Two highly distinguished academics, John Wixted from the University of California, San Diego, and Gary Wells from Iowa State University, have come together to present a new synthesis of the literature on the relationship between the confidence of an eyewitness and the accuracy of that witness. The joining of these two forces will come as a surprise to many of us in the field who have seen them duke it out at professional meetings, and even more so to those who know that it even got personal in a widely circulated manuscript. It is a testament to the leadership at Psychological Science in the Public Interest that these two former adversaries could come together to produce a common product.

Seeing the manuscript brought back some old memories for one of us (Elizabeth Loftus). Back in the early 1990s, at the height of the “memory wars,” Loftus locked horns with one of the country’s leading experts in child abuse, Lucy Berliner, who routinely dealt with people in pain from being sexually victimized. Loftus, on the other hand, routinely talked with people who claimed to have been falsely accused of sexual abuse, and saw their desperation and pain. Loftus and Berliner debated the issue in numerous venues—forums that often encouraged disagreement. Then, one day, they decided to talk privately (over burgers, fries, and chardonnay) and found there was much to agree about in that sea of disagreement (Berliner & Loftus, 1992).

It is not known whether burgers, fries, or chardonnay helped Wixted and Wells come together to write this major synthesis on eyewitness confidence and accuracy, but whatever facilitated their collaboration, it has been enormously fruitful. In an earlier era, many scholars opined that the relationship between confidence and accuracy was pretty weak. In fact, nearly four decades ago, one of us summarized the relationship this way:

Although there are many studies showing that the more confident a person is in a response, the greater the likelihood that the response is accurate, some studies have shown no relationship at all between confidence and accuracy. In fact, there are even conditions under which the opposite relation exists . . . namely, people can be more confident about their wrong answers than their right ones. To be cautious, one should not take high confidence as any absolute guarantee of anything. (Loftus, 1979, p. 101)

Now come Wixted and Wells to argue a major point of agreement—namely, that when conditions are pristine, there is a strong relationship between confidence and accuracy. But when conditions are not pristine, the accuracy of even high-confidence witnesses is, in their words, “seriously compromised.” Of course, their long manuscript makes a number of other points, which they back up with thoughtful marshalling of data contributed by hundreds of scholars over the past 40 years.

Readers may rightfully wonder, what do Wixted and Wells mean by “pristine” conditions? Their article has a whole section on this issue. One example is whether the procedure used to elicit an eyewitness identification is conducted in a double-blind fashion. This means that the investigator conducting the test of witness memory does not know who the police suspect is (and neither does the witness). This is important, of course, because it means the investigator cannot inadvertently (or even deliberately) cue the witness as to the “desired” choice. Moreover, the blind investigator cannot give the witness feedback on the choice, which could artificially inflate the witness’s confidence and have other negative effects on memory.

Other examples of pristine conditions include choosing innocent fillers so that the suspect does not stand out in the lineup, providing a warning to the witness that the offender might not be in the lineup, and obtaining a confidence statement from the witness at the very time that the initial identification is made. When these conditions are not met, Wixted and Wells would argue that the procedure is not pristine, and confidence may not be a good indicator of accuracy.

The astute reader of their article would rightly wonder just how often conditions are actually pristine out there in the real world of crime and investigation. It just so happens that one of us (Rachel L. Greenspan) has been investigating this issue over the past year. In late 2011, the Police Executive Research Forum (2013) conducted a survey of eyewitness-identification procedures used by law enforcement agencies. Their large sample of agencies (N = 619), created to be a nationally representative sample of all U.S. law enforcement agencies, provided relatively recent data on what procedures are currently being used in the field. We have used these data to give a brief picture of how often pristine lineups actually occur.

Our analyses indicate that at least some of the criteria outlined by Wixted and Wells are frequently met in the real world. A great majority of agencies (83.9%) reported that witnesses identifying a suspect from a photo lineup do receive an instruction that the perpetrator may or may not be present in the lineup. Moreover, officers often give other pressure-reducing instructions, such as informing the witness that he or she does not need to make an identification (56.3%) or that the investigation will continue even without an identification (59.8%).

Most agencies (69.1%) also reported that only one suspect is allowed per lineup; however, almost 16.4% of agencies reported that more than one suspect is allowed in each photo lineup. A further 14.4% of agencies reported having no clear practice or policy on this issue. Despite a large number of agencies reporting that they allow more than one suspect per lineup, it is unknown how lineups are conducted with more than one suspect.

The Duke lacrosse case represents one well-known example of a multi-suspect lineup (Wells, Cutler, & Hasel, 2009). During the course of the investigation, the witness in this case viewed several lineups, all of which contained only members of the lacrosse team. One of the later lineups contained every member of the lacrosse team with no known-innocent fillers, essentially creating “a multiple-choice question which had no wrong answer” (Wells et al., 2009, p. 318). The innocent fillers in a lineup are an important feature for controlling for guessing on the part of the witness and thus an essential criterion in the creation of a pristine lineup. Our data show that this criterion may not be met in all lineups. Other criteria are also met less frequently. For instance, the administration of photo lineups is double-blind only about 31% of the time.

Arguably, one of the most important criteria for a pristine lineup is the documentation of the confidence statement at the time of the identification. If a highly confident witness has made a positive identification from a pristine lineup, the identification cannot be considered strong evidence in the legal system unless the confidence statement was documented. Roughly 15% of agencies do not explicitly ask witnesses for their level of confidence after they make an identification. Witness confidence is documented only 76.2% of the time for identifications and 43.9% of the time for non-identifications.

Overall, these data indicate that although some criteria for pristine identifications are commonly met in the field, there are many situations in which all the aforementioned criteria for a pristine lineup are not met. Fortunately, as Wixted and Wells state, many districts and states are moving to adopt reforms to improve eyewitness-identification procedures. This trend may be strengthened by the recent publication of the National Research Council’s (2014) report reviewing eyewitness evidence. Many of the recommendations the National Research Council proposed for law enforcement (e.g., providing witness instructions, documenting confidence, implementing double-blind lineups) mirror Wixted and Wells’s criteria for pristine lineups.

At least one interesting question remains. Out in the messy real world, we will not be able to classify particular sets of case facts as pristine or not pristine. There will be all sorts of shades of gray. What is the classification when only two or three of the criteria are met? What happens when new criteria are discovered to be critical for good practices? How do we ensure that investigators will not exaggerate the pristine-ness of the procedures, even unwittingly? Despite these concerns, it is important to emphasize that Wixted and Wells have called to our attention important new findings and significant reanalyses of earlier findings and have provoked a hugely important societal conversation.

Summary

Distinguished academics John Wixted and Gary Wells have collaboratively presented a new analysis of research regarding the connection between an eyewitness's certainty and the accuracy of that witness's memory. This collaboration is notable given past professional disagreements between the two scholars, highlighting the ability of Psychological Science in the Public Interest to bring former adversaries together for a common objective.

This situation brings to mind a past reconciliation during the "memory wars" of the early 1990s, when Elizabeth Loftus and Lucy Berliner, who held differing perspectives on sexual abuse claims, found common ground after private discussion.

It is uncertain what facilitated the collaboration between Wixted and Wells, but their joint work has proven highly productive. Previously, many experts believed the link between eyewitness confidence and accuracy was weak. An earlier summary from nearly four decades ago noted that while greater confidence often correlated with accuracy, some studies showed no relationship, and in certain situations, individuals were more confident in incorrect answers than correct ones.

Wixted and Wells now assert a significant point: a strong relationship exists between confidence and accuracy when conditions are "pristine." However, if conditions are not ideal, the accuracy of even highly confident witnesses is significantly compromised. Their comprehensive work further elaborates on these points, supported by four decades of data from numerous scholars.

Pristine Conditions for Eyewitness Identification

Readers may inquire about the definition of "pristine" conditions. The article dedicates a section to this topic. One example is the use of a double-blind procedure during an eyewitness identification test. This means the investigator conducting the test and the witness are unaware of the police suspect's identity. This prevents the investigator from inadvertently or deliberately influencing the witness's choice or providing feedback that could falsely inflate the witness's confidence or negatively affect memory.

Other examples of pristine conditions include selecting innocent individuals for the lineup so the suspect does not stand out, informing the witness that the offender might not be present in the lineup, and recording the witness's confidence level immediately after the initial identification. When these conditions are not met, Wixted and Wells argue the procedure is not pristine, and confidence may not accurately indicate accuracy.

Real-World Application of Pristine Conditions

An observant reader might question how often these pristine conditions are met in actual crime investigations. Recent research has explored this issue. A 2011 survey by the Police Executive Research Forum (2013) examined eyewitness-identification procedures used by U.S. law enforcement agencies. Data from 619 agencies, representing a national sample, provide insights into current practices.

Analyses suggest that some of Wixted and Wells's criteria are frequently met in practice. A large majority of agencies (83.9%) reported instructing witnesses identifying a suspect from a photo lineup that the perpetrator may or may not be present. Additionally, officers often provide other instructions to reduce pressure, such as informing the witness that an identification is not required (56.3%) or that the investigation will proceed even without one (59.8%).

Most agencies (69.1%) also reported allowing only one suspect per lineup. However, nearly 16.4% of agencies permitted more than one suspect in each photo lineup, and 14.4% reported no clear policy on this matter. The specifics of how lineups with multiple suspects are conducted remain unknown, despite a substantial number of agencies allowing them.

Challenges to Achieving Pristine Conditions

The Duke lacrosse case serves as a notable instance of a multi-suspect lineup. In that investigation, the witness viewed several lineups composed solely of lacrosse team members. One later lineup included every team member without any known-innocent individuals, creating a scenario where there was "no wrong answer." The inclusion of innocent fillers is crucial for controlling witness guessing and is a fundamental aspect of a pristine lineup. Data indicate this criterion may not always be met. Other criteria are also less frequently observed. For example, photo lineups are administered using a double-blind method only about 31% of the time.

A crucial criterion for a pristine lineup is the documentation of a confidence statement at the time of identification. If a highly confident witness makes a positive identification from a pristine lineup, the identification cannot be considered strong legal evidence without this documented statement. Approximately 15% of agencies do not explicitly ask witnesses for their confidence level after an identification. Witness confidence is documented only 76.2% of the time for identifications and 43.9% for non-identifications.

Future Directions and Remaining Questions

These data collectively suggest that while some criteria for pristine identifications are commonly met, many situations exist where all criteria for a pristine lineup are not fulfilled. Fortunately, as noted by Wixted and Wells, numerous districts and states are adopting reforms to enhance eyewitness-identification procedures. This trend may be further supported by the recent National Research Council’s (2014) report on eyewitness evidence, which mirrors many of Wixted and Wells's recommendations for law enforcement, such as providing witness instructions, documenting confidence, and implementing double-blind lineups.

One important question remains regarding the practical application in real-world scenarios. It will be challenging to categorize specific case facts as strictly pristine or not pristine, as various degrees of compliance will exist. How should situations be classified when only a few criteria are met? What happens when new critical practices are identified? How can investigators be ensured they will not unintentionally overstate the pristine nature of their procedures? Despite these concerns, Wixted and Wells have significantly contributed by highlighting important new findings, reanalyzing previous research, and stimulating a vital societal discussion.

Summary

Two prominent academics, John Wixted and Gary Wells, have collaborated on a new review of research concerning how an eyewitness's confidence relates to the accuracy of their identification. This collaboration is notable because the two scholars had previously disagreed publicly on this topic. The journal Psychological Science in the Public Interest facilitated their joint effort.

This new work brings to mind a past collaboration between Elizabeth Loftus and Lucy Berliner, who also held differing views on memory and abuse. Despite their initial disagreements in public forums, a private discussion helped them find common ground.

It is not known what brought Wixted and Wells together, but their collaboration on eyewitness confidence and accuracy has been very productive. In the past, many experts believed there was a weak connection between a witness's confidence and the accuracy of their testimony. Earlier, a summary of this relationship noted that while confidence often correlates with accuracy, there were also situations where no relationship existed, or even where people were more confident in wrong answers than right ones. Therefore, high confidence was not considered a definitive guarantee of accuracy.

Wixted and Wells now argue that a strong link exists between confidence and accuracy under "pristine" conditions. However, when conditions are not ideal, the accuracy of even highly confident witnesses is significantly reduced. Their extensive work presents numerous other points, supported by a careful analysis of data from many researchers over the last 40 years.

Readers may wonder what "pristine" conditions mean. The article explains this in detail. One example is the use of a double-blind procedure for eyewitness identification. This means the investigator conducting the memory test does not know who the police suspect is, and neither does the witness. This is crucial because it prevents the investigator from accidentally or intentionally influencing the witness's choice. A blind investigator also cannot provide feedback to the witness, which could falsely boost the witness's confidence and negatively affect their memory.

Other examples of pristine conditions include selecting innocent people (fillers) for a lineup so the suspect does not stand out, warning the witness that the offender might not be in the lineup, and recording the witness's confidence level at the exact moment the initial identification is made. If these conditions are not met, Wixted and Wells argue that the procedure is not pristine, and confidence may not be a reliable indicator of accuracy.

An attentive reader might question how often pristine conditions are actually met in real-world crime investigations. Rachel L. Greenspan has been researching this issue. A 2011 survey by the Police Executive Research Forum collected data from 619 law enforcement agencies, representing a national sample of U.S. agencies, on their eyewitness identification procedures. This data offers a current view of how often pristine lineups occur.

Analyses show that some of Wixted and Wells's criteria are frequently met in practice. Most agencies (83.9%) reported instructing witnesses viewing photo lineups that the perpetrator may or may not be present. Officers also often provide other instructions to reduce pressure, such as informing the witness that they do not have to make an identification (56.3%) or that the investigation will continue even without an identification (59.8%).

Most agencies (69.1%) also reported allowing only one suspect per lineup. However, nearly 16.4% of agencies reported allowing more than one suspect in each photo lineup, and another 14.4% had no clear policy on this. Even though many agencies allow multiple suspects, it is not clear how these lineups are conducted.

The Duke lacrosse case is a well-known example of a multi-suspect lineup. In that investigation, a witness viewed several lineups that only included members of the lacrosse team. One later lineup contained every team member and no innocent fillers, essentially creating a "multiple-choice question which had no wrong answer." Innocent fillers are important for preventing witness guessing and are therefore essential for a pristine lineup. Data indicate this criterion may not always be met. Other criteria are also met less often. For instance, photo lineups are administered double-blind only about 31% of the time.

One of the most critical criteria for a pristine lineup is documenting the confidence statement at the time of identification. If a highly confident witness makes a positive identification from a pristine lineup, this identification cannot be considered strong legal evidence unless the confidence statement was recorded. Approximately 15% of agencies do not explicitly ask witnesses for their confidence level after an identification. Witness confidence is documented only 76.2% of the time for identifications and 43.9% of the time for non-identifications.

Overall, these data suggest that while some criteria for pristine identifications are often met in practice, there are many situations where all criteria for a pristine lineup are not. Fortunately, as Wixted and Wells point out, many jurisdictions are adopting reforms to improve eyewitness-identification procedures. This trend may be strengthened by the recent National Research Council report reviewing eyewitness evidence. Many of the Council's recommendations for law enforcement, such as providing witness instructions, documenting confidence, and implementing double-blind lineups, align with Wixted and Wells's criteria for pristine lineups.

An interesting question remains: In the complex real world, it may be difficult to categorize specific case facts as strictly pristine or not. There will likely be many gray areas. How should cases be classified if only some criteria are met? What happens when new critical practices are identified? How can one ensure investigators do not, even unintentionally, overstate the pristine nature of their procedures? Despite these concerns, Wixted and Wells have highlighted significant new findings and re-analyses, sparking an important societal discussion.

Summary

Two respected academics, John Wixted and Gary Wells, have written a new paper about how confident an eyewitness is and how accurate their memory turns out to be. Their collaboration is notable because they were previously in disagreement on these issues. This collaboration highlights how professionals can come together to produce valuable work despite past differences.

One of the authors, Elizabeth Loftus, recalled a similar experience in the 1990s. During a period called the “memory wars,” she had disagreements with Lucy Berliner, an expert in child abuse cases. They often debated in public, but eventually, they met privately and discovered many areas where they could agree.

It is not known how Wixted and Wells came to work together, but their collaboration has been very successful. In the past, many experts thought there was a weak connection between a witness's confidence and the accuracy of their memory. Some believed that confidence was not a reliable indicator, and sometimes people were even more confident about wrong answers than right ones.

However, Wixted and Wells now argue that there is a strong link between confidence and accuracy when certain conditions, which they call “pristine,” are met. If these conditions are not met, they state that even highly confident witnesses may not be accurate. Their long paper supports these claims with extensive data from many researchers over the last 40 years.

Readers may wonder what “pristine conditions” mean. The authors explain that one important example is a "double-blind" procedure for eyewitness identification. This means that the person conducting the memory test does not know who the police suspect is, and neither does the witness. This prevents the investigator from accidentally or intentionally guiding the witness toward a certain choice or influencing their confidence.

Other examples of pristine conditions include using innocent people in a lineup so the suspect does not stand out, warning the witness that the offender might not be in the lineup, and recording the witness's confidence level at the exact moment they make an initial identification. If these conditions are not followed, Wixted and Wells argue the procedure is not pristine, and confidence may not accurately reflect memory.

One of the authors, Rachel L. Greenspan, has been studying how often these pristine conditions are met in real police investigations. A 2011 survey of law enforcement agencies provided data on their eyewitness identification procedures. This data offers insight into how often pristine lineups actually occur.

The analysis shows that some of Wixted and Wells's criteria are frequently met. For example, most agencies (83.9%) tell witnesses looking at photo lineups that the perpetrator may or may not be present. Officers also often give instructions to reduce pressure, such as telling the witness they do not have to make an identification (56.3%) or that the investigation will continue even without one (59.8%).

Most agencies (69.1%) reported that they only allow one suspect per lineup. However, nearly 16.4% of agencies allow more than one suspect in each photo lineup, and another 14.4% have no clear policy on this. It is unclear how lineups with multiple suspects are conducted.

The Duke lacrosse case is a well-known example of a multi-suspect lineup. In that investigation, a witness viewed several lineups that only included members of the lacrosse team. One lineup included every team member and no innocent fillers. This made it like a multiple-choice question without a wrong answer. Innocent fillers are crucial for preventing guessing and creating a pristine lineup. The data suggest this criterion may not always be met. Other criteria are also met less often; for instance, photo lineups are double-blind only about 31% of the time.

One of the most critical criteria for a pristine lineup is documenting the witness's confidence level at the time of identification. If a very confident witness identifies someone from a pristine lineup, this identification is not strong legal evidence unless their confidence statement was recorded. Approximately 15% of agencies do not explicitly ask witnesses about their confidence after an identification. Witness confidence is documented only 76.2% of the time for identifications and 43.9% of the time for non-identifications.

Overall, the data show that while some conditions for pristine identifications are often met, there are many situations where all criteria are not. Fortunately, many police districts and states are adopting reforms to improve eyewitness identification procedures, a trend that may be supported by a recent report from the National Research Council. Many of the Council's recommendations, such as providing witness instructions, documenting confidence, and using double-blind lineups, align with Wixted and Wells's criteria for pristine lineups.

One question remains: in real-world situations, it will be hard to simply label cases as "pristine" or "not pristine." There will be many situations where only some criteria are met. It is also important to consider what happens if new critical practices are discovered and how to ensure investigators do not exaggerate the "pristine" nature of their procedures. Despite these concerns, Wixted and Wells have brought important new findings and analyses to light, sparking a vital public discussion.

Summary

Two well-known experts, John Wixted and Gary Wells, have written about how sure an eyewitness is about what they saw and how correct that memory is. It might surprise some people that these two experts, who used to disagree, are now working together. Their work shows that when things are done perfectly, what an eyewitness is sure about matches what really happened.

One of the writers of this summary also had a similar experience. Elizabeth Loftus used to disagree with another expert, Lucy Berliner, about child abuse cases. They talked it over and found they actually agreed on many things.

It is not known how Wixted and Wells came to agree, but their work is very important. Many years ago, some experts thought that how sure a person was about what they saw did not always mean they were correct. They even thought that sometimes people could be very sure about wrong answers.

However, Wixted and Wells now say that if conditions are very good, there is a strong link between how confident an eyewitness is and how accurate their memory is. But if conditions are not perfect, even a very confident witness might not be correct. They share many other points in their long paper, using information from many researchers over 40 years.

People might wonder what "perfect conditions" mean. The experts explain that one example is when the person asking the witness questions does not know who the police think the suspect is. This helps make sure the person asking questions does not accidentally give clues to the witness. Also, the person asking questions should not tell the witness if their choice was right, as this can make the witness feel more sure, even if they are wrong.

Other perfect conditions include making sure the suspect does not stand out in a lineup of people. Also, the witness should be told that the person who committed the crime might not be in the lineup. Most importantly, the witness's level of certainty should be written down right after they pick someone. If these conditions are not met, Wixted and Wells say that being sure does not mean being correct.

One of the writers of this summary, Rachel L. Greenspan, has been looking into how often these perfect conditions happen in real crime cases. A study in 2011 checked how police agencies handle eyewitness cases. This study looked at many police groups across the country.

The study found that some of Wixted and Wells's perfect conditions are often met. Most police groups (83.9%) tell witnesses that the person who committed the crime might not be in the photo lineup. Many also tell witnesses they do not have to pick anyone (56.3%) or that the police will keep investigating even if no one is picked (59.8%).

Most police groups (69.1%) also only put one suspect in a lineup. But about 16.4% of groups allow more than one suspect in a photo lineup. Another 14.4% do not have clear rules on this. It is not known how lineups are done when there is more than one suspect.

The Duke lacrosse case is an example where many suspects were in a lineup. The witness in that case saw several lineups with only members of the lacrosse team. One lineup had every team member and no innocent people who were clearly not the suspect. This was like a multiple-choice test with no wrong answer. Having innocent people in a lineup is important so that the witness does not just guess. The study shows that this rule might not always be followed. Other rules are also not always followed. For example, asking questions about photo lineups "blindly" (where the questioner does not know the suspect) only happens about 31% of the time.

One of the most important rules for a perfect lineup is writing down how sure the witness is at the time they pick someone. If a very sure witness picks someone from a perfect lineup, this choice is not strong proof in court unless their confidence was written down. About 15% of police groups do not clearly ask witnesses how sure they are after they pick someone. The witness's confidence is written down only 76.2% of the time when someone is picked, and 43.9% of the time when no one is picked.

These findings show that while some rules for perfect eyewitness choices are often followed, there are many times when all the rules are not met. Luckily, Wixted and Wells say that many areas are making changes to improve how eyewitnesses are handled. A recent report from the National Research Council also suggests similar improvements.

One question remains: in real life, it will be hard to say if a case is perfectly handled or not. There will be many situations where only some rules are followed. What happens if only a few rules are met? What if new important rules are found? How can we make sure police do not say procedures were perfect when they were not? Even with these questions, Wixted and Wells have shared important new ideas and made people think more about this topic.