation of some by others (Sample, 2003: 165). Ruth Sample (2003: 57) argues that when we extract benefits from transacting with a victim of structural injustice – and these benefits are due in part to an injustice that she has suffered – then we fail to give the victim appropriate respect. For Sample, it is this form of disrespect that constitutes the wrong-making feature of exploitation.

The second approach holds that structural injustice is necessary to think correctly about responsibility. According to Iris Marion Young (2006: 119–125), most of us contribute to structural injustice because we follow the accepted rules and conventions of our institutions. She holds that many of the problems that we collectively face are large-scale structural problems that cross national boundaries, but the concept of responsibility that we operate with involves fault and liability, which is suited to small-scale interactions. In particular, the fault/liability model pays insufficient attention to social structures that constrain the choices available to us (Young, 2004: 369). Young therefore develops a model of political responsibility. She argues that most of us participate in structural processes that harm or have unjust consequences for others in virtue of our jobs, purchasing choices and other activities. We thus share political responsibility to remedy structural injustice. Political responsibility is forward-looking: the point of highlighting these constraints and unfair distributions is to change these structures rather than to determine who is to be blamed for them. It involves working collectively to prevent future harms on the grounds that we are connected by our own actions to the processes that cause injustice for others, along with our relative power and privilege. More powerful individuals and institutions have more responsibility to change unfair processes and their outcomes, and those with relatively less power can take responsibility actively to pressure the more powerful to take responsibility for change. Those who acquire privileges by virtue of the structures have special responsibilities to contribute to organised efforts to correct them. According to Young (2004: 369), our political responsibilities must be discharged if we are to mitigate exploitation created by our social structures.

Thus, structural accounts argue that the problem with transactional accounts is that they are insufficiently structural. This means that the transactional accounts miss the site of exploitation, and that exploitation can take place between groups. In the following sections, I apply a structural account of exploitation to intergenerational relations. I argue that in the same way that structural injustice can be identified globally, it can also be identified intergenerationally. What we need is a structural and intergenerational account in order to identify intergenerational exploitation.

Intergenerational Exploitation

Before developing an account of intergenerational exploitation, it would be helpful to consider a promising view of exploitation in the intergenerational context put forward by Bertram, which I refer to as the reciprocity account.

Bertram argues that exploitation consists in a breach of fair reciprocity. This occurs when people are engaged in cooperative relationships together. According to Bertram (2009), there is exploitation if the distribution of rewards from cooperation fails to be roughly proportional to the distribution of effortful contribution. He says that to knowingly impose disproportionate burdens or benefits on those with whom one is engaged in cooperation is exploitative. The key to extending the notion of exploitation between generations lies in the idea that a co-operative arrangement may be extended in time. The possibility of exploitation arises because co-operative schemes may span several generations, for example, a football club. Just as within a group of contemporaries, shirkers exploit their counterparts; this is also the case in long-term intergenerational cooperation (Bertram, 2009: 156). For instance, if one generation neglects to invest in the maintenance of infrastructure and pushes these costs on to future generations, then this generation would be described as exploiting future people on Bertram’s (2009: 156) view.

Importantly, Bertram’s account is focused on capturing exploitation between non-overlapping generations. But it is difficult to conceive how a breach of fair reciprocity has occurred if there is no possibility of cooperation. The problem for Bertram is that exploitation requires an exchange between the exploiter and the exploited. For example, sweatshop contracts involve a relationship between two agents in which one agent offers a wage, the second agent deliberates and responds, and the first agent acts based on the second agent’s decision. But this kind of conversation does not exist between non-overlapping generations. More specifically, Bertram does not explain how future non-overlapping people consent to the exploitative exchange. As Goodin says, extortionists, blackmailers and con artists enlist the support of their victim in some way, and this is why we feel more comfortable in saying that they exploit their victims than we would be in saying the same about thieves (Goodin, 1987: 174–175; see also Caney, 2018).

A more common problem with reciprocity-based accounts of exploitation is that a lack of reciprocity is insufficient for exploitation. For example, gifts are non-reciprocal and involve knowingly imposing disproportionate burdens or benefits on those engaged in cooperation. But in the case of gift giving, we do not want to say that people are exploited because the distribution of rewards fails to be roughly proportional to the distribution of effortful contribution (Goodin, 1987: 175–176). Thus, if an earlier generation transfers resources to a later generation – without hope or expectation of a return – we do not want to say that the interaction is exploitative. A further problem is the danger of swamping later generations with duties of reciprocity, especially if unintentionally produced benefits give rise to the same range of duties as intentionally produced benefits. There are also issues surrounding the involuntary receipt of benefits. According to Nozick (1974: 90–95), foisting benefits on others without their consent can never generate obligations to pay the benefactors, for this would implausibly subject us to other people’s will.

A lack of reciprocity cannot, therefore, be the whole story when it comes to identifying exploitation, especially in the intergenerational terrain. What we have is two distinct concerns. The first involves a lack of consent. The second kind of worry is that unless the scope of reciprocity is appropriately restricted, then it will generate implausibly numerous obligations and render the concept of exploitation implausible. In the following section, I explain how these problems can be overcome by modifying Locke’s account of tacit consent and drawing on a structural account of exploitation. This work allows us to see how a mutually beneficial, consensual exchange is taking place between generations, but it is the condition that lies in the background of the exchange that is the real site of intergenerational exploitation. More specifically, it is a mistake to concentrate on the exchange between individuals because it is the condition that lies in the background of the exchange that the wrong-making feature is to be found. I then consider the way in which structural injustice disadvantages younger generations within a transaction by placing them in a restricted choice situation. To make my case, I examine social structures in real-world intergenerational problems, such as those involved in long-term public debt and employment. These cases allow us to see how it is possible for members of an earlier generation to exploit members of a later one or give rise to the preconditions that facilitate the exploitation of later generations.

Identifying Intergenerational Exploitation: Public Debt

A massive public debt has been created because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Countries around the world approved more than US$4.5 trillion worth of emergency measures in the initial months of the outbreak and this is only the start of the costs (International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2020). The emergency measures include isolation enforcement to protect the vulnerable, particularly older generations; pumping resources into public health, furlough and welfare packages; and fiscal stimulus policies to mitigate the recession. These massive debts will be passed on to future taxpayers, some of whom are too young to vote.

As well as incurring huge debts from recent crisis, younger and future taxpayers will also be responsible for increasing the levels of deficit created by pension and welfare burdens. These burdens relate to the amount that OECD governments have borrowed to finance their welfare, health and pension systems. There has been a long-term shortfall between revenues and payments in most OECD countries because governments have failed to raise taxes in line with spending. This is partly due to the structure of the pension and benefits system and partly because in many OECD countries, birth rates have fallen so much that the population of working adults is declining (Coyle, 2011: 92–93). What we find is that people are having less children, and people are getting older. Most notably, people who are working are required to give an increasing amount of their income (via taxation) to supporting older generations who need income and assistance. For several decades, many governments have evaded these demographic pressures by borrowing massively from their future tax payments to spend on citizens of the present. This means succeeding generations of taxpayers will not enjoy the same welfare benefits or pensions as their parents and will also have to pay higher taxes to repay the debts incurred on past benefits (Coyle, 2011: 112–113).

To see how it is possible for older generations to exploit younger generations, let us begin by first imagining a democratic society borrows £500 billion at time t₁ to cover the costs of the COVID-19 crisis and deficit created by pension and welfare burdens. Suppose that t₂ is the point in time at which the majority of those alive at t₁ have retired or ceased living, and this massive debt continues to bind those born well beyond t₂ so they pay a significant proportion of costs. In such a case, earlier generations have been able to use political, economic and legal structures to impose disproportionate costs on later generations that are binding. It appears that earlier generation A and later generation B take out a loan out from L. Because B’s bargaining position is worse than A’s, A can get B to agree to a repayment schedule that involves A unfairly benefitting more than B from the loan.

However, a critic might respond that in real-world intergenerational cases, there is no exchange between A and B: generation A simply imposes costs on B by unilaterally taking out a loan from L and using institutional structures so that B is forced to repay on terms that are unfair with respect to A and B. If this is true, then I face the same problem as Bertram. It is difficult to see how this is exploitation: there needs to be an exchange of some sort. This is akin to my leaving a group dinner at a restaurant without paying my share, and landing others with the tab. Or we might take this analogy further, suppose that, for some reason, unless all bills are paid, every diner will die. Suppose I dine on my own and leave without paying. Other diners now must pay my bill or die. I wrong them, but I do not interact or exchange with them. This seems like theft. It would make no difference whether I did this or pinched the other diners’ wallets to pay for my meal. As such, the intergenerational account I am proposing fails to correctly distinguish between theft and exploitation.

A critic might also argue that the enactment of the debt is coercive. From the standpoint of democracy, no member of later generation B ever cast a vote in favour of the massive debts or in favour of the officials that agreed to the debt on their behalf. The critic might take this further and argue that policy decisions are often biased against the future because the ‘silent majority’ of those who will be affected in the future cannot influence political decisions today (Ekeli, 2005, 2009; MacKenzie, 2016; Tremmel, 2006). Even if some members of generation B can vote, earlier generations tend to have more political influence because, as a group, they control more political resources, vote in higher proportions and hold more political offices than later generations (MacKenzie, 2016; Van Parijs, 1998). To make matters worse, generation B can be forced to honour the massive debts due to the disastrous consequences of refusing to pay back the money owed: being excluded from further credit, being subject to high interest rates on subsequent borrowing, turmoil in international trade, recession and economic upheavals. All these factors place severe limits on what generation B can do. Thus, to show this is a case of exploitation, I need to explain why we should think of this as an exchange – why we should think that the later generation B ought to be treated as if they were consensually engaging in a mutually beneficial exchange with both L and, particularly, A. I shall now make this case.

Identifying a Mutually Beneficial Exchange

First, it is helpful to draw on James Madison’s argument contained in a letter which he sent to Thomas Jefferson in the year in which Congress proposed the Bill of Rights. Jefferson famously argues that ‘a living generation can bind itself only’ and that every law should lapse every 19 years unless it is re-enacted for another 19 years by a majority vote of those living at the time of its re-enactment. A law that is not re-enacted should be struck from the books (Jefferson, 1984: 963). In response, Madison (1904: 438n–439n) raises the following objections in his letter:

Would not a Government ceasing of necessity at the end of a given term, unless prolonged by some Constitutional Act, previous to its expiration, be too subject to the casualty and consequences of an interregnum?

Would not a Government so often revised become too mutable and novel to retain that share of prejudice in its favor which is a salutary aid to the most rational Government?

Would not such periodical revision engender pernicious factions that might not otherwise come into existence; and agitate the public mind more frequently and more violently than might be expedient?

When it comes to contracting and public debts, Madison argues that if the earth is the gift of nature to the living, their title can extend to the earth in its natural state only. He goes on to say that the improvements made by the dead form a charge against the living who take the benefit of them. Debts may be incurred for purposes which interest the living as well as the unborn. This includes debts for repelling a conquest (the evils of which descend through many generations) and debts for the benefit of posterity. Importantly, the term of 19 years might not be sufficient for discharging the debts in either of these cases. According to Madison (1904: 438n–439n), given mutual benefits can be promoted by long-term public debt, all that is ‘indispensable in adjusting the account between the dead & the living is to see that the debts against later generations do not exceed the advances made by former generations’.

What Madison’s argument allows us to see is the way in which social and institutional structures can benefit later generations, and how generations can enter exchanges when it comes to contracting and providing public debts. Specifically, later generations pay for the benefits and improvements they receive from preceding generations. If we apply Madison’s reasoning, then we might say that generation B engages in a beneficial exchange with both L and, particularly, A. This is because L receives interest payments from the loan and B receives benefits of posterity (the effects of a vaccination programme, treatments in the event of contracting a virus, fiscal stimulus to improve employment opportunities, welfare guarantees, etc.) in exchange for servicing the loan. This now leaves us with the issue of consent and worries about making our successors pay for things that they do not want.

Invoking the Idea of Tacit Consent

In his response to Jefferson’s letter, Madison (1904: 440n) also argues that tacit consent may be given to established governments and laws, and that this consent is to be inferred from the omission of an express revocation. This idea of tacit consent may be a starting point for responding to the worry that later generations do not consent to debts created by earlier generations. Tacit consent can highlight the acceptance of public debt on the part of a later generation (compared to the loan not having been taken out at all). But does silence by later generations genuinely constitute morally binding tacit consent to the debts and laws which earlier generations seek to impose upon them? Many would argue that does not. One problem is that Madison does not explain why debts enacted by earlier generations should bind later generations who believe the debts are illegitimate.

But there is a Lockean response to this concern. According to Locke, earlier generations can legitimately exert their influence on later generations. He argues that at the age of majority, later generations come to be bound – by their tacit consent – to obey the laws of their ancestors by inheriting, or residing on, the land of their ancestors. Later generations who enjoy the benefits of government implicitly consent to the law and are bound by it. Later generations would be bound for as long as they owned or set foot on this land, in the same way that an individual is bound to obey the laws of somebody’s household by setting foot in that household (Locke, 1980; see also Otsuka, 2003). It follows that if those who reach the age of majority offer their morally binding tacit consent via residence to the laws that govern them, then this explains how later generations consent to these laws and the paying of public debt. To return to our example: earlier generation A and later generation B receive a loan from L for the benefit of posterity (say, to cover the costs of the COVID-19 crisis, vaccinations, fiscal stimulus and welfare costs); B offers morally binding tacit consent to the loan by continuing to remain on the soil of their ancestors and accepting the benefits provided by the loan.

However, some might question the consensual nature of this type of exchange. A familiar objection pressed against Locke concerns the freedom of tacit consent. Hume famously maintains that, for most of us, enjoying the benefits and protection of the laws of a government is not a free choice. Hume (1963: 281–282) gives us the following analogy:

Can we seriously say that a poor peasant or artisan has a free choice to leave his country, when he knows no foreign language or manners, and lives from day to day, by the small wages which he acquires? (1) We may as well assert, that a man, by remaining in a vessel, freely consents to the dominion of the master; though he was carried on board while asleep, and must leap into the ocean, and perish, the moment he leaves her.

Thus, can later generations really be said to consent to the state if they have nowhere else to go? States have discretionary control over migration: they erect walls, passport control, detain people in camps and so on. Thus, if leaving one’s country is the alternative how can these agreements be consensual? It follows that the lack of reasonable alternative undermines the consensual nature of this type of exchange.

In response, it is important to note that a lack of reasonable alternative features in many familiar cases of exploitation. For example, we might similarly argue that if dire poverty is the alternative to entering a sweatshop contract, how can such contracts be consensual? In response, exploitation theorists point out that a lack of alternative does not necessarily vitiate consent. As Alan Wertheimer points out, if a surgeon says to a patient, ‘You can choose to have your leg amputated or you will die’, we do not say that the patient choosing to have his leg amputated is coerced just because death is an unreasonable alternative. Instead, we seek patients’ informed consent in many routine life-saving operations (see Wertheimer, 1996: 110). It therefore seems plausible to hold that a lack of reasonable alternative, and the pressurised nature of consent, seems to align with familiar cases of exploitation.

Crucially, not all cases where a lack of reasonable alternative is present are consensual or exploitative. For example, we do not consent to a bandit who proclaims, ‘Your money or your life?’ even if we hand over our money at gunpoint nor does it seem correct to characterise this as exploitation. Here, it is helpful to consider Robert Nozick’s framework for distinguishing threats from offers. Nozick maintains that threats consist in coercion and offers do not. What is key is that the structure of an exploitative interaction closely resembles what Nozick describes as a restricted offer. For Nozick, a proposal is an offer if a person would rationally choose to move from the pre-offer situation to the offer situation. This can be contrasted with a threat where people do not prefer to make this move – if I were to force you to hand over your wallet at the point of a gun, then I would be moving you from a status quo to another situation in which you would not have chosen to put yourself (Nozick, 1997: 41). In the case of an offer, my intervention involves moving you from a status quo to another situation which you would prefer. For Nozick, the threat/offer distinction is also marked by the fact that compliance with a threat will leave a person worse off than she was in the pre-threat situation. By contrast, accepting an offer makes a person better off than she was in the pre-offer situation, for example, by helping the person or reducing the harm she faced.

If we consider this framework in the context of our public debt example, we can identify a mutually beneficial and consensual transaction: earlier generation A, later generation B and L all gain benefits from the loan. We might also say that generation B tacitly consents to the loan by accepting the benefits it provides (e.g. by accepting vaccinations, health care, opportunities created by fiscal stimulus, welfare) To ensure that benefits are not being foisted on generation B (due to a lack of reasonable alternative), we can appeal to Nozick’s distinction between threats and offers. In our example, it seems plausible that generation B prefers to move from the pre-proposal situation in which they are subject to the harmful impacts of COVID 19, to the proposal situation in which these harmful impacts have been reduced. This now leaves us with the issue of understanding the wrong-making feature of these transactions, so we can identify exploitation between generations.

Intergenerational Exploitation: Identifying the Distributive (Fairness-Based) Wrong

What is key to understanding the wrong-making feature is that just as the background structure of society (the political, economic and legal structures) restricts the options of workers and gives owners of factories the power to impose sweatshop contracts, the background structure of society can similarly restrict the options of later generations and give earlier generations the power to impose binding costs and unfair deals on later generations. It might be thought that power asymmetry between older and younger generations is a hard fact of modern societies: earlier generations will always have more power than later generations. However, the interesting claim here is that the power asymmetry created by the background structure of society is distinct because it is artificial: it is created by social processes and institutional design, and it is possible for us to change these processes. It consists in one generation exerting a kind of power or possessing a kind of advantage over another, and it is people participating in and consenting to these constructs that explains why these power imbalances are maintained and authorised.

To return to our case involving generations A and B, because the background structure of A and B’s society restricts the options of later generations, B’s bargaining position is worse than A’s; A can use power to get B to agree to a repayment schedule that involves A unfairly benefitting more than B from the loan. In this kind of case, there is mutual, albeit unequal, benefit and willing tacit acceptance on the part of the later generation B (compared to the loan not having been taken out at all). However, there is something distinctive about a society’s background structure constraining later generations and, at the same time, enhancing the power and opportunities of earlier generations, so that earlier generations can take out a massive loan based on the repayment of others. We can identify a fairness-based wrong in the exchange if the debts against later generations exceed the advances/benefits made by former generations.

Intergenerational Exploitation: Political Responsibilities

It might also be argued that we can identify conduct-based wrongs in the exchange. Specifically, if earlier generations extract excess benefits from a later generation whose options have been restricted – and this restriction is due to background structures and processes – then it might be argued that earlier generations fail to give the victims appropriate respect, dominate later generations, take unfair advantage of the vulnerable or violate a duty of costless rescue. However, this understanding gives the impression that intergenerational exploitation is being used to hold earlier generations responsible and blame them for certain changes to the economy that are bad for the young and good for them. This is not the claim being put forward. This kind of blaming is unconvincing because it does not seem reasonable to charge earlier generations with intentionally putting in place institutions and structures that benefit them and impose costs on younger generations. While it is true that some members of earlier generations might have contributed to the accumulation of public debt, others might have done their best to resist these changes. Instead, I am putting forward the more modest claim of how it is possible for individual members of an earlier generation to exploit members of a later one, and the account developed is structural in nature. Given that this is so, it is important to work with a forward-looking idea of political responsibility. That is, the point of highlighting these constraints and unfair distributions is to change these structures rather than to determine who is to be blamed for them.

Following Young’s framework, we might reason about our political responsibilities in the intergenerational context along the parameters of (1) connection, (2) power and (3) privilege. To flesh out this framework in the context of public debt, earlier generations might trace connections between their own actions – whether they received furlough payments during the pandemic, vaccinations, pensions and so on – and later generations potentially affected by these activities, particularly if these activities restrict the choices of later generations and impose debts that exceed the advances made by former generations. Tracing these connections helps us to de-reify the structural processes that mediate between generations. More powerful individuals and institutions have more responsibility to change unfair processes and their outcomes, and those with relatively less power (but some ability to influence the powerful members) can take responsibility actively to pressure the more powerful to take responsibility for change. Equally, people who acquire relative privileges by virtue of the structures have special responsibilities to contribute to organised efforts to correct them. For example, the combined wealth of the world’s 10 richest men rose by US$540 billion (£400 billion) during the pandemic due to rebounding stocks, according to Berkhout et al. (2021). This amount would be enough to prevent the world from falling into poverty because of the virus and pay for vaccines for all (Berkhout et al., 2021). Here, the mega-rich have special responsibilities not to impose huge debts on the young – if debts against the younger generation exceed the advances made by former generations. This is not because the more privileged are to blame, but because they have more resources and are able to adapt to changed circumstances without suffering serious deprivation.

Building on the proposal above, it follows that the intergenerational political responsibilities of earlier generations should be discharged if they are to mitigate intergenerational exploitation created by our social structures. If members fail to discharge these intergenerational responsibilities, and continue to impose unfair debts on their successors, then we might argue that earlier generations fail to treat their successors with dignity and respect. The spirit of this wrong might be expressed in Kant’s Categorical Imperative. Importantly, there are two senses of using someone as a means. On one hand, there is the notion that to treat someone as a mere means is to treat him in a way that is incompatible with being an end in himself, for example, drink driving after you have been out on a bender treats others as a means because it does not respect their worth.

On the other hand, there is a narrower understanding of using someone as a means, which is closely connected to the idea of using someone as a tool to fix a problem or advance your own situation. Cutting up one healthy individual to save five is a famous example of this type of use. Warren Quinn draws this distinction by separating harm that results from eliminative agency and harm that results from opportunistic agency. Eliminative agency harm involves situations in which the victim presents an obstacle to one’s actions. In contrast, opportunistic agency harm involves situations in which one benefits from the presence of the victim. In the case of drink driving, this does not opportunistically use others as a means. Instead, the presence of a potentially affected party presents an obstacle as people would still drink drive even if victims were not there. Indeed, drink drivers would prefer not to hit a victim. This is very different from a case in which we kill another person in order to harvest his vital organs. Unlike the drink driving case, utilising someone’s organs is not something that we can do without this person’s involvement. This makes it clear that this person’s body represents an opportunity for us. Quinn (1989: 344) argues that using someone in an opportunistic sense is harder to justify.

Quinn’s analysis of opportunistic agency can, I think, be applied directly to the case of long-term public debt and our case involving generations A and B. If earlier generations fail to discharge their intergenerational political responsibilities and continue to impose unfair debts, then earlier generations treat their successors as having a diminished moral status. Earlier generations secure a massive long-term loan where the specific terms of loan repayment could not have been secured but for the presence of succeeding generations and their being in a restricted choice situation. This is on the grounds that B is used as security to pay back the loan. More specifically, the presence of the younger B generation, and their vulnerability in a restricted choice situation, presents an opportunity or advantage for generation A. It seems that generation B is being used opportunistically because A could not have secured a long-term debt (and derived benefits) but for their presence. This diminishes the moral status of B: generation A extracts excess benefits and transfers the costs to B, whose options have been restricted background structures and processes. On this understanding, generation A would be treating generation B as a mere means even if members did not intend, but only foresaw the effects of their activities and maintained this condition by failing to discharge their intergenerational political responsibilities.

Exploitation across Time: Objection

Now against this position, it might be argued that identifying unfairness is more complicated in the intergenerational context. One push back is that it is not clear whether this is an age group effect or a birth cohort effect. Age groups are groups of people at a certain stage of their lives, for instance, children or the elderly. Birth cohorts are groups of people born at a specific time and who age together. For example, the baby boomers are a birth cohort of those people born between the end of the Second World War and the 1960s. The difference between age groups, on one hand, and birth cohorts, on the other, lies with the fact that ‘birth cohorts are specific groups of people who age together, while age groups are phases through which different cohorts pass as they age’ (Bidadanure, 2016: 239; see also Daniels, 1988: 13). It follows that since we all age, treating age groups unequally will not necessarily bring about inequalities between individuals; however, treating birth cohorts unequally does bring about inequalities between individuals. Thus, if I am understanding intergenerational exploitation as an age group effect, then it might be argued that how an individual fares at one moment in time can be compensated for by how they fare at other moments. For instance, members of generation B (as they age and become the more powerful generation) can raise capital and pass repayments on to the next generation C. Similarly, generation C might raise capital and pass repayments on to the next generation D, and so on. It therefore seems that there are no complaints of unfairness because as each generation ages, it has the power to draw benefits and pass costs on to future generations. However, the fundamental problem with this justification is that it is tantamount to a pyramid scheme: it is saying that earlier generations may recruit new members to bring money in and funnel it up the line. This type of proposal clearly involves using later generations in Quinn’s opportunistic sense and is thus hard to justify. One of the main problems with pyramid schemes is that they are inherently unstable and end up collapsing. The instability in the intergenerational context relates to the huge public debt and a declining birth rate. As discussed above, in our world most OECD countries have a declining birth rate. If this pattern continues, then the costs of paying towards earlier generations (e.g. interest payments, costs of welfare, health care and pensions) will be greater and greater for each succeeding generation creating instability. Here, we can also note a cohort effect. If we are structuring our political and economic institutions by borrowing heavily from future tax payments to spend on citizens of the present, if we know that due to these demographic pressures succeeding generations will have to pay higher taxes and will not receive the same level of welfare or pensions, and so on, as their parents, then this raises intergenerational political responsibilities. If members fail to discharge these responsibilities, and continue to impose unfair debts on their successors, then we might argue that earlier generations fail to treat their successors with dignity and respect.

In sum, my aim in this section has been to show how it is possible for earlier generations to exploit later generations. In the case of long-term public debt, I argue that the older generation do the exploiting when (1) debts against a later generation exceed the advances/benefits made by the former generation and (2) members of the former generation fail to honour their intergenerational political responsibilities. In the intergenerational context, our political responsibility to work collectively to prevent future unfairness is grounded in how we are connected by our own actions to the processes that cause unfairness to later generations, along with our relative power and privilege. The interesting claim in this section is that the older generation do the exploiting.

The work in the following section is more modest; the claim I defend is that older generations place younger ones in conditions that make them vulnerable to exploitation. I will now consider intergenerational exploitation in the practice of employment. In this case, I will argue that our institutional, political and legal structures can give rise to preconditions that facilitate the exploitation of younger generations.

Identifying Intergenerational Exploitation: Employment

It is possible for earlier generations to set the preconditions for exploitation when political, social and legal institutions are designed or maintained in such a way that they make younger generations vulnerable in their trade relations with others, for example, the severe economic consequences that have derived from COVID-19, the 2007 banking crisis, a rapidly ageing population have affected younger generations as a group more than any other generation. Presently, there is a staggeringly high rate of long-term unemployment and poverty among the younger working generation. High levels of poverty and youth unemployment create vulnerability among young adults and mean that employers are able to offer unstable forms of employment such as temporary or zero-hour contracts and unpaid internships.

Recall that on a structural account of exploitation, exploitation arises when political, social and economic institutions against which the exchange is being made restrict a person’s choices leaving them with no reasonable alternative but to enter a particular transaction. The fact that a person is in a restricted position allows others to impose unfair deals and extract terms that he or she would not ordinarily contemplate accepting.

To see how the situation experienced by members of the younger working generation can connect to this form of exploitation, consider the following example:

Brian: Imagine Brian completed an undergraduate degree at a good university. Brian seeks employment, but despite months of searching and countless interviews, he cannot gain employment on a graduate scheme. Brian’s only option to secure a position is to strike a deal with Carl, who offers him a 6-month unpaid internship. Brian begins working 40 hours a week as an intern, but he needs to work an extra three jobs – one as a cleaner, one in a bar and another as a food delivery driver – to try to make ends meet. He is exhausted. He gets up at 5am in the morning, leaves the house by 5:30am and cycles to his first job. He cleans from 6–8:30am and then cycles to begin his internship at 9am. He is finishing this second job at 5pm, then cycles to his final job in the bar. It’s midnight when Brian gets to bed. Brian then spends his weekends delivering takeaway food. In each of these extra jobs, Brian is employed using zero-hour contracts. On a good week, he might earn £300 for 50 hours of work. But on a bad week, there are fewer shifts available, and he comes away with half of this sum. When this happens, Brian needs to use his credit card to meet the costs of his rent and food.

We can now counterfactualise Brian’s situation to make an exploitation claim. Consider Brian’s employment transaction with Carl: Brian is a university graduate, but his access to secure employment is being restricted; younger generations have been most impacted economically by crisis and an ageing population. This has left younger generations vulnerable to precarious forms of employment. Carl takes unfair advantage of Brian when he says, ‘Come work a 40-hour week for me – for free – for the next six months and I’ll write you a reference’. Because there is a high rate of poverty and unemployment among young people, this gives employers the power to push precarious temporary or zero-hour contracts. This can be seen when Brian needs to work an extra three jobs. Employers can force such one-sided terms because there is a large proportion of young people competing for these contracts. Employers can extract benefits and derive insecure terms of agreement from a generation of young people – such as Brian – who have no reasonable alternative but to accept these terrible deals.

In the same way that people are choosing to enter sweatshop contracts because of global background structures, today’s younger generation is choosing to enter exploitative contracts because of serious injustice in the background political and economic institutions against which their decision is being made. Here, we can identify various wrongs in the above interactions. First, if institutions are being designed and maintained by earlier generations so that younger generations face highly restrictive conditions – being blocked or excluded from employment and subject to abject poverty – then this puts young people in a situation of vulnerability. This means that employers can offer unstable forms of employment such as temporary or zero-hour contracts and unpaid internships. Here, we might claim that members of generation A – in consenting to and maintaining political, social and economic institutions – put young person B in a restrictive condition such that C can exploit B. This is because C can take advantage of B’s vulnerability by offering an exchange that involves an unequal division of the surplus. In this case, we might say that A acts unjustly if they do this, but it does not follow that A exploits B; they act unjustly perhaps because A does not discharge their political responsibilities and makes B vulnerable to exploitation by others.

From this, it might be argued that employers such as Carl are guilty of conduct-based wrongs when they extract benefits and push precarious temporary or zero-hour contracts on vulnerable younger people, that is, employers are failing to give younger people appropriate respect, dominate or take unfair advantage of the vulnerable. However, again this kind of argument is way too quick. We need to look carefully at the situation of the employers. Although employers might be aware that they are taking advantage of vulnerable younger people, they might also be operating in constrained conditions themselves, so they have no reasonable alternative but to push unfair deals. Employers might desperately want to resist precarious temporary or zero-hour contracts, but this might be the best they can do if they are to remain in business. It is therefore important to work with a forward-looking account of intergenerational political responsibilities. Again, these responsibilities might be determined along the parameters of connection, power and privilege. More specifically, employers might trace connections between their own actions and members of younger generations potentially affected by these activities, particularly if these activities restrict the choices of younger generations so they have no reasonable alternative but to accept precarious employment contracts. More powerful employers and institutions have more responsibility to change unfair processes and their outcomes, and those with relatively less power (but some ability to influence the powerful members) can take responsibility actively to pressure the more powerful to take responsibility for change. Equally, employers who acquire relative privileges by virtue of the structures have special responsibilities to contribute to organised efforts to correct them. Again, this is not because the more privileged employers are to blame, but because they have more resources and are able to adapt to changed circumstances without suffering serious deprivation. It follows that the intergenerational political responsibilities of employers should be discharged if they are to mitigate the exploitation of our successors created by our social structures. If employers fail to discharge these political responsibilities, and continue to impose unfair deals on young people, then we might argue that employers fail to treat young people with dignity and respect. The spirit of this wrong might again be expressed in Quinn’s opportunistic sense. Employers extract benefits that could not have been secured but for the presence of younger people and their being in a restricted choice situation.

Objections

As in the case of debt above, there might be a couple of pushbacks against my account. I will deal with these in turn. First, it might again be argued that it is not clear whether this is an age group effect or a birth cohort effect. If I am understanding intergenerational exploitation as an age group effect, then people might enter temporary and zero-hour contracts when they are younger, but they go on to enter more secure and better paid employment as they age. It follows that there is not any unfairness between generations. However, there is again a big problem with this kind of justification. It is tantamount to saying that it is okay for younger generations to experience the conditions described in Brian’s case above because when they age, they get to do precisely the same thing, that is, there will be a fresh batch of vulnerable newbies for them to take advantage of by offering long hours, precarious contracts and an unequal division of the surplus. More specifically, their turn for extracting benefits from the vulnerable will come. This is not okay. It is not okay for our institutions to restrict the choices of our younger generations and for earlier generations to leave them in vulnerable conditions where they have no reasonable alternative but to take a temporary precarious contract. These contracts come with a great deal of worry, sleepless nights and shame. They involve people tirelessly working long hours and missing out weekends because they are frightened of losing the next contract. Earlier generations and employers have political responsibilities to relieve these generational effects. If they fail to discharge these responsibilities, then this will give rise to exploitation: earlier generations create the preconditions for exploiting the young, and employers do the exploiting.

I also think that intergenerational exploitation can be understood as a cohort effect. This will be the case if this form of employment situation worsens for each succeeding generation and endures for a longer stretch of time. In this kind of situation, there is unfairness between generations. Earlier generations and employers have intergenerational political responsibilities to relieve these cohort effects. If they fail to discharge these responsibilities, then this will give rise to exploitation.

A second objection raised against my account concerns whether exploitation is really an issue of intergenerational relations. It might be argued that I have not chosen the right level of analysis. Some might insist that class forces, and ultimately capitalists are the real actors, and exploitation take place between groups separated by class rather than between generations. For example, the employment situation for the young today – high levels of youth unemployment, low pay, temporary or zero-hour contracts and so on – affects individuals of all generations; someone in their 50s who is laid off and struggles to re-enter the job market may also be exploited and endure a precarious situation. Connectedly, others might argue that the labour market is indeed exploitative for the young, but the exploiters are capitalists, and the changes that have brought this about come from neoliberalism, not from immoral conduct by an earlier generation.

However, the claim that intergenerational exploitation exists does not commit one to the claim that all members of an earlier generation are equally active in producing the preconditions for the exploitation of a later one, or that members of an earlier generation do not use class forces to exploit their own contemporaries: a member of an older generation being exploited by class forces and capitalists is still consistent with the thesis. What I do resist is the invitation to reduce the intergenerational problem to the class power structure or dynamic created by capitalism. Structural exploitation relies on power relationships between groups. It is not necessary to analyse these power relations in terms of class. As feminists emphasise, a structural account which is sex-blind ignores women’s reproductive labour in the home, upon which capitalism is entirely dependent. Similarly, a structural account which is race-blind fails to explain the way in which groups racialised as inferior are victims of a particular form of racial exploitation. To use examples by W.E.B. Du Bois (1935) and Charles W. Mills (2004), our institutions and structures give rise to racial exploitation when Black candidates with superior credentials are turned down in favour of White candidates or when Black children are given an inferior education by state governments, with most resources going to White children (Du Bois, 1903, 1935; Harris, 1993; Mills, 2004). This can give rise to racial exploitation as social structures are being maintained to disadvantage Black people so they need to take an inferior job for less money.

There are different forms of structural injustice or at least different ways of understanding structural injustice. These structures distribute advantages and disadvantages among different groups, and this gives rise to exploitation. The desperate circumstances facing younger generations is the outcome of the actions and decisions of members of previous generations maintaining our institutions and social structures. The background structural injustice that many young people are suffering is intergenerational. And this is only compounded by race, gender and social class. For example, 4 years after graduation, Black graduates have, on average, nearly twice as much debt as their White counterparts and are three times more likely to be behind on payments (Addo et al., 2016; Scott-Clayton and Li, 2016). It is imperative that we understand that older generations can create and/or maintain uncertain and desperate conditions that enable the exploitation of its successors in their employment contracts, and younger people already suffering social disadvantage can be even more exposed to this form of exploitation than their peers.

An upshot of my account is that we should not reduce the intergenerational problem to the class power structure or dynamic created by capitalism. Instead, we can note that the problems of structural injustice concerning social class, race and gender have been created and maintained by some preceding generations. It is imperative that we discharge our intergenerational political responsibilities to ensure that we do not exploit our successors or set the preconditions for their exploitation by others, and this includes along parameters such as class, race and gender. Our intergenerational political responsibilities are the most crucial because they can help to mitigate the injustice faced by our successors.

Conclusion

The concern that younger generations are becoming victims of injustice has hit unprecedented proportions in a number of countries. While much discussion exists on the many ways in which the younger generations are more disadvantaged than their predecessors, very little has appeared on how the latter’s decisions can generate specifically exploitative relationships. My purpose in this article has been to develop a criterion for identifying intergenerational exploitation. I have elaborated this conception by examining the way in which considerations of background structures are relevant to this account. What the article has shown is how it is possible for members of an earlier generation to exploit members of a later one or give rise to the preconditions that facilitate the exploitation of later generations. To the extent that it is in their powers to do so, older generations ought to remedy these conditions.

Exploitation

The concept of wrongful exploitation is exemplified by sweatshop labor in impoverished countries. While these contracts may offer some benefit to workers, moving them from severe poverty, and are entered into consensually, there is an intuitive sense that they are morally flawed. This raises questions about what makes such seemingly beneficial exchanges exploitative.

Traditional transactional theories of exploitation focus on unfairness or immoral conduct occurring between individuals. These accounts suggest that employers are exploitative when they take advantage of workers' desperate circumstances, leading to acceptance of unstable conditions, low wages, or long hours. Such theories often point to issues like distributive injustice, disrespect, or using others as mere means.

However, a limitation of transactional accounts is their failure to fully capture exploitation as a structural phenomenon, embedded within political, legal, and economic systems, and occurring between groups. Structural accounts argue that the problem lies not just in the individual exchange, but in the background conditions that create vulnerability and allow unfair terms to be imposed. These structures require ongoing participation to be maintained.

Within structural approaches, some argue that background injustices create inequalities that facilitate individual exploitation. Others, such as those focusing on political responsibility, contend that collective participation in social structures can lead to unjust outcomes for certain groups. This perspective emphasizes a forward-looking responsibility to change these structures, considering factors like connection to the processes, power, and privilege.

Therefore, to properly identify exploitation, especially between groups, a structural understanding is necessary. This approach allows for the analysis of how societal frameworks can constrain choices for some while enhancing circumstances for others, creating conditions ripe for exploitation.

Intergenerational Exploitation

Understanding exploitation across generations requires careful consideration. One notable perspective, the reciprocity account, suggests that exploitation occurs when cooperation between generations results in a disproportionate distribution of burdens or benefits. For instance, if one generation neglects infrastructure investment, passing costs to future generations, this could be seen as exploitative.

However, this account faces challenges, particularly regarding the concept of exchange and consent between non-overlapping generations. Unlike individual transactions, direct interaction and explicit consent between distant generations are absent. Furthermore, a lack of reciprocity alone may not constitute exploitation, as evidenced by gift-giving, which is non-reciprocal but not exploitative. The risk of creating implausible obligations for future generations also presents a problem.

To address these concerns, a revised approach is needed that integrates structural exploitation theory with the idea of a beneficial, albeit often tacit, exchange between generations. This allows for an understanding of how societal conditions, rather than just individual actions, can enable intergenerational exploitation.

Identifying Intergenerational Exploitation: Public Debt

Significant public debts, such as those incurred during global crises or from unfunded pension and welfare systems, are increasingly falling on younger and future taxpayers. This situation arises as governments borrow against future tax payments to support current citizens, often due to declining birth rates and rising life expectancy, leading to a long-term shortfall between revenues and expenditures.

This scenario raises the question of whether an earlier generation can exploit a later one by imposing binding and disproportionate costs. Critics might argue that this is not exploitation due to a lack of direct exchange or consent, suggesting it is closer to theft or coercion because younger generations have no democratic say in these financial decisions.

However, a counter-argument, drawing on principles similar to those of James Madison, posits that later generations benefit from the "improvements" and public services (e.g., infrastructure, healthcare, economic stability) provided by earlier generations. This exchange of benefits for the responsibility of debt servicing can be considered a mutually beneficial, albeit unequal, transaction.

The concept of tacit consent can further explain how later generations become bound by these debts. By residing in and benefiting from the societal structures and public services established by predecessors, later generations implicitly accept the associated obligations. While acknowledging the limited alternatives available to later generations (similar to a sweatshop worker's limited choice), this does not necessarily negate consent but rather highlights the coercive pressures that align with many forms of exploitation, distinct from outright threats.

The essence of intergenerational exploitation in public debt lies in the structural power imbalance. When societal structures, maintained by earlier generations, disproportionately constrain the options of later generations, allowing earlier generations to impose unfair debt repayment schedules, exploitation occurs. This is particularly true if the debts imposed on later generations exceed the benefits received. Addressing this requires a forward-looking approach to political responsibility, where those with greater connection to the issues, power, or privilege have a greater obligation to modify structures to prevent future unfairness.

Identifying Intergenerational Exploitation: Employment

Earlier generations can establish the preconditions for exploitation by designing or maintaining political, social, and legal institutions that make younger generations vulnerable in the labor market. Economic crises and an aging population have disproportionately affected younger adults, leading to high rates of unemployment and poverty, which in turn enable employers to offer unstable forms of employment like temporary or zero-hour contracts and unpaid internships.

Structural exploitation, in this context, occurs when background societal institutions restrict a person's choices, leaving them with no reasonable alternative but to accept unfair job terms. For example, a university graduate facing widespread unemployment may be compelled to take an unpaid internship or precarious contract. Employers, in this scenario, take advantage of the vulnerability created by these systemic conditions.

While employers may be directly involved in offering exploitative contracts, the underlying issue is the broader institutional structure maintained by earlier generations. This places younger individuals in a restrictive position, making them susceptible to exploitation. The focus is not on blaming individuals but on highlighting the political responsibility of those with power and privilege to reform these structures.

The argument that such conditions are merely an "age group effect" (where individuals move into more secure jobs as they age) is problematic. This perspective implies a continuous cycle of vulnerability for successive younger generations, akin to an unsustainable pyramid scheme, rather than addressing the fundamental injustice. This pattern constitutes a "cohort effect" that requires intergenerational political responsibility to alleviate.

Furthermore, viewing this solely as a class-based or capitalist issue risks overlooking the distinct intergenerational dimension. While class forces and capitalism contribute, intergenerational exploitation operates through different power relations, similar to how structural injustices based on race or gender manifest. It is crucial to recognize how the actions and decisions of previous generations create and maintain conditions that disproportionately disadvantage younger generations, necessitating a collective commitment to discharge intergenerational political responsibilities to prevent such exploitation, especially when compounded by factors like race or gender.

Conclusion

A growing concern exists regarding the disadvantage faced by younger generations in various countries. While discussions often highlight general inequalities, there has been less focus on how decisions made by preceding generations can create specifically exploitative relationships. This analysis has sought to define intergenerational exploitation by emphasizing the role of background societal structures. It has demonstrated how earlier generations can directly exploit later ones or establish the conditions that facilitate their exploitation by others. It is incumbent upon older generations, within their capacity, to address and remedy these conditions.

Introduction

Earlier generations can impact the opportunities, resources, and overall well-being of their successors. A growing concern exists regarding governments accruing large public debts over long periods, with the repayment burden often falling on subsequent generations. Many observers worry that current policies and institutions are structured to benefit older generations, potentially at the expense of younger ones. For instance, young adults in developed nations have faced disproportionately severe economic consequences from financial crises and global health events, despite being highly educated. Such conditions can lead to increased vulnerability among young adults, resulting in unstable employment such as temporary contracts, zero-hour agreements, or unpaid internships.

When younger adults accrue more debt and face reduced access to employment and public services compared to other generations, a distinct form of economic inequality emerges. These inequalities can leave younger individuals susceptible to specific forms of exploitation. While intergenerational injustice offers insights into why deep disparities between generations are problematic, a more specific understanding of exploitation between generations is needed. This content aims to clarify what intergenerational exploitation entails and to explain the moral concerns associated with it.

Exploitation

Exploitation is often understood as occurring between individuals, typically involving an unfair or morally questionable transaction. For example, some employment arrangements, despite being mutually beneficial, can be viewed as exploitative if they take advantage of a worker's desperate circumstances, leading to acceptance of unstable conditions, low wages, or long hours. Such situations often involve an imbalance of power or a failure to uphold moral duties like protecting the vulnerable.

However, exploitation can also be a structural phenomenon embedded within political, legal, and economic systems. Structural exploitation affects entire groups and arises from the background conditions of society, rather than solely from individual exchanges. While individuals participate in maintaining these structures, the primary site of exploitation lies within the systems themselves, which can constrain the choices of some while enhancing the circumstances of others. This structural approach suggests that societal institutions can create vulnerabilities that lead to exploitation between groups, rather than just between individuals.

Intergenerational Exploitation

Intergenerational exploitation occurs when current generations benefit from policies or structures that disproportionately burden future generations. One view suggests this happens when there is a breach of fair reciprocity within long-term cooperative arrangements spanning multiple generations. For example, if one generation neglects infrastructure maintenance, pushing these costs onto future generations, it could be seen as exploiting them.

A challenge for simple reciprocity-based views is explaining how exploitation occurs between non-overlapping generations, where direct cooperation or exchange is impossible. Exploitation typically implies some form of interaction or even tacit consent. Furthermore, a mere lack of reciprocity is insufficient to define exploitation; for instance, gifts are non-reciprocal but not exploitative. Therefore, a more nuanced understanding is required, one that accounts for how future generations might be considered to be in a beneficial, albeit unequal, exchange, and how structural conditions create the vulnerability for exploitation.

Identifying Intergenerational Exploitation: Public Debt

Large public debts, whether from recent global crises or long-term shortfalls in pension and welfare systems, disproportionately burden younger and future taxpayers. These debts are incurred by earlier generations but must be repaid by successors who may not have consented to them. The question arises whether this constitutes exploitation when future generations are seemingly forced to repay these significant costs.

An argument can be made that a mutually beneficial exchange exists. Drawing on the idea that later generations benefit from the "improvements" made by past generations (e.g., infrastructure, public health, economic stability), it is reasoned that succeeding generations tacitly consent to these debts by continuing to reside in and benefit from the established societal structures. This tacit consent, similar to accepting public services, implies a choice, even if other alternatives are limited. The critical factor in determining exploitation lies not in the existence of an exchange, but in the fairness of its terms.

Exploitation in this context arises when the burdens imposed on later generations by these debts significantly exceed the benefits received from former generations. This represents a fairness-based wrong. Furthermore, a conduct-based wrong can be identified if earlier generations fail to discharge their political responsibilities. Political responsibility is forward-looking and focuses on collectively changing structures that create unfair distributions. It considers how individuals are connected to the processes causing injustice, their power to influence change, and any privileges gained from these structures. For example, those who benefit significantly from existing systems may have a greater responsibility to prevent the imposition of excessive debt on younger generations.

It has been suggested that the transfer of burdens might be a temporary "age group" effect, where younger generations will eventually become older and pass costs onto their successors. However, this perspective risks creating a problematic "pyramid scheme" scenario. If declining birth rates mean ever-increasing burdens for each succeeding generation, the system becomes inherently unstable and unfair. This highlights that intergenerational exploitation can be a "cohort effect," where specific generations consistently face greater disadvantages, leading to an unfair distribution of resources and opportunities across time.

Identifying Intergenerational Exploitation: Employment

Similar to public debt, employment practices can also demonstrate intergenerational exploitation. Political, social, and legal institutions can be designed or maintained in ways that make younger generations particularly vulnerable in the labor market. Factors such as severe economic downturns, an aging population, and high youth unemployment rates contribute to situations where younger workers face precarious employment conditions.

Consider a recent graduate struggling to find secure work, resorting to unpaid internships or multiple zero-hour contracts to make ends meet. While employers may also face constraints, the structural conditions allow them to offer unfair deals, as a large pool of vulnerable young people are competing for limited opportunities. These situations parallel other forms of structural exploitation where background injustices restrict choices, leaving individuals with few reasonable alternatives but to accept unfavorable terms.

In this context, earlier generations, by consenting to and maintaining institutions that place young people in restrictive conditions, contribute to their vulnerability to exploitation by employers. The employers, in turn, exploit this vulnerability by offering exchanges with an unequal division of benefits. It is not necessarily about blaming individual employers, but about identifying a collective political responsibility to address these structural issues. Those with greater power and privilege, including employers, have a responsibility to work towards changing these unfair processes. Failure to discharge these responsibilities can lead to a situation where younger generations are treated as a "mere means," used opportunistically to secure benefits that could not exist without their presence and restricted choices.

Some arguments suggest that such employment issues are primarily matters of class rather than intergenerational relations, or that capitalists, not older generations, are the true exploiters. However, understanding intergenerational exploitation does not negate other forms of structural injustice like class, race, or gender. Instead, it highlights how these problems are compounded. For example, young people from marginalized groups may experience even greater vulnerability to exploitative employment conditions. The design and maintenance of institutions by preceding generations can create the desperate circumstances that enable the exploitation of their successors.

Conclusion

The concept that younger generations are increasingly becoming victims of injustice is gaining prominence. While many discussions focus on the disadvantages faced by younger generations, less attention has been given to how decisions made by preceding generations can lead to specifically exploitative relationships. This content aimed to provide a framework for identifying intergenerational exploitation. It has demonstrated how earlier generations can directly exploit later ones or create the preconditions that facilitate their exploitation by others. To the extent that it is within their power, older generations have a responsibility to address and remedy these conditions.

Summary

Earlier generations can risk the opportunities, resources, and well-being of those who come after them. There is growing concern about governments creating large public debts that future generations will have to pay, such as those to recover from crises like COVID-19. Many believe that current policies and systems are designed to benefit older generations at the expense of younger ones. For example, young adults in many developed countries were hit especially hard by the 2007 banking crisis. Even though they are the most educated group in history, millions of young adults in these countries are unemployed. This problem is expected to get much worse due to the COVID-19 pandemic. High youth unemployment makes young adults vulnerable, allowing employers to offer unstable jobs like temporary or zero-hour contracts and unpaid internships.

When young adults face rising debt and less access to jobs and public services compared to older generations, it creates a unique kind of economic unfairness. These inequalities also leave young adults open to specific types of harm or exploitation. However, more needs to be understood about how exploitation threatens relationships between generations. It seems unfair for one generation to create public policies and maintain systems that ignore the needs of those who follow. It also seems morally wrong for systems to hand out important resources and chances (like jobs, pensions, and debt) in a way that creates a big power imbalance between generations. Such actions can be seen as forms of exploitation themselves, and they can also set the stage for more exploitative relationships.

This article aims to explain the concept of intergenerational exploitation. The main questions addressed are: What exactly is intergenerational exploitation? And what makes this type of exploitation wrong? The idea of exploitation between generations has not been widely explored. While ideas of intergenerational injustice explain why deep inequalities between generations matter, they don't often define exploitation between generations. One promising idea is the "reciprocity account," which suggests that earlier generations exploit later ones if they break a rule of fairness in their shared efforts. However, this idea has significant weaknesses. This article aims to develop a clearer understanding of intergenerational exploitation that addresses these problems.

To develop this understanding, the article first looks at current theories of exploitation that focus on individual exchanges. While these theories explain how one person can exploit another, they are not enough to explain exploitation between larger groups. The article then describes approaches that look at exploitation caused by larger social structures, like in sweatshop labor. It argues that just as unfairness caused by structures can be found globally, it can also be found across generations.

A key concern in understanding structural issues is how our political, economic, and legal systems can limit the choices of some people while improving the lives of others, making some vulnerable to exploitation. This article argues that just as these systems affect people across national borders (like forcing them into sweatshop contracts), they can also affect people across generations. This means that future generations might face very limited and unfavorable choices. The article suggests that this intergenerational view offers a strong explanation for how exploitation can happen over time, and why it is likely to occur in our world. To support this, it examines key situations involving long-term public debt and employment. In the case of public debt, it shows how older generations can be the ones doing the exploiting. In the case of employment, it explains how older generations can create the conditions that allow younger generations to be exploited.

Exploitation

Sweatshop labor in poor countries is a clear example of unfair exploitation. These agreements involve a mutual exchange that people agree to. They improve workers' situations by lifting them out of extreme poverty, and employers benefit from the labor. Workers choose these agreements because they prefer moving from severe poverty to a situation where they are spared such hardship. Because sweatshop agreements involve a mutually beneficial exchange that people agree to, some economists argue that it seems odd to criticize these employers as exploitative. They might suggest that while the employer could do more to help their employees, they are still doing more than most individuals who offer no similar benefit. If this is exploitation, how bad can it really be?

However, there is an intuitive feeling that sweatshop agreements are wrong in some way, and this moral concern drives discussions about exploitation. These discussions try to identify what makes exploitative agreements wrong. Once this wrong is understood, it can challenge or cast doubt on whether these types of exchanges are truly acceptable.

The most common ways of understanding exploitation focus on individual transactions. In these views, exploitation happens between individuals and involves unfairness or morally wrong behavior. For example, sweatshop employers are seen as wrongly exploiting workers by taking advantage of their desperate situations. This forces workers to agree to unstable jobs with very low pay and long hours. These ideas often point to unfairness in the exchange itself or to morally wrong conduct, such as one person dominating another, showing disrespect, using someone only for their own gain, or failing a moral duty to protect vulnerable people.

Both fairness-based and conduct-based understandings offer a reasonable explanation for why sweatshop workers are unfairly exploited by their employers. However, these views miss a key point: exploitation can be a structural problem built into our political, legal, and economic systems, and it can happen between groups. While exploitation between individuals is important, we cannot fully understand the wrong in sweatshop contracts without seeing them as structural issues. They are structural because they come from our basic systems and need the active participation of the people involved, including those who are disadvantaged, to continue. Therefore, structural views argue that the main problem lies in the broader social conditions. It is a mistake to focus only on exchanges between individuals, because the unfairness is found in the conditions that exist around the exchange.

While there is agreement that underlying systems matter for exploitation, there are different ideas about how they matter. One view argues that unfair structural conditions create inequalities between individuals, which then allow some people to exploit others. This view suggests that when someone benefits from a deal with a person who is a victim of unfair structural conditions, and these benefits come partly from the injustice the victim has suffered, then the exploiter fails to show the victim proper respect. This lack of respect is seen as the core wrong in exploitation. Another approach argues that structural unfairness is necessary to think correctly about responsibility. It suggests that most people contribute to structural unfairness by following the accepted rules of our systems. Many large-scale problems, like those crossing national borders, are structural. Our usual idea of responsibility, which focuses on fault and blame, is better suited for small-scale interactions and doesn't pay enough attention to the social structures that limit our choices. Therefore, a different idea of political responsibility is needed. This view suggests that most people participate in structural processes that cause harm or unfair outcomes for others through their jobs, purchasing choices, and other activities. Thus, people share a political responsibility to fix structural unfairness. This responsibility looks to the future: the goal of pointing out these limits and unfair distributions is to change these structures, not to find blame. It involves working together to prevent future harm because people are connected by their own actions to the processes that cause unfairness for others, along with their relative power and advantages. Those with more power and stronger systems have more responsibility to change unfair processes and outcomes. Those with less power can actively pressure the more powerful to take responsibility for change. People who gain advantages because of these structures have special responsibilities to help fix them. Political responsibilities must be carried out to reduce exploitation caused by our social structures.

Therefore, structural views argue that individual-focused explanations are not enough because they miss where exploitation truly happens, and that exploitation can occur between groups. The following sections will apply a structural view of exploitation to relationships between generations. It will argue that structural unfairness can be found across generations, just as it can be found globally. A structural and intergenerational understanding is needed to identify exploitation between generations.

Intergenerational Exploitation

Before developing an explanation of exploitation between generations, it is helpful to consider a promising idea put forward by Christopher Bertram, known as the "reciprocity account."

Bertram argues that exploitation happens when there is a break in fair give-and-take. This occurs when people are working together in cooperative relationships. According to Bertram, exploitation exists if the rewards from cooperation are not roughly balanced with the effort each person contributes. He states that knowingly placing unfair burdens or benefits on those involved in a cooperative effort is exploitative. The key to extending the idea of exploitation to different generations lies in the concept that a cooperative arrangement can last over time. Exploitation can arise because cooperative plans, like a football club, might involve several generations. Just as people within the same generation who avoid work exploit others, the same applies to long-term cooperation between generations. For example, if one generation neglects to invest in fixing infrastructure and pushes these costs onto future generations, that generation would be described as exploiting future people according to Bertram's view.

Importantly, Bertram’s idea focuses on exploitation between generations that do not overlap in time. But it is hard to imagine how a break in fair give-and-take could happen if there is no possibility of cooperation. The problem for Bertram’s view is that exploitation seems to require some kind of exchange between the exploiter and the exploited. For example, sweatshop agreements involve a relationship between two parties: one offers a wage, the second thinks about it and responds, and the first acts based on the second's decision. But this kind of interaction doesn't exist between generations that don't overlap. More specifically, Bertram does not explain how future non-overlapping people agree to an exploitative exchange.

A more common problem with give-and-take-based ideas of exploitation is that a lack of give-and-take is not enough to define exploitation. For example, gifts are one-sided and involve knowingly giving disproportionate benefits to those involved in a cooperation. But in the case of gift-giving, it is not said that people are exploited because the benefits are not roughly proportional to the effort given. So, if an earlier generation transfers resources to a later generation without expecting anything in return, it would not be called an exploitative interaction. A further problem is the risk of burdening later generations with too many duties of give-and-take, especially if unintended benefits create the same duties as intended ones. There are also questions about receiving benefits without agreeing to them. It is argued that forcing benefits on others without their consent cannot create obligations to pay back those who gave the benefits, because this would unfairly subject people to the will of others.

Therefore, a lack of give-and-take alone cannot fully explain exploitation, especially when it comes to relationships between generations. There are two distinct concerns here. The first is a lack of consent. The second concern is that unless the idea of give-and-take is limited, it will create too many obligations and make the concept of exploitation seem unreasonable. The next section will explain how these problems can be overcome by adjusting Locke's idea of unspoken consent and by using a structural understanding of exploitation. This will show how a mutually beneficial exchange that people agree to can occur between generations, but the real source of intergenerational exploitation lies in the conditions surrounding the exchange. More specifically, it is a mistake to focus on the exchange between individuals, because the unfairness is found in the background conditions of the exchange. This article will then consider how structural unfairness disadvantages younger generations within a transaction by putting them in a situation with limited choices. To support this argument, it will examine social structures in real-world intergenerational problems, such as long-term public debt and employment. These examples will show how it is possible for members of an earlier generation to exploit members of a later one, or to create the conditions that allow for the exploitation of later generations.

Identifying Intergenerational Exploitation: Public Debt

A massive public debt has been created because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Countries around the world approved trillions of dollars worth of emergency spending in the first months of the outbreak, and this is only the beginning of the costs. These emergency measures include enforcing isolation to protect vulnerable people, especially older generations; putting resources into public health, job support, and welfare programs; and using economic policies to lessen the recession. These huge debts will be passed on to future taxpayers, some of whom are too young to vote.

In addition to the huge debts from recent crises, younger and future taxpayers will also be responsible for rising deficits caused by pension and welfare costs. These burdens come from how much governments in many developed countries have borrowed to fund their welfare, health, and pension systems. For a long time, there has been a gap between government income and spending in most developed countries because governments have not raised taxes enough to match their spending. This is partly due to how the pension and benefit systems are structured and partly because birth rates have fallen so much in many developed countries that the working-age population is shrinking. What is seen is that people are having fewer children, and people are living longer. Most notably, working people are required to give an increasing amount of their income (through taxes) to support older generations who need income and assistance. For several decades, many governments have avoided these demographic pressures by borrowing huge amounts from future tax payments to spend on current citizens. This means that future generations of taxpayers will not enjoy the same welfare benefits or pensions as their parents and will also have to pay higher taxes to repay the debts built up from past benefits.

To see how older generations can exploit younger ones, consider a democratic society that borrows a large sum of money at one point in time to cover the costs of a crisis and the deficit created by pension and welfare burdens. Imagine that at a later time, most of those alive when the debt was taken out have retired or passed away, but this massive debt continues to bind those born much later, forcing them to pay a significant portion of the costs. In such a case, earlier generations have been able to use political, economic, and legal structures to place unfair and binding costs on later generations. It appears that an earlier generation (A) and a later generation (B) take out a loan from a lender (L). Because B's negotiating position is weaker than A's, A can get B to agree to a repayment plan that unfairly benefits A more than B from the loan.

However, a critic might argue that in real-world intergenerational cases, there is no direct exchange between A and B. Generation A simply imposes costs on B by taking out a loan from L and using systems to force B to repay it on unfair terms. If this is true, then it faces the same problem as Bertram's idea. It is difficult to see how this is exploitation; there needs to be some kind of exchange. This is similar to someone leaving a group dinner without paying their share, sticking others with the bill. Or, if all bills must be paid to prevent everyone from dying, and one person dines alone and leaves without paying, others must pay their bill or die. This seems like theft, not exploitation. It would be no different from simply stealing others' wallets to pay for a meal. Therefore, the proposed intergenerational explanation fails to properly distinguish between theft and exploitation.

A critic might also argue that the creation of debt is forced. From a democratic point of view, no member of a later generation (B) ever voted for the massive debts or for the officials who agreed to the debt on their behalf. The critic might go further and argue that policy decisions are often biased against the future because the "silent majority" of those who will be affected in the future cannot influence political decisions today. Even if some members of generation B can vote, earlier generations tend to have more political influence because, as a group, they control more political resources, vote in higher numbers, and hold more political offices than later generations. To make matters worse, generation B can be forced to honor the massive debts due to the terrible consequences of refusing to pay the money owed: being cut off from future credit, facing high interest rates on later borrowing, chaos in international trade, recession, and economic disruptions. All these factors severely limit what generation B can do. Thus, to show that this is a case of exploitation, an explanation is needed for why this should be seen as an exchange – why later generation B should be treated as if they were willingly taking part in a mutually beneficial exchange with both the lender and, especially, generation A. This argument will now be made.

Identifying a Mutually Beneficial Exchange

First, it is helpful to consider James Madison’s argument in a letter he sent to Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson famously argued that "a living generation can bind itself only" and that every law should expire every 19 years unless a majority of those living at the time vote to renew it. A law not renewed should be removed. In response, Madison raised several objections in his letter: Would a government that automatically ends after a set period, unless extended, be too vulnerable to a temporary power vacuum and its consequences? Would a government so frequently reviewed become too unstable and new to keep the respect that helps even the most logical government? Would such regular reviews create harmful groups that might not otherwise exist, and stir up public opinion more often and more forcefully than is wise?

When it comes to agreements and public debts, Madison argues that if the earth is a gift of nature to the living, their claim can only extend to the earth in its natural state. He goes on to say that the improvements made by previous generations create a responsibility for the living who benefit from them. Debts may be taken on for reasons that benefit both the living and those yet to be born. This includes debts for defending against invasion (the harms of which affect many generations) and debts for the benefit of future generations. Importantly, a 19-year term might not be enough to pay off these debts in either case. According to Madison, given that long-term public debt can promote mutual benefits, all that is "essential in balancing the books between the dead and the living is to ensure that the debts against later generations do not exceed the benefits provided by former generations."

What Madison’s argument helps to understand is how social and institutional structures can benefit later generations, and how generations can engage in exchanges when it comes to agreements and public debts. Specifically, later generations pay for the benefits and improvements they receive from previous generations. If Madison’s reasoning is applied, it could be said that generation B engages in a beneficial exchange with both the lender and, particularly, generation A. This is because the lender receives interest payments from the loan, and B receives future benefits (the effects of a vaccination program, treatments for a virus, economic measures to improve job opportunities, welfare guarantees, etc.) in exchange for paying back the loan. This now leaves the question of consent and concerns about making future generations pay for things they do not want.

Invoking the Idea of Tacit Consent

In his response to Jefferson’s letter, Madison also argued that unspoken consent can be given to established governments and laws, and that this consent can be assumed if there is no clear rejection. This idea of unspoken consent can be a starting point for addressing the concern that later generations do not agree to debts created by earlier generations. Unspoken consent can highlight acceptance of public debt by a later generation (compared to the loan not being taken out at all). But does silence by later generations truly count as morally binding unspoken consent to the debts and laws that earlier generations try to impose on them? Many would argue that it does not. One problem is that Madison does not explain why debts created by earlier generations should bind later generations who believe the debts are unfair.

However, there is a Lockean response to this concern. According to Locke, earlier generations can fairly influence later generations. He argues that once they reach adulthood, later generations become bound by their unspoken consent to obey the laws of their ancestors by inheriting or living on their ancestors' land. Later generations who enjoy the benefits of government implicitly agree to the law and are bound by it. Later generations would be bound as long as they owned or set foot on this land, just as an individual is bound to obey the rules of someone's household by entering it. It follows that if those who reach adulthood give their morally binding unspoken consent through residence to the laws that govern them, then this explains how later generations agree to these laws and to paying public debt. To return to the example: earlier generation A and later generation B receive a loan from a lender for the benefit of future generations (for example, to cover the costs of a crisis, vaccinations, economic support, and welfare costs); B offers morally binding unspoken consent to the loan by continuing to live on their ancestors' land and accepting the benefits provided by the loan.

However, some might question whether this type of exchange truly involves consent. A common criticism against Locke concerns how free unspoken consent really is. It is often argued that for most people, enjoying the benefits and protection of government laws is not a free choice. An analogy suggests that people cannot truly be said to freely consent to stay in a vessel if they were carried onto it while asleep and would perish if they left it.

Therefore, can later generations really be said to consent to the state if they have nowhere else to go? States control who can migrate: they build walls, have passport controls, and detain people in camps. So, if leaving one's country is the only alternative, how can these agreements be seen as consensual? It suggests that the lack of reasonable alternatives makes this type of exchange not truly consensual.

In response, it is important to note that a lack of reasonable alternatives appears in many common examples of exploitation. For instance, it could similarly be argued that if extreme poverty is the only other option to entering a sweatshop agreement, how can such agreements be consensual? In reply, those who study exploitation point out that a lack of alternatives does not necessarily cancel out consent. For example, if a surgeon tells a patient, "You can choose to have your leg amputated or you will die," it is not said that the patient choosing amputation is forced simply because death is an unreasonable alternative. Instead, informed consent is sought in many routine life-saving operations. It therefore seems reasonable to believe that a lack of reasonable alternatives, and the pressured nature of consent, is consistent with common examples of exploitation.

Crucially, not all situations where there is a lack of reasonable alternatives are consensual or exploitative. For example, people do not consent to a bandit who demands, "Your money or your life?" even if money is handed over at gunpoint, nor does it seem right to call this exploitation. Here, it is helpful to consider a framework for telling the difference between threats and offers. This framework states that threats involve force, and offers do not. The key is that an exploitative interaction looks a lot like what is called a "restricted offer." In this kind of offer, a person would logically choose to move from their current situation to the offered situation. This is different from a threat, where people would not prefer to make that move. In the case of an offer, an intervention moves a person from their current state to a better one. Threats, however, leave a person worse off than they were before. By contrast, accepting an offer makes a person better off than they were before the offer, for example, by helping the person or reducing the harm they faced.

If this framework is considered in the context of the public debt example, a mutually beneficial and consensual transaction can be identified: earlier generation A, later generation B, and the lender all gain benefits from the loan. It might also be said that generation B implicitly agrees to the loan by accepting the benefits it provides (e.g., by accepting vaccinations, healthcare, opportunities created by economic support, welfare). To ensure that benefits are not being forced upon generation B (due to a lack of reasonable alternatives), the distinction between threats and offers can be used. In this example, it seems reasonable that generation B would prefer to move from a situation where they are suffering the harmful effects of a crisis to a situation where these harmful effects have been reduced. This now leads to the issue of understanding what makes these transactions wrong, so that exploitation between generations can be identified.

Intergenerational Exploitation: Identifying the Distributive (Fairness-Based) Wrong

The key to understanding what makes these transactions wrong is that just as the basic structure of society (its political, economic, and legal systems) limits the choices of workers and gives factory owners the power to impose sweatshop agreements, so too can the basic structure of society limit the choices of later generations and give earlier generations the power to impose binding costs and unfair deals on them. It might be thought that an imbalance of power between older and younger generations is a natural fact of modern societies: earlier generations will always have more power than later ones. However, the interesting point here is that the power imbalance created by the basic structure of society is unique because it is artificial. It is created by social processes and how systems are designed, and it is possible to change these processes. It involves one generation having a certain kind of power or advantage over another, and the continued participation and agreement of people in these systems explain why these power imbalances continue and are considered acceptable.

To return to the case involving generations A and B, because the basic structure of A and B's society limits the options of later generations, B's negotiating position is weaker than A's. A can use its power to get B to agree to a repayment schedule that unfairly benefits A more than B from the loan. In this kind of situation, there is mutual, though unequal, benefit and unspoken acceptance by later generation B (compared to the loan not having been taken out at all). However, there is something distinct about a society's basic structure limiting later generations while, at the same time, increasing the power and opportunities of earlier generations, so that earlier generations can take out a huge loan that others will have to repay. A fairness-based wrong can be identified in the exchange if the debts placed on later generations are greater than the benefits or advancements provided by earlier generations.

Intergenerational Exploitation: Political Responsibilities

It could also be argued that wrong actions are part of the exchange. Specifically, if earlier generations gain excessive benefits from a later generation whose options have been limited—and this limitation is due to underlying structures and processes—then it might be argued that earlier generations fail to treat the victims with proper respect, control later generations, take unfair advantage of the vulnerable, or fail to fulfill a duty to help without cost. However, this interpretation gives the impression that intergenerational exploitation is used to hold earlier generations responsible and blame them for certain economic changes that harm the young and benefit them. This is not the claim being made. This kind of blaming is unconvincing because it does not seem reasonable to accuse earlier generations of intentionally creating systems and structures that benefit them and impose costs on younger generations. While it is true that some members of earlier generations might have contributed to the accumulation of public debt, others might have tried their best to resist these changes. Instead, a more moderate claim is being put forward about how individual members of an earlier generation can exploit members of a later one, and the explanation developed is structural in nature. Given this, it is important to use a forward-looking idea of political responsibility. That is, the purpose of highlighting these limitations and unfair distributions is to change these structures rather than to determine who is to blame for them.

Following a framework of responsibility, one might think about political responsibilities across generations based on (1) connections, (2) power, and (3) privilege. To explain this framework in the context of public debt, earlier generations might trace the connections between their own actions—such as whether they received government financial support during a pandemic, vaccinations, pensions, and so on—and later generations potentially affected by these activities, especially if these activities limit the choices of later generations and impose debts that exceed the benefits provided by earlier generations. Tracing these connections helps to clarify the structural processes that link generations. More powerful individuals and institutions have greater responsibility to change unfair processes and their outcomes, and those with relatively less power (but some ability to influence the powerful members) can take responsibility by actively pressuring the more powerful to take responsibility for change. Similarly, people who gain advantages because of these structures have special responsibilities to help fix them. For example, the combined wealth of the world's richest individuals significantly increased during a pandemic due to rebounding stocks. This amount would be enough to prevent global poverty caused by the virus and pay for vaccines for everyone. In this case, the extremely wealthy have special responsibilities not to impose huge debts on the young if debts against the younger generation are greater than the benefits provided by earlier generations. This is not because the more privileged are to blame, but because they have more resources and can adapt to changing circumstances without suffering serious hardship.

Building on the suggestion above, it follows that the political responsibilities of earlier generations toward future generations should be carried out to reduce intergenerational exploitation created by our social structures. If members fail to carry out these responsibilities, and continue to impose unfair debts on those who follow, then it could be argued that earlier generations fail to treat their successors with dignity and respect. The essence of this wrong might be expressed by a moral principle that states people should not be treated merely as a means to an end. Importantly, there are two meanings of "using someone as a means." On one hand, treating someone as a mere means is to treat them in a way that does not respect their inherent worth. For example, driving drunk after a night out treats others as a means because it does not respect their value.

On the other hand, there is a narrower understanding of using someone as a means, which is closely linked to the idea of using someone as a tool to solve a problem or to improve one's own situation. The famous example of cutting up one healthy individual to save five is an example of this type of use. This distinction is drawn by separating harm that results from actions aimed at removing an obstacle (eliminative agency) and harm that results from taking advantage of someone's presence (opportunistic agency). Harm from eliminative agency involves situations where the victim presents an obstacle to one's actions. In contrast, harm from opportunistic agency involves situations where one benefits from the presence of the victim. In the case of drunk driving, this does not "opportunistically" use others as a means. Instead, the presence of a potentially affected party presents an obstacle, as drunk drivers would still drive even if victims were not there. Indeed, drunk drivers would prefer not to hit a victim. This is very different from a case in which someone is killed to harvest their vital organs. Unlike the drunk driving case, using someone's organs cannot be done without that person's involvement. This makes it clear that the person's body represents an opportunity. Using someone in an opportunistic sense is harder to justify.

This analysis of opportunistic action can be directly applied to the case of long-term public debt and the example involving generations A and B. If earlier generations fail to carry out their political responsibilities toward future generations and continue to impose unfair debts, then earlier generations treat their successors as having less moral worth. Earlier generations secure a massive long-term loan where the specific terms of repayment could not have been secured without the presence of future generations and their being in a situation of limited choice. This is because B is used as collateral to pay back the loan. More specifically, the presence of the younger B generation, and their vulnerability in a limited choice situation, creates an opportunity or advantage for generation A. It seems that generation B is being used opportunistically because A could not have secured a long-term debt (and gained benefits) without their presence. This lowers the moral standing of B: generation A gains excessive benefits and shifts costs to B, whose options have been limited by background structures and processes. In this understanding, generation A would be treating generation B as a mere means even if members did not intend, but only foresaw, the effects of their actions and continued this situation by failing to carry out their political responsibilities toward future generations.

Exploitation across Time: Objection

Against this position, it might be argued that identifying unfairness is more complex when it comes to relations between generations. One argument is that it is not clear whether this is an "age group effect" or a "birth cohort effect." Age groups are people at a certain stage of their lives, like children or the elderly. Birth cohorts are groups of people born at a specific time who age together. For example, baby boomers are a birth cohort of those born between the end of World War II and the 1960s. The difference is that birth cohorts are specific groups who age together, while age groups are phases different cohorts go through as they get older. It follows that since everyone ages, treating age groups unequally will not necessarily create inequalities between individuals. However, treating birth cohorts unequally does create inequalities between individuals. Thus, if intergenerational exploitation is understood as an age group effect, it might be argued that how an individual fares at one point in life can be balanced by how they fare at other points. For instance, members of generation B (as they age and become the more powerful generation) can raise money and pass repayments on to the next generation C. Similarly, generation C might raise money and pass repayments on to the next generation D, and so on. It therefore seems that there are no complaints of unfairness because as each generation ages, it has the power to gain benefits and pass costs on to future generations. However, the basic problem with this reasoning is that it is like a pyramid scheme: it is saying that earlier generations may recruit new members to bring in money and send it up the line. This type of proposal clearly involves using later generations in an "opportunistic" sense and is therefore difficult to justify. One of the main problems with pyramid schemes is that they are inherently unstable and eventually collapse. The instability in the intergenerational context relates to the huge public debt and a declining birth rate. As discussed earlier, in the world today, most developed countries have a declining birth rate. If this pattern continues, then the costs of contributing to earlier generations (e.g., interest payments, costs of welfare, healthcare, and pensions) will become greater and greater for each succeeding generation, creating instability. Here, a cohort effect can also be noted. If political and economic systems are structured by borrowing heavily from future tax payments to spend on current citizens, and if it is known that due to these demographic pressures, future generations will have to pay higher taxes and will not receive the same level of welfare or pensions as their parents, then this raises political responsibilities across generations. If members fail to carry out these responsibilities and continue to impose unfair debts on their successors, then it might be argued that earlier generations fail to treat their successors with dignity and respect.

In summary, the aim in this section has been to show how it is possible for earlier generations to exploit later generations. In the case of long-term public debt, it is argued that the older generation does the exploiting when (1) debts against a later generation exceed the benefits provided by the former generation, and (2) members of the former generation fail to carry out their political responsibilities toward future generations. In the context of relations between generations, the political responsibility to work together to prevent future unfairness is based on how people are connected by their own actions to the processes that cause unfairness to later generations, along with their relative power and advantages. The interesting claim in this section is that the older generation does the exploiting.

The work in the following section is more modest. The claim defended is that older generations place younger ones in conditions that make them vulnerable to exploitation. Intergenerational exploitation in the context of employment will now be considered. In this case, it will be argued that our institutional, political, and legal structures can create conditions that allow for the exploitation of younger generations.

Identifying Intergenerational Exploitation: Employment

It is possible for earlier generations to set the stage for exploitation when political, social, and legal systems are designed or maintained in a way that makes younger generations vulnerable in their work dealings with others. For example, the severe economic consequences from the COVID-19 pandemic, the 2007 banking crisis, and a rapidly aging population have affected younger generations as a group more than any other. Currently, there is an extremely high rate of long-term unemployment and poverty among the younger working population. High levels of poverty and youth unemployment make young adults vulnerable, which means employers can offer unstable types of jobs, such as temporary or zero-hour contracts and unpaid internships.

Recall that under a structural view of exploitation, it arises when political, social, and economic systems surrounding an exchange limit a person’s choices, leaving them with no reasonable alternative but to enter a particular transaction. The fact that a person is in such a limited position allows others to impose unfair deals and demand terms that they would not normally consider accepting.

To see how the situation faced by members of the younger working generation can connect to this form of exploitation, consider the following example: Brian completed a degree at a good university. He seeks employment, but despite months of searching and many interviews, he cannot get a job in a graduate program. Brian's only option to secure a position is to make a deal with Carl, who offers him a 6-month unpaid internship. Brian starts working 40 hours a week as an intern, but he needs to work three extra jobs—one as a cleaner, one in a bar, and another as a food delivery driver—to try to make ends meet. He is exhausted. He wakes up at 5 am, leaves the house by 5:30 am, and bikes to his first job. He cleans from 6–8:30 am and then bikes to start his internship at 9 am. He finishes this second job at 5 pm, then bikes to his final job in the bar. It is midnight when Brian gets to bed. Brian then spends his weekends delivering takeaway food. In each of these extra jobs, Brian is employed using zero-hour contracts. In a good week, he might earn £300 for 50 hours of work. But in a bad week, there are fewer shifts available, and he earns half that amount. When this happens, Brian needs to use his credit card to cover his rent and food costs.

Brian’s situation can now be considered to make a claim about exploitation. Consider Brian’s work agreement with Carl: Brian is a university graduate, but his access to stable employment is limited. Younger generations have been hit hardest economically by crises and an aging population. This has made younger generations vulnerable to unstable forms of employment. Carl unfairly takes advantage of Brian when he says, "Come work 40 hours a week for me – for free – for the next six months and I'll write you a reference." Because there is a high rate of poverty and unemployment among young people, this gives employers the power to push unstable temporary or zero-hour contracts. This can be seen when Brian needs to work three extra jobs. Employers can force such one-sided terms because a large number of young people are competing for these contracts. Employers can gain benefits and demand insecure terms of agreement from a generation of young people—like Brian—who have no reasonable alternative but to accept these terrible deals.

In the same way that people choose to enter sweatshop agreements because of global background structures, today’s younger generation is choosing to enter exploitative agreements because of serious unfairness in the underlying political and economic systems where their decision is made. Here, various wrongs can be identified in the interactions described. First, if systems are being designed and maintained by earlier generations in a way that puts younger generations in highly restrictive conditions—being blocked or excluded from employment and facing extreme poverty—then this makes young people vulnerable. This means that employers can offer unstable forms of employment such as temporary or zero-hour contracts and unpaid internships. In this case, it might be claimed that members of an earlier generation (A), by agreeing to and maintaining political, social, and economic systems, put a young person (B) in such a restrictive condition that another person (C) can exploit B. This is because C can take advantage of B’s vulnerability by offering an exchange that involves an unfair division of the benefits. In this case, it might be said that A acts unfairly if they do this, but it does not necessarily mean that A exploits B. A might act unfairly because A does not carry out their political responsibilities and makes B vulnerable to exploitation by others.

From this, it might be argued that employers like Carl are guilty of wrong actions when they gain benefits and force unstable temporary or zero-hour contracts on vulnerable young people. That is, employers are failing to show young people proper respect, dominating them, or taking unfair advantage of the vulnerable. However, this argument is too quick. The situation of the employers also needs to be carefully examined. Although employers might be aware that they are taking advantage of vulnerable young people, they might also be operating under their own limited conditions, so they have no reasonable alternative but to push unfair deals. Employers might desperately want to avoid unstable temporary or zero-hour contracts, but this might be the best they can do if they want to stay in business. It is therefore important to use a forward-looking view of political responsibilities across generations. Again, these responsibilities might be determined by considering connections, power, and privilege. More specifically, employers might trace connections between their own actions and members of younger generations potentially affected by these activities, especially if these activities limit the choices of younger generations so they have no reasonable alternative but to accept unstable employment contracts. More powerful employers and institutions have greater responsibility to change unfair processes and their outcomes, and those with relatively less power (but some ability to influence the powerful members) can take responsibility by actively pressuring the more powerful to take responsibility for change. Similarly, employers who gain advantages because of these structures have special responsibilities to help fix them. Again, this is not because the more privileged employers are to blame, but because they have more resources and can adapt to changing circumstances without suffering serious hardship. It follows that the political responsibilities of employers toward future generations should be carried out to reduce the exploitation of those who come after us that is created by our social structures. If employers fail to carry out these political responsibilities and continue to impose unfair deals on young people, then it might be argued that employers fail to treat young people with dignity and respect. The essence of this wrong might again be expressed as using someone for personal gain. Employers gain benefits that could not have been secured without the presence of younger people and their being in a situation of limited choice.

Objections

As in the case of debt discussed earlier, there might be a couple of counterarguments to this explanation. These will be addressed in turn. First, it might again be argued that it is not clear whether this is an "age group effect" or a "birth cohort effect." If intergenerational exploitation is understood as an age group effect, then people might enter temporary and zero-hour contracts when they are younger, but they go on to enter more secure and better-paying jobs as they age. It follows that there is no unfairness between generations. However, there is again a big problem with this kind of justification. It is like saying that it is acceptable for younger generations to experience the conditions described in Brian’s case because when they age, they get to do the exact same thing—that is, there will be a new group of vulnerable newcomers for them to take advantage of by offering long hours, unstable contracts, and an unfair division of benefits. More specifically, their turn to gain benefits from the vulnerable will come. This is not acceptable. It is not acceptable for institutions to limit the choices of younger generations and for earlier generations to leave them in vulnerable conditions where they have no reasonable alternative but to accept a temporary, unstable contract. These contracts come with a great deal of worry, sleepless nights, and shame. They involve people tirelessly working long hours and missing weekends because they are afraid of losing their next contract. Earlier generations and employers have political responsibilities to ease these generational effects. If they fail to carry out these responsibilities, then this will lead to exploitation: earlier generations create the conditions for exploiting the young, and employers do the exploiting.

It is also believed that intergenerational exploitation can be understood as a cohort effect. This would be the case if this form of employment situation worsens for each succeeding generation and lasts for a longer period of time. In this kind of situation, there is unfairness between generations. Earlier generations and employers have political responsibilities toward future generations to relieve these cohort effects. If they fail to carry out these responsibilities, then this will lead to exploitation.

A second objection raised against this explanation concerns whether exploitation is truly an issue of relations between generations. It might be argued that the wrong level of analysis has been chosen. Some might insist that class structures, and ultimately capitalists, are the real forces at play, and exploitation happens between groups separated by class rather than between generations. For example, the employment situation for young people today—high levels of youth unemployment, low pay, temporary or zero-hour contracts, and so on—affects individuals of all generations. Someone in their 50s who is laid off and struggles to re-enter the job market may also be exploited and endure an unstable situation. Relatedly, others might argue that the labor market is indeed exploitative for the young, but the exploiters are capitalists, and the changes that have caused this come from certain economic policies, not from immoral conduct by an earlier generation.

However, the claim that intergenerational exploitation exists does not mean that all members of an earlier generation are equally active in creating the conditions for the exploitation of a later one, or that members of an earlier generation do not use class forces to exploit their own contemporaries. A member of an older generation being exploited by class forces and capitalists is still consistent with the main argument. What is resisted is the suggestion to simplify the intergenerational problem down to the class power structure or dynamic created by capitalism. Structural exploitation relies on power relationships between groups. It is not necessary to analyze these power relations only in terms of class. For example, as feminists emphasize, a structural explanation that ignores gender differences overlooks women's unpaid labor in the home, which capitalism relies on entirely. Similarly, a structural explanation that ignores race fails to explain how groups identified by race as inferior are victims of a specific form of racial exploitation. As examples, institutions and structures can lead to racial exploitation when Black candidates with better qualifications are turned down in favor of White candidates, or when Black children receive an inferior education from state governments, with most resources going to White children. This can lead to racial exploitation as social structures are maintained to disadvantage Black people, forcing them to take inferior jobs for less money.

An outcome of this explanation is that the intergenerational problem should not be simplified to the class power structure or dynamic created by capitalism. Instead, it can be noted that the problems of structural unfairness concerning social class, race, and gender have been created and maintained by some previous generations. It is essential that political responsibilities toward future generations are carried out to ensure that successors are not exploited or placed in conditions that allow for their exploitation by others, and this includes along lines such as class, race, and gender. Political responsibilities across generations are the most crucial because they can help to reduce the unfairness faced by those who come after us.

Conclusion

The concern that younger generations are becoming victims of unfairness has reached unprecedented levels in many countries. While much discussion exists on the many ways in which younger generations are more disadvantaged than their predecessors, very little has appeared on how the decisions of earlier generations can create specifically exploitative relationships. The purpose of this article has been to develop a way to identify intergenerational exploitation. This understanding has been explained by examining how underlying structures are relevant to this concept. The article has shown how it is possible for members of an earlier generation to exploit members of a later one, or to create the conditions that allow for the exploitation of later generations. To the extent that it is within their power to do so, older generations should address these conditions.

Older groups of people can make things harder for younger groups when it comes to chances, money, and a good life. Many worry that governments are taking on large debts that future generations will have to pay back. For example, the money needed to recover from COVID-19. Some people believe that rules and systems are set up to help older groups, but they hurt younger ones.

In many countries, young adults were hit hard by the 2007 banking crisis. Even though they are the most educated group ever, millions of young adults could not find jobs. And with the COVID-19 pandemic, job problems for young people are set to get even worse. When many young people cannot find stable work, it makes them weak. This means bosses can offer bad jobs, like temporary work, jobs with no set hours, or unpaid training.

When young adults have more debt and worse access to jobs and public services than older groups, it creates an unfair money problem. This unfairness can also leave young adults open to being taken advantage of. It seems wrong for one group of people to make rules and keep systems that do not care about the needs of those who come after them. It also seems wrong for important things like jobs, pensions, and debts to be shared in a way that gives too much power to one group over another. These actions can be a form of taking advantage of others, and they can also lead to more unfair situations later.

Exploitation

Sweatshop labor in poor countries is a clear example of unfair exploitation. These agreements involve a mutual exchange that people agree to. They improve workers' situations by lifting them out of extreme poverty, and employers benefit from the labor. Workers choose these agreements because they prefer moving from severe poverty to a situation where they are spared such hardship. Because sweatshop agreements involve a mutually beneficial exchange that people agree to, some economists argue that it seems odd to criticize these employers as exploitative. They might suggest that while the employer could do more to help their employees, they are still doing more than most individuals who offer no similar benefit. If this is exploitation, how bad can it really be?

The most common ideas about exploitation say it happens between two people and involves unfairness or bad actions. For example, a factory owner takes advantage of a worker's desperate situation. But these ideas often miss a bigger point: exploitation can be built into our systems. This means our laws, money rules, and way of life can create unfair situations for whole groups of people, not just between two individuals.

Some experts say that when our systems are unfair, they create big differences between people. This makes it easy for some to take advantage of others. Others say that most people play a part in these unfair systems just by following the rules. They believe we all have a duty to help fix these problems, especially those who have more power or who benefit most from the unfair rules. This means looking forward and working together to change the systems, rather than blaming one person. This is called "political responsibility."

This thinking shows that when we look at only two people making a deal, we might miss the larger system that creates the problem. The goal is to see how the system itself causes unfairness and allows one group to take advantage of another. This idea of system-wide exploitation can also apply to different groups of people who live at different times.

Intergenerational Exploitation

It helps to think about how one group of people might take advantage of another group that lives at a different time. One idea is that it happens when people in a group that cooperates over a long time do not share the work or rewards fairly. For example, if an older group does not fix roads or buildings and leaves the cost for younger groups, this might be seen as taking advantage.

However, this idea has problems. It is hard to say one group takes advantage of another if they cannot truly cooperate or agree. It also means that gifts could be seen as exploitation because they are not fair. Also, if a group receives benefits they did not ask for, like a gift, they should not have to pay for them.

So, just being unfair is not enough to show that one group is taking advantage of another across time. We need to think about how people can agree without saying yes, and how the overall system plays a role. This can help us see how older groups might take advantage of younger groups, even if both groups get some benefits. The unfairness comes from the overall situation that affects these dealings.

Identifying Intergenerational Exploitation: Public Debt

Today, governments have taken on huge debts because of things like COVID-19. This money was used for things like health care, helping businesses, and supporting people. These large debts will have to be paid by younger people and future taxpayers, even those too young to vote today. Older groups also borrowed a lot to pay for pensions and other benefits because they did not raise enough taxes. This means future generations will have to pay higher taxes and might not get the same benefits.

Think of it like this: an older group takes a big loan that helps them now. But a younger group has to pay most of it back later because their situation is weaker. Some might say this is not fair because the younger group never agreed to it, and it feels like theft. Others might say it's like older groups forcing payments on younger ones without their choice.

However, if we look closer, we can see it as a kind of exchange. Old rules and big projects set up by older groups can help younger groups. The younger groups use these benefits (like roads, schools, or vaccines). By living in the country and using these benefits, they are seen as silently agreeing to the laws and debts. This "silent agreement" means they get the benefits but also take on the costs.

The problem is that younger groups often have few other choices. They cannot easily leave the country to avoid the debt. But having few choices does not always mean it is not an agreement, as long as the situation is better than having no help at all. For example, it is better to get a vaccine and avoid illness, even if it adds to a debt others incurred. The main problem is when the amount of debt the younger group has to pay is much more than the benefits they get from the older group. The system is set up to give older groups power, making it easier for them to pass on unfair costs.

This is not about blaming older individuals. It is about how our systems work. People in older generations, especially those with more power and wealth, have a duty to make sure these systems are fair for younger groups. They have a "political responsibility" to work together to fix unfair systems. If they do not, and they keep passing on unfair debts, it is like they are using younger generations as a tool to solve their own problems. This lessens the worth of the younger generation.

Some might say this is not a problem that passes through time, because young people will get older and pass costs to the next group. But this is like a pyramid scheme that will eventually break down as fewer young people are born. So, older groups must deal with their political responsibilities.

Identifying Intergenerational Exploitation: Employment

Older groups can also set up situations where younger groups are easily taken advantage of in their jobs. This happens when our laws and ways of life lead to tough job markets for young people, like after the banking crisis or COVID-19. Many young people face long periods without work or are stuck in poverty. This makes them easy targets for bad job offers, like temporary work, jobs with no set hours, or unpaid training.

Imagine a young person named Brian who finishes college but cannot find a good job. He ends up taking an unpaid internship and works three other low-paying jobs just to make ends meet. He is tired all the time. His boss knows Brian has no other good choices, so the boss takes advantage of Brian's situation by making him work for free.

This problem is not just about the boss; it is about the whole system. The rules and how things are set up by older generations put young people in a weak spot. This allows bosses to offer unfair jobs. It is like older groups are allowing the system to make younger groups vulnerable to bad deals.

Again, this is not about blaming individual employers. They might also be in a tough spot. But everyone, especially those with more power or who benefit from the system, has a duty to help fix these problems. They should work to make sure young people have fair job choices. If they do not, and they continue to allow unfair jobs, it is like they are using young people for their own gain.

Some might say that young people will get better jobs when they are older, so it balances out. But this is like saying it is okay to be taken advantage of now because you can do the same to others later. That is not fair. Also, for some young people, especially those who already face disadvantages like their race or gender, these job problems are even worse and can last longer. We must fix these problems and not pass them on.

Conclusion

Many countries are seeing that younger generations are facing more and more unfairness. While people talk a lot about how younger groups are worse off, there is little talk about how the choices of older groups can specifically lead to situations where younger groups are taken advantage of. This discussion has shown how older groups can either take advantage of younger groups or create situations that make it easier for others to do so. If older groups have the power to fix these problems, they should.