INTRODUCTION

Hope is a crushed stalk

Between clenched fingers.

Hope is a bird’s wing

Broken by a stone. . . .

Hope is a song in a weary throat.

Give me a song of hope

And a world where I can sing it.

--Pauli Murray¹

Passionate dissents filled with dismay, sorrow, and even poems of hope, may appear more commonplace today than in years past.² Even so, Justice Yu’s dissent and the Washington Supreme Court’s majority opinion in State v. Anderson are remarkable.³ The majority in Anderson, upholding a sixty-one-year sentence for a seventeen-year-old, marks a stark reversal in the court’s juvenile sentencing jurisprudence, particularly where the constitutionality of de facto life and long sentences for children are concerned.⁴ While the majority maintains that these harsh sentences should be permissible for “rare children whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption,”⁵ Justice Yu’s emphasis on implicit racial bias, disparate racial outcomes, and neurobiological developmental differences between young people and adults is as forceful as it is well reasoned.⁶

Importantly, Justice Yu’s dissent in Anderson does not shy away from the racial undertones and implications of the decision.⁷ Unlike the defendants in two strikingly similar cases involving de facto life sentences imposed on juveniles, Mr. Anderson is Black.⁸ While Justice Yu does “not suggest that the majority is knowingly or intentionally discriminating against Anderson on the basis of his race,” the fact of Mr. Anderon’s race and the characterization of his actions as more culpable than his white counterparts cannot be merely glossed over or discounted.⁹

Justice Yu expresses concern over the role that unconscious bias, including the “adultification” bias against young men of color, may have impacted the original sentencing record and the resentencing court’s characterization of Mr. Anderson’s actions.¹⁰ For instance, the court viewed Mr. Anderson living alone at age seventeen as evidence of his maturity and increased culpability, rather than as a mitigating factor indicating the “extraordinarily harsh environment” of Mr. Anderson’s unstable upbringing.¹¹ In relying on this and other problematic characterizations in the original sentencing record, Justice Yu asserts that the majority’s decision perpetuates “the shameful legacy” the judiciary inherits “in devaluing [B]lack lives.”¹² Given Anderson’s narrow margin, it is unclear whether it marks a dark new chapter in the court’s youth sentencing jurisprudence or is merely an aberration from a larger national trend against imposing our harshest sentences on children and young offenders.¹³

This Note begins with an examination of the larger context of the constitutionality of harsh sentences applied to juveniles under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Next, it addresses the scientific consensus on juvenile brain development underpinning the United States Supreme Court’s reasoning in groundbreaking decisions on juvenile sentencing from the Court in the early 2000s. Next, the Note compares Washington’s approach to harsh juvenile sentences with the approaches of various jurisdictions throughout the United States, ultimately culminating in Anderson. Finally, this Note concludes by recommending that the Washington Supreme Court overturn Anderson and categorically ban de facto life sentences for all juveniles and young adults up to age twenty five, or that the Washington State Legislature enact a law effectuating the same result.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Constitutionality of Long Sentences for Young Offenders

While Anderson stands out among other cases in Washington’s juvenile sentencing jurisprudence, it does so primarily due to the consistent national trend against imposing harsh sentences on young offenders.¹⁴ This trend began in 2012 when the United States Supreme Court held in Miller v. Alabama that mandatory life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) sentences for juveniles categorically violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments.¹⁵ Less than four years later, the court in Montgomery v. Louisiana held that its decision in Miller was retroactive, and applied to persons sentenced to mandatory LWOP for crimes committed while the offender was a juvenile.¹⁶ Miller, as noted in Montgomery, announced a new substantive constitutional standard for juvenile sentencing. Following these landmark Supreme Court cases, states across the country passed remedial statutes implementing this new rule of law.¹⁷ While Washington was among those states, the Washington Supreme Court went further.

In both State v. Bassett and State v. Haag, the Washington Supreme Court held that LWOP and de facto life sentences are unconstitutional when imposed on juveniles under both the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Washington State Constitution’s prohibition against cruel punishment.¹⁸ The court, however, left several questions undecided, including what length of sentence is allowed before it violates Miller, and what level of cruelty to a child is permissible before it violates the Eighth Amendment.

In the wake of Miller, other courts have also reasoned that if it is categorically unconstitutional to sentence a minor to LWOP, then even sentences shorter than “true life” could be unconstitutional as the “practical equivalent of life without parole.”¹⁹ Much of the reasoning at the core of Miller related to recent developments in the scientific understanding of juvenile brain development.²⁰ Specifically, the United States Supreme Court highlighted the ever-growing scientific consensus in psychological and medical communities that juveniles categorically possess diminished executive functioning and behavioral control when compared with adults.²¹ The brain differences between adolescents and adults lead the Court to conclude that juvenile offenders possess “diminished moral culpability” such that subjecting them to die in prison without a meaningful opportunity for release is unconstitutional regardless of their crime.²² A further discussion of the impact of the scientific consensus on youth brain development follows later in this Note.

B. Scientific Consensus on Juvenile Brain Development

One need not be a neuroscientist or academic researcher in the field of developmental psychology to understand that children behave differently from mature adults. However, this collective understanding has been further substantiated in the academic literature in recent decades. As neuroimaging methods have grown in prevalence and advanced in their imaging precision, scientists have identified structural and functional differences between the brains of youths and adults.²³ Particularly notable are differences in the prefrontal cortex—the brain region primarily associated with inhibitory control and rational decision-making processes.²⁴

Additional studies have consistently found that youths are more immature, malleable, and vulnerable to external influences than adults.²⁵ Studies examining the neural circuitry of youth and adult brains have shown that developing brains are fundamentally less able to control their behavior than mature adult brains.²⁶ This reduction in inhibitory control further illustrates that youths have a lesser capacity for mature and reasoned judgment.²⁷ Behavioral research also supports these studies’ conclusions, showing that “adolescents are overrepresented statistically in virtually every category of reckless behavior.”²⁸

Youths are also more susceptible to environmental influences, particularly the influence of their peer groups.²⁹ Similarly, youths’ malleable identities during the developmental stages up to age twenty-five substantially increase their capacity for rehabilitation.³⁰ For example, youth intervention and juvenile diversion programs have been shown to have a greater effect on reducing recidivism for young people when compared to traditional correctional settings in large part due to the developmental qualities shared by youths.³¹

Courts throughout the United States have been criticized for their delayed recognition of scientific consensus in a variety of fields, and even Chief Justice Roberts famously called gerrymandering data “sociological gobbledygook.”³² It is therefore unsurprising that the United States Supreme Court only began recognizing the impact of juvenile brain development research on the constitutionality of harsh criminal sentences in the early 2000s.³³ The well-established body of juvenile brain development research underpinning these rulings³⁴ and research indicating racial disparities in sentencing in Washington³⁵ may strengthen arguments for overturning Anderson and even for extending resentencing hearings to offenders convicted of crimes before age twenty-five.

C. Application of Youth Brain Development Research in Assessing the Constitutionality of Harsh Sentences

The Court first recognized the importance of juvenile brain development in criminal sentencing in 2005 in Roper v. Simmons, when it held that sentencing juvenile offenders to death was unconstitutional.³⁶ The Court in Roper based its decision on the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments, holding that the amendment “guarantees individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions.”³⁷ Further, that prohibition against disproportionate punishments “flows from the basic ‘precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.’” ³⁸

Just five years later, in Graham v. Florida, the court held that imposing a sentence of LWOP was unconstitutional when applied to a juvenile convicted of a nonhomicide offense.³⁹ The Court in Graham recognized the strong and uniform scientific, neuropsychological and medical consensus showing fundamental differences in behavior control between adolescent and adult minds.⁴⁰

In 2012’s Miller v. Alabama, the Court extended Graham’s rule, holding that life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is unconstitutional when applied to juveniles.⁴¹ The Supreme Court listed a number of factors—now known as the Miller factors—respecting the attendant characteristics of youth that courts must now consider when sentencing juveniles who commit serious crimes.⁴² These factors include immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks. As well as the family and home environment of the offender, the circumstances of the offense, including the influence of familial and peer pressures on the offender, the possibility that incompetence associated with youth may have influenced the conviction, and the offender’s possibility of rehabilitation.⁴³ In Washington, trial courts involved in “Miller-fix” resentencing hearings for offenders sentenced to LWOP as juveniles may not disregard these mitigating factors stemming from the offender’s youth in favor of applying retributive factors.⁴⁴

The Court in Montgomery, Miller, Graham, and Roper held our harshest criminal punishments unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments.⁴⁵ The reasoning in these decisions reflects and embraces the scientific consensus that “children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.”⁴⁶ The Court in Miller synthesized principles from Roper and Graham and again recognized the scientific consensus on juvenile brain development.⁴⁷ In its reasoning, the Court identified three arenas in which children differ from adults.⁴⁸ First, juveniles “‘lack . . . maturity and [possess] an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,’ leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking.”⁴⁹ Second, juveniles “are more vulnerable . . . to negative influences and outside pressures,” have limited “contro[l] over their own environment,” and are unable to leave environments that breed violence and crime.⁵⁰ Finally, the Miller court notes that juveniles’ characters are not fully formed, and the character traits seemingly exemplified by a juvenile’s actions are less likely to be “evidence of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].”⁵¹ These differences illustrate that no action by a juvenile, even a heinous one, can be as morally reprehensible as if the same act was committed by a fully developed adult.⁵²

The court’s reasoning is not only based on respected, rigorous, peer-reviewed scientific research on the brain development of youths but also on common sense.⁵³ As it stated, “[a]ny parent knows” that children, even seventeen-year-old children, are fundamentally different from fully mature adults.⁵⁴ Miller, in referencing Graham, identified that LWOP sentences “share some characteristics with death sentences that are shared by no other sentences.”⁵⁵

Miller, as extended retroactively in Montgomery, required that states provide offenders sentenced to LWOP as juveniles “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”⁵⁶ It also held that trial courts sentencing juvenile offenders must “take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.”⁵⁷ These requirements became the Miller-fix resentencing hearings at issue in cases like Anderson.

Yet simultaneously, and perhaps contradictorily, the Miller Court held that the harshest sentences may be appropriate for the “rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.”⁵⁸ The Miller Court grants sentencing courts discretion in determining what constitutes “irreparable corruption,” so long as sentencing courts account—at least ostensibly—for the mitigating factors of the offender’s youth.⁵⁹ Additionally, the Miller Court notes that such occasions should be uncommon because of the practical challenges in distinguishing between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects transient immaturity and the offender who is incorrigible and cannot be rehabilitated.⁶⁰

This difficulty calls into question the very reasoning for including an exception for supposedly irredeemable juvenile offenders. For if, after several decades of incarceration, an offender shows evidence of reform, remorse, and rehabilitation, then the juvenile offender could not have been irredeemable, regardless of what the sentencing judge thought at the time that the offender was sentenced. Thus, even in the United States Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, tension persists relating to the very concept of an irredeemable youth offender. This tension is exacerbated by the fact that evidence of actual rehabilitation, if or when it occurs, contradicts the very premise justifying the exception in the first place.

Some have argued that term-of-years sentences prevent states “from making the judgment at the outset that those offenders never will be fit to reenter society,” which is consistent with the Eighth Amendment.⁶¹ But a term-of-years sentence that grants a juvenile offender the opportunity to reenter society at eighty years old—as in Anderson—shares a similar problem as true LWOP sentences, where juvenile offenders are irrevocably judged at the outset. In these de facto life sentences, no matter the work the juvenile offender does in prison, they are denied a meaningful opportunity for release.

D. Multi-State Responses to Long Juvenile Sentences After Miller

As discussed earlier in this Note, Montgomery clarified that Miller did not merely announce a standard for new juvenile sentences; it retroactively applied it to offenders already serving LWOP sentences for crimes committed as children. This development forced states to consider how to apply Montgomery to juvenile offenders already incarcerated. While each state developed standards for approaching these Miller-fix resentencing hearings, responses have varied across the United States. For instance, in 2015, the Supreme Court of Connecticut, for similar reasons as those articulated in Haag, held that a fifty-year term-of-years sentence for a juvenile was an unconstitutional de facto life sentence under Miller.⁶² New Jersey came to the same conclusion regarding a fifty-five-year sentence,⁶³ as did Iowa with a fifty-two-year sentence,⁶⁴ and Wyoming with a forty-five-year sentence.⁶⁵ By upholding a sixty-one-year sentence in Anderson, Washington has become an outlier.⁶⁶

1. Juvenile Sentencing Measures in Various States

California grappled with the Miller requirements in People v. Contreras.⁶⁷ In that case, the California Supreme Court remanded both a fifty and fifty-eight-year sentence for resentencing consistent with Miller.⁶⁸ In doing so, the court clarified that harsh sentences applied to juvenile offenders do not need to exceed an offender’s life expectancy to unconstitutionally deprive the offender of a meaningful opportunity for release based on demonstrated rehabilitation and maturity.⁶⁹ The California legislature later eliminated LWOP sentences for juveniles and now permits parole eligibility or sentence modification after twenty-five years.⁷⁰ Additionally, in 2017, the California legislature extended parole eligibility to incarcerated persons who committed offenses before age twenty-five such that this class of offenders would be eligible for parole after serving fifteen years.⁷¹

Similarly, the Oregon State Legislature eliminated juvenile LWOP in 2019, providing for parole eligibility after serving fifteen years for offenders who committed crimes before age eighteen.⁷² During the required parole hearing, the presiding parole board must consider the Miller factors, and give substantial weight “to the fact that a person under 18 years of age is incapable of the same reasoning and impulse control as an adult and the diminished culpability of minors as compared to that of adults.”⁷³ The board at this hearing must also consider the offender’s family and community circumstances at the time of the offense; any potential history of abuse or trauma; potential involvement in the juvenile dependency system; and the offender’s demonstrated emotional growth, maturity, and participation in rehabilitative and educational programs while in custody.⁷⁴

While California, Oregon, and other western jurisdictions may be particularly noteworthy to policymakers in Washington, across the United States, other states have varied greatly in their approaches to juvenile life sentences. Interestingly, many nonwestern and even historically conservative states provide young offenders with the opportunity for parole after serving fifteen to twenty-five years, even if the sentence is for the most serious categories of crime.

After Miller, some states moved to provide parole eligibility for juveniles after serving fifteen to twenty-five years. For instance, West Virginia not only eliminated LWOP but also passed new sentencing guidelines providing parole eligibility for persons convicted of offenses as juveniles after serving fifteen years.⁷⁵ Washington D.C. amended its sentencing guidelines to provide juveniles serving harsh sentences with a mechanism for achieving sentence modification after serving fifteen years.⁷⁶ North Dakota adopted a similar mechanism for sentence modification after serving twenty years.⁷⁷ Nevada’s maximum sentence for juveniles is currently a sentence of life with parole, and the statute’s retroactive provision provides that juveniles are eligible for parole after fifteen years for nonhomicide offenses or twenty years for homicide offenses involving one victim.⁷⁸ Finally, Wyoming’s penalty for first-degree murder committed by a juvenile is life with parole after serving twenty-five years.⁷⁹

Other states, like Arkansas, adopted maximum sentences for juveniles guilty of capital murder with parole eligibility after serving thirty years, and after twenty-five or twenty years for first-degree murder and non-homicide offenses respectively.⁸⁰ Delaware took a similar approach allowing offenders incarcerated for offenses committed as juveniles to petition for sentence modification after serving thirty years in first-degree murder cases and after serving twenty years in all other cases.⁸¹ Connecticut took a more specific approach and adjusted its statutes to provide that those sentenced to more than fifty years are eligible for parole after serving thirty years.⁸² Massachusetts’ penalty for first-degree murder committed by a juvenile is life with the possibility of parole between twenty and thirty years depending on the nature of the offense.⁸³ A New Jersey statute provides that juveniles convicted of murder may receive either a sentence of thirty years without the possibility of parole or a term-of-years sentence between thirty years and life, with eligibility for parole after serving thirty years.⁸⁴

Yet other states have adopted harsh laws that provide for parole eligibility only after serving between thirty-five and fifty years. In Vermont, the maximum sentence for a juvenile convicted of first-degree murder is a sentence of thirty-five years-to-life, with parole eligibility after thirty-five years.⁸⁵ Colorado state law allows juveniles convicted of Class 1 felonies parole eligibility after serving forty years, minus earned time, which may add up to 25% of the sentence.⁸⁶ Texas is also on the high end of states, where juveniles convicted of capital and first-degree felonies may receive life with the possibility of parole after serving forty years.⁸⁷

2. Juvenile LWOP Resentencing in Washington

Before Bassett, Washington provided parole eligibility after serving a sentence of twenty years to most juvenile offenders,⁸⁸ and after twentyfive years to youth under age sixteen convicted of aggravated first-degree murder.⁸⁹ Washington’s Constitution prohibits cruel punishments, leading to challenges based on state as well as federal constitutional grounds.⁹⁰ In Washington, punishments may be unconstitutionally cruel when they are “disproportionate to the seriousness of [the] crimes.”⁹¹ Advocates for youth sentencing reform typically echo arguments made on the national level in cases like Roper, Graham, and Miller: due to the immaturity of the prefrontal cortex of the brain, young offenders are less culpable than their adult counterparts, and as a corollary, the harshest punishments can never be proportionate to the crime the young offender may have committed.⁹²

Until 2022, the Washington Supreme Court largely agreed.⁹³ In State v. Ramos, the Washington Supreme Court applied Miller to an eighty-year aggregate term-of-years sentence, explaining that Miller applies anytime a juvenile offender might be sentenced to die in prison without a meaningful opportunity for early release based on rehabilitation, whether the sentence is for a single crime or an aggregate sentence for multiple crimes.⁹⁴ Specifically, “standard range consecutive sentencing may, and in this case did, result in a total prison term exceeding the average human life-span— that is, a de facto life sentence.”⁹⁵ One year later, in Bassett, the court held that the United States Supreme Court’s reasoning in Miller applies not only to LWOP sentences, but also to de facto juvenile life sentences, striking down part of Washington’s Miller-fix statute that permitted such sentences.⁹⁶

Today, juveniles sentenced to more than twenty years in prison generally have the opportunity to petition Washington’s Indeterminate Sentence Review Board (ISRB) for early release after having served at least twenty years.⁹⁷ If the incarcerated individual’s petition for early release is denied, that individual may file a new petition for release five years from the date of the denial or at an earlier date set by the ISRB.⁹⁸ Early release is presumed unless the ISRB determines by a preponderance of the evidence that it is more likely than not that the individual will reoffend.⁹⁹

The Washington Supreme Court has also held that laws preventing courts from adequately weighing the mitigating qualities of a defendant’s youth are unconstitutional.¹⁰⁰ Courts must consider the mitigating circumstances of youth even when sentencing juveniles adjudicated as adults because “children are different.”¹⁰¹ The Washington Supreme Court later affirmed its requirement that sentencing courts consider a juvenile defendant’s youthfulness when it announced a new constitutional rule that applies retroactively.¹⁰² However, Washington courts continue to grapple with when a long-term-of-years sentence constitutes an unconstitutional de facto juvenile life sentence under Bassett and Ramos. For example, in State v. Delbosque, the Washington Supreme Court declined to address whether a forty-eight year sentence imposed at a Miller-fix resentencing was a de facto life sentence because the issue was not properly raised, it nevertheless remanded the case for resentencing, noting that the sentencing court believed it to be a life sentence.¹⁰³

The following year in Monschke, the Washington Supreme Court held that the state constitution prohibited mandatory LWOP sentences for offenders convicted of aggravated murder who were nineteen and twenty years old at the time of the offense.¹⁰⁴ The court stated that the “neurobiological maturity of an individual adolescent” impacts the constitutionality of imposing mandatory LWOP sentences for offenders over age eighteen, and recognized that the mitigating qualities of youth are relevant for young adults as well.¹⁰⁵ While the court emphasized the importance of individualized sentencing, it relied on cognitive differences between young people and fully developed adults, stating, “just as courts must exercise discretion before sentencing a 17-year-old to die in prison, so must they exercise the same discretion when sentencing an 18-, 19-, or 20-year-old.”¹⁰⁶ So just because individuals gain legal rights at the ripe age of eighteen and later on at twenty-one, it does not necessarily follow that they should be subjected to harsh LWOP sentences.

Later in 2021, the court decided Haag, holding that a forty-six-year sentence was an unconstitutional de facto life sentence and that in Millerfix resentencing proceedings, trial courts must place greater emphasis on mitigation rather than retribution.¹⁰⁷ In deciding Haag, the court found persuasive the approaches taken by sister states, holding that term-of-years sentences in the forty-five to fifty-five year range constituted the “functional equivalent of life without parole” and that the promise of Miller is that juvenile offenders have “a meaningful opportunity to rejoin society after leaving prison.”¹⁰⁸ The court further discussed the higher mortality rate and shorter life expectancy for incarcerated persons.¹⁰⁹ With these considerations in mind, the court noted releasing Mr. Haag from confinement at age sixty-three deprives him of a meaningful life.¹¹⁰ Yet, even Haag left unaddressed the question of the “rare juvenile offender[s] whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.”¹¹¹

The summer of 2022 resulted in a marked shift from the court’s consistent trend of greater leniency toward young offenders. In Kennedy, the court upheld a thirty-one-year sentence (an extraordinary upward sentence from the high end of the standard range of twenty-six years) imposed on a nineteen-year-old because brain-development research illustrating the mitigating qualities of youth was not novel and may have been considered at the time of the defendant’s original sentencing.¹¹² Relying on similar reasoning, the court rejected a challenge to a sixty-four-year sentence imposed on a twenty-one-year-old, refusing to extend its holding in Monschke beyond age twenty.¹¹³ The 2022 term culminated in Anderson, which, as this Note has already discussed, upheld a de facto life sentence of sixty-one years for a seventeen-year-old.¹¹⁴

II. THE FUTURE OF DE FACTO LIFE SENTENCES FOR JUVENILES AND YOUNG ADULTS IN WASHINGTON

Anderson may have reopened the door to de facto life sentences for juveniles whose crimes do not reflect the mitigating qualities of youth, but these harsh sentences remain ripe for future challenges either through the courts or the legislature. While ever fewer Miller-fix resentencing hearings will be brought in coming years, Anderson leaves the future of harsh sentences for juvenile offenders unclear, at least for those found guilty of serious crimes.

By narrowing the holding in Haag, permitting the imposition of de facto life sentences only on juvenile offenders whose crimes do not reflect the mitigating qualities of youth, the Washington Supreme Court widens an exception for “incorrigible” youth, which even Miller, Graham, and Roper note should rarely be applied.¹¹⁵ The Anderson majority argues that it distinguishes Haag and true LWOP cases because term-of-year sentences “are not inherently harsher” for young offenders.¹¹⁶ Honing in on its precedent, the majority also distinguishes Bassett—arguing that not all juvenile offenders, at least those “whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption,” deserve an opportunity for release.¹¹⁷ In distinguishing Haag to such a degree, the Anderson majority makes clear that sentences far longer than Mr. Haag’s forty-six-year sentence may properly be imposed on juvenile offenders, but only if the sentencing court determines that the mitigating qualities of youth (the Miller factors) do not apply to the offender in question.¹¹⁸

A. Increased Imposition of De Facto Life Sentences on Juveniles

Anderson may lead to the imposition of more de facto life sentences for juvenile offenders. If a sentencing court explains why it believes that the circumstances of a juvenile offender’s crime do not adequately reflect youthful immaturity, impetuosity, or failure to appreciate risks and consequences, then that court appears free to sentence that juvenile to die in prison. The level of consideration the sentencing court must give these factors remains unclear, and mere lip service may be insufficient, but the Anderson majority makes clear that sentencing courts “must also consider the facts of the particular case, including those that counsel in favor of punishment.”¹¹⁹ Under the abuse of discretion standard or misapplication of the law standard for reversing sentencing court decisions,¹²⁰ juvenile offenders may face barriers in challenging de facto life sentences in the future.

Additionally, the very concept of an irredeemable juvenile offender may rely on the flawed premise that some juveniles are irredeemable “super-predators.”¹²¹ Even if one accepts the premise that some juvenile offenders cannot be rehabilitated, surely evidence of actual rehabilitation and reform while in prison would prove that a sentencing court was incorrect in its assessment of a juvenile offender’s redeemability.¹²² After all, even the United States Supreme Court has recognized that “incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth.”¹²³

B. Other Potential Directions in De Facto Life Sentence Jurisprudence for Young Offenders after Anderson

Alternatively, the imposition of de facto life sentences on juveniles could remain an infrequent occurrence, and sentencing courts may only rarely rely on Anderson to impose such harsh sentences on young offenders. As Justice Yu points out in her dissent in Anderson, a sentencing judge’s characterization of facts relating to the circumstances of the crime, in particular the relevant offender’s youthfulness, is highly subjective and is likely to be impacted by unconscious biases.¹²⁴ But this inherent subjectivity could cut in the other direction. Sentencing courts may become more aware of the developmental neuroscience research and follow Washington’s earlier trend against imposing excessively harsh sentences on juvenile and young offenders, even those convicted of serious crimes.¹²⁵

Several other future directions are also possible. First, the Washington Supreme Court could simply overturn Anderson, a case decided by a narrow margin of 5–4,¹²⁶ and hold that a categorical ban on de facto life sentences applies to juveniles and adolescents up to age twenty-five to be consistent with brain development research.¹²⁷ The United States Supreme Court could also issue that same ruling, extending Miller nationwide. Though, this is perhaps unlikely given the ideological composition of the United States Supreme Court as of early 2023.¹²⁸

Alternatively, the Washington State Legislature could pass sentencing legislation to eliminate de facto life sentences for juvenile and young adult offenders. While no current legislation before the Washington State Legislature responds directly to harsh juvenile sentences like those at issue in Anderson, several bills modernizing sentencing for juveniles and emerging adults have been proposed. For instance, Washington H.B. 1325 aims to modernize sentencing for persons incarcerated as young adults by increasing the age for sentence review consideration from eighteen to twenty-five, in recognition of developmental brain science and racial justice.¹²⁹ While H.B. 1325 and its companion bill, S.B. 5451, did not progress during the 2023 spring legislative session, similar bills may pass in the future.¹³⁰

If Washington ultimately shifts from its position on juvenile sentencing in Anderson, the persuasive use of scientific data will likely be central to this change. The Washington Supreme Court has found scientific data about racially disparate impact persuasive in its criminal punishment jurisprudence in the past, notably in State v. Gregory, the 2018 case that ended the death penalty in Washington.¹³¹ Central to the court’s decision in Gregory was the “Beckett Report” which found, along with significant variations by county, that “[B]lack defendants were four and a half times more likely to be sentenced to death than similarly situated white defendants.”¹³² Perhaps similar scientific research into the racially disparate application of de facto life sentences on youths of color, if available, could persuade the court in the future.

III. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Washington Should Eliminate De Facto Life Sentences for Offenders Under Twenty-Five Years Old

As a policy matter, the Washington State Legislature or the Washington Supreme Court should consider prohibiting de facto life sentences for juveniles and young offenders up to age twenty-five. Crimes committed by young offenders inherently and inescapably reflect the mitigating qualities of youth because they were committed by young people. Decades of robust and reliable brain development research indicates that offenders younger than age twenty-five lack full structural development in brain areas involved in decision-making and impulse control. This research supports the conclusion that young offenders are categorically less culpable than older offenders,¹³³ supporting the conclusion that harsh sentences applied to youth cannot be proportional as required by the Washington and United States Constitution’s respective prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment.

Even well-intentioned sentencing judges lack the capacity and diagnostic expertise to consistently predict which young offenders will be capable of reform and rehabilitation,¹³⁴ so the better course is to limit excessively long sentences and reevaluate future risk and rehabilitation after a reasonable time. Such an assessment could occur at fixed intervals, such as every five years, or could be tied to the completion of rehabilitationfocused programming within a correctional setting. Additionally, clinical professionals, while perhaps better situated than judges are for assessing psychological and neurological development, are also unable to perfectly predict the paths that a person’s life will take. The Washington Supreme Court has previously stated that “no clear line exists between childhood and adulthood,”¹³⁵ holding that Miller’s constitutional guarantee of an individualized sentence that considers the mitigating qualities of youth must apply to defendants at least under age twenty-one. In another opinion, it recognized the “fundamental differences between adolescent and mature brains” as support for finding diminished culpability for young offenders older than eighteen.¹³⁶

Of course, some may state that age twenty-five is just as arbitrary a number as eighteen and that individual differences in human brain development are irregular and uncertain, justifying a more individualized approach to assessing culpability. Indeed, even the United States Supreme Court in Roper recognized that eighteen is an arbitrary number when holding that juvenile offenders may not be subjected to the death penalty.¹³⁷

Drawing the line at 18 years of age is subject, of course, to the objections always raised against categorical rules. The qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual turns 18. By the same token, some under 18 have already attained a level of maturity some adults will never reach. For the reasons we have discussed, however, a line must be drawn . . . The age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood. It is, we conclude, the age at which the line for death eligibility ought to rest.¹³⁸

If we must subject any member of our society to spend their lives and ultimately die in prison, those persons should only be those most clearly culpable for the actions that put them there. While our society recognizes age eighteen as the age of adulthood, brain development research is clear that young brains continue to experience immaturity into their early twenties,¹³⁹ and Washington courts have recognized this reality in the context of criminal sentencing in the past.¹⁴⁰ The court’s reasoning in Anderson goes in the precise opposite direction.

Beyond developmental neuroscience research, robust sociological and psychological research also indicates that people tend to “age out” of crime.¹⁴¹ Most violent crimes are committed by persons in their teen years and their early twenties.¹⁴² Youths’ increased impulsivity and difficulty rationally weighing the consequences of actions may contribute to these trends.¹⁴³ This data pairs with neuroscience research about the development of the prefrontal cortex supporting the conclusion that disproportionately long sentences are particularly inappropriate when applied to persons who commit offenses before age twenty-five.

1. Eliminating De Facto Life Sentences for Young Offenders Decreases the Risk of Racially Disparate Impacts

Racial bias and discrimination in the criminal justice system are unfortunately nothing new.¹⁴⁴ As discussed earlier in this Note, Justice Yu’s dissent in Anderson discussed the adultification bias that is commonly applied against youths of color.¹⁴⁵ Due to this societal tendency to view children of color as older than white children of the same age, racially disparate applications of these harsh sentences on youths of color are likely to perpetuate.¹⁴⁶ Racially disparate application of the death penalty led to the abolition of the practice in Washington and ending de facto life sentences for juveniles and young adults should similarly advance racial equity and justice.¹⁴⁷ One of the core aspects of the Beckett Report that led to the end of the death penalty in Washington was the finding that offenders of color received less mercy than similarly situated white offenders.¹⁴⁸ One can reasonably presume that the same, arbitrary phenomenon may occur in the application of harsh sentences across our state.

Young offenders are also uniquely capable of transformation and rehabilitation.¹⁴⁹ Well-established research shows that recidivism rates are strongly correlated with age, such that most persons will simply “age out” of crime.¹⁵⁰ By eliminating de facto life sentences for young offenders, Washington would provide this segment of the population with the opportunity to transform their lives and be released after a reasonable sentence. Additionally, this reform would combat mass incarceration by reducing the expenditure of state resources and taxpayer dollars on offenders who pose minimal risk of re-offending and begin to combat racial inequities experienced by communities of color in our state.¹⁵¹

2. Individual Differences in Cognitive Development Cannot Justify the Imposition of De Facto Life Sentences on Youth Offenders

Some may argue that individual differences in brain development mean that certain offenders under age eighteen will have more developed prefrontal cortices than certain offenders up to age twenty-five. Using this reasoning, advocates for harsher sentences for juveniles could argue that the application of harsh sentences in “uncommon” or “rare” circumstances should be permitted, or even that such sentences are more tailored to the nature of the crime in question. This argument is largely based on retributive justifications for punishment, the idea that serious crimes should always be punished harshly irrespective of the individual’s comparative culpability, rather than based on an assessment of the offender’s capacity for culpability, future risk of recidivism, or the offender’s capacity for rehabilitation.¹⁵²

Some young offenders may never be rehabilitated and, even after decades of imprisonment, may not be safe to reenter society. But de facto life sentences deprive offenders of the incentive and the opportunity to prove sentencing judges wrong.¹⁵³ If an offender sentenced as a juvenile can show demonstrated remorse, maturity, and rehabilitation to the satisfaction of a parole board after serving a reasonable sentence, that offender has, by definition, disproven the assertion that that youth offender is “incorrigible” and incapable of change.

The very idea that certain young offenders are irredeemable or are super-predators echoes racist ideas from the early 1990s, and has no basisin data or science.¹⁵⁴ Justice Yu’s dissent in Anderson discusses the adultification bias against youth of color at some length and highlights the role that the justice system has played in devaluing Black lives.¹⁵⁵ This bias means that even a well-intentioned sentencing judge may implicitly feel that a young offender of color is more mature, and therefore less capable of reform and rehabilitation than a similarly situated white offender of the same age.¹⁵⁶ Harsh sentences deprive young offenders of the opportunity and incentive to refute these biases and arbitrarily subject offenders who can demonstrate their transformation to a lifetime of incarceration.

B. Implement Tangible Guidelines to Assist Sentencing Judges in Recognizing the Mitigating Qualities of Youth

Regardless of whether the Washington State Legislature or Washington Supreme Court overhauls the juvenile sentencing process to address the problems with de facto life sentences for young offenders, the courts in charge of sentencing offenders need clarity in determining when a sentence is unconstitutionally long for a juvenile offender. The Anderson majority insists that Haag, Bassett, and its prior juvenile sentencing jurisprudence remain good law and that its holding is consistent with the court’s precedent.¹⁵⁷ However, distinguishing between an unconstitutional de facto life sentence for a juvenile, or merely a permissible harsh term-of-years sentence, will likely prove challenging in practice.

The standard articulated in Anderson is that de facto life sentences for juveniles are not prohibited for crimes that do not reflect the mitigating qualities of youth.¹⁵⁸ But most, if not all, serious crimes are acts that our society typically does not associate with youthful behavior. Murder certainly is not, and yet the Court in Haag overturned a forty-six-year sentence for a murder that it deemed impulsive while upholding a sixty-one-year sentence in Anderson that it deemed calculated.¹⁵⁹ This judgment call is inherently subjective and requires that judges attempt to assess the developmental maturity of the offender in question. This is a difficult task, and one that judges are ill-equipped to perform, likely leading to arbitrary and racially discriminatory results. Therefore, the Washington Supreme Court or Washington State Legislature should, at minimum, adopt clearer guidelines to assist sentencing judges in making this determination.

Of course, a better solution is to abolish de facto life sentences for juveniles altogether by providing a meaningful opportunity for release after serving a reasonable sentence. This solution would provide a uniform response to dealing with juveniles and young offenders who are found guilty of serious crimes.

CONCLUSION

The majority opinion in Anderson marks a stark departure from the Washington Supreme Court’s earlier juvenile sentencing jurisprudence by upholding de facto life sentences for juveniles whose crimes—as assessed by the sentencing court—do not reflect the mitigating qualities of youth. This decision poses troubling public policy and constitutional questions. It also calls into question the continued efficacy and persuasiveness of scientific research before the Washington Supreme Court. What is uncertain is whether this aberration in the court’s juvenile sentencing is here to stay.

On the one hand, the Washington Supreme Court may rely on Anderson as a seminal case for juvenile sentencing cases of the future. The constitutionality of Mr. Anderson’s sixty-one-year sentence may open the door to greater and even longer term-of-years sentences for juvenile offenders in Washington—as long as the Miller factors were ostensibly considered at sentencing. This could lead to a new era of super-predator rhetoric about youth of color and re-entrench the role of the criminal justice system in devaluing the lives of Black and brown members of our community. On the other hand, the Washington Supreme Court may overturn Anderson in the years to come. The Washington State Legislature may also enact juvenile sentencing reforms that would make Anderson moot.

One fundamental problem at the core of the Anderson majority reasoning is that crimes committed by young people inherently reflect the mitigating qualities of youth. De facto life sentences are LWOP in all but name. Yet, Anderson permits a sentencing court to disregard the fact that an offender is a child and sentence them to die in prison, without ever having to review the decision and determine whether the child truly was irredeemable. A person’s capacity for redemption and transformation is virtually unknowable at the time of sentencing, particularly where children and young people are concerned. Young offenders should be guaranteed the opportunity for a meaningful life after they are released from prison.

The Anderson decision is also troubling for its potential for racially disparate applications in sentencing due to the heightened risk of unconscious bias against persons of color. Washington courts have stated a willingness to reconcile with their role in devaluing the lives of citizens of color. Anderson illustrates that the Washington legal community has a long way to go before it lives up to this commitment.

While Anderson is a setback for juvenile and racial justice, the decision was a close one. Justice Yu’s powerful dissent may be the source of some hope,¹⁶⁰ even if that hope feels like a crushed stalk at the moment. Perhaps dedicated scientists and lawyers will work to create another “Beckett Report” or similar study evaluating the disparate juvenile sentences based on race, and this will persuade the court where decades of developmental neuroscience data has failed. Perhaps a member of the court will shift their perspective on the issue and recognize the flaws in the majority’s reasoning. In any case, there is reason to hope for an end to harsh juvenile sentences in Washington State. Either through the legislature or the courts, we must give our communities a song of hope, and create a world where we can sing it.

Summary

State v. Anderson represents a significant departure from established Washington State juvenile sentencing jurisprudence. The majority opinion upheld a lengthy sentence for a minor, effectively a life sentence, despite a national trend toward leniency in such cases. Justice Yu's dissent powerfully argued against this decision, highlighting concerns about implicit racial bias and the developmental differences between adolescent and adult brains. This note analyzes the legal and scientific underpinnings of the debate, examining the constitutional implications of harsh juvenile sentences, the scientific consensus on brain development, and the varied approaches of other jurisdictions. It concludes by recommending the complete abolition of de facto life sentences for individuals under twenty-five in Washington State.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Constitutionality of Long Sentences for Young Offenders

The Anderson decision contrasts with the prevailing national trend against severe sentences for juvenile offenders, a trend initiated by Miller v. Alabama's declaration that mandatory life without parole (LWOP) for juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment. Subsequent cases like Montgomery v. Louisiana expanded this ruling, prompting states to implement remedial legislation. While Washington initially aligned with this trend in cases like State v. Bassett and State v. Haag, upholding the unconstitutionality of LWOP and de facto life sentences for juveniles, Anderson represents a significant divergence. The unresolved questions left in the wake of earlier rulings regarding sentence length and permissible cruelty towards children are central to the debate surrounding Anderson.

B. Scientific Consensus on Juvenile Brain Development

Extensive research in neuroscience and developmental psychology demonstrates significant structural and functional differences between the adolescent and adult brain, particularly in the prefrontal cortex responsible for inhibitory control and rational decision-making. This immaturity renders juveniles more susceptible to external influences, including peer pressure, and more capable of rehabilitation due to their developing identities. This scientific consensus, while increasingly recognized by courts, has not always been fully integrated into sentencing practices. The Supreme Court's gradual incorporation of these findings into its juvenile sentencing jurisprudence from the early 2000s onward is a crucial element in understanding the Anderson case.

C. Application of Youth Brain Development Research in Assessing the Constitutionality of Harsh Sentences

The Supreme Court's landmark decisions in Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, and Miller v. Alabama established a framework for evaluating the constitutionality of harsh juvenile sentences. These rulings, grounded in the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, emphasized the diminished culpability of juveniles due to their developmental immaturity. The Miller factors—immaturity, impetuosity, susceptibility to influence, and capacity for rehabilitation—must be considered during sentencing. However, the Miller court also acknowledged a possible exception for “rare” cases of irreparable corruption, leading to ongoing debate and tension in its application. The inherent difficulty in determining irretrievable depravity challenges the very foundation of this exception.

D. Multi-State Responses to Long Juvenile Sentences After Miller

Following Montgomery v. Louisiana's retroactive application of Miller, states implemented diverse approaches to resentencing juveniles previously given LWOP. While many states enacted legislation offering parole eligibility after fifteen to twenty-five years, Washington's approach in Anderson stands as an outlier, upholding a lengthy sentence that effectively constitutes life imprisonment. The contrasting approaches in states like California, Oregon, and others highlight the range of responses to Miller and the varying interpretations of constitutional requirements for juvenile sentencing.

II. THE FUTURE OF DE FACTO LIFE SENTENCES FOR JUVENILES AND YOUNG ADULTS IN WASHINGTON

Anderson's impact on future juvenile sentencing in Washington remains uncertain. The narrow majority decision creates ambiguity, potentially leading to increased imposition of de facto life sentences, particularly if the subjective assessment of a juvenile offender’s mitigating qualities is not consistently applied. The inherent difficulties in determining whether a juvenile is "irredeemable" contribute to the challenges of applying this ruling. Alternative scenarios include the overturning of Anderson by the Washington Supreme Court or the passage of legislative reform.

A. Increased Imposition of De Facto Life Sentences on Juveniles

Anderson could lead to a rise in de facto life sentences for juveniles, as sentencing courts might interpret the ruling as allowing harsher sentences in cases deemed to lack mitigating qualities associated with youth. This potential increase raises concerns about the subjectivity of such assessments and the risk of implicit biases influencing sentencing decisions. The inherent tension between a juvenile’s capacity for change and the initial determination of irretrievable depravity remains a crucial issue.

B. Other Potential Directions in De Facto Life Sentence Jurisprudence for Young Offenders after Anderson

Conversely, Anderson may not substantially alter sentencing practices, with courts continuing to prioritize leniency. Alternatively, Anderson could be overturned, either by the Washington Supreme Court or through legislative action, implementing a categorical ban on de facto life sentences for young offenders. The possibility of national-level intervention by the Supreme Court, while less likely given the current composition of the court, remains a potential development.

III. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Washington Should Eliminate De Facto Life Sentences for Offenders Under Twenty-Five Years Old

Washington State should prohibit de facto life sentences for individuals under twenty-five. This recommendation stems from the scientific consensus on brain development, which demonstrates the diminished culpability of young people compared to adults. Eliminating such sentences enhances racial equity by mitigating the effects of implicit bias, aligns with the evolving understanding of youth rehabilitation, and reduces the cost of prolonged incarceration for individuals who pose minimal long-term risk.

1. Eliminating De Facto Life Sentences for Young Offenders Decreases the Risk of Racially Disparate Impacts

Abolishing de facto life sentences for young offenders directly addresses the risk of racial disparity in sentencing. The adultification bias against youth of color increases their likelihood of receiving harsher sentences, perpetuating systemic inequities. This reform promotes racial justice, consistent with Washington's evolving jurisprudence, and echoes the rationale behind abolishing the death penalty.

2. Individual Differences in Cognitive Development Cannot Justify the Imposition of De Facto Life Sentences on Youth Offenders

Arguments invoking individual differences in cognitive development to justify harsher sentences for some youth are ultimately unconvincing. The inherent difficulty in predicting future behavior and the potential for error outweigh the supposed benefits of individualized assessment. The focus should be on establishing clear, consistent guidelines that reflect the diminished culpability of young people.

B. Implement Tangible Guidelines to Assist Sentencing Judges in Recognizing the Mitigating Qualities of Youth

To ensure consistent application of juvenile sentencing guidelines, clearer standards are necessary. The ambiguity inherent in current guidelines regarding mitigating qualities of youth may be better addressed by comprehensive legislative reform.

CONCLUSION

Anderson presents a significant challenge to the progress made in Washington State's juvenile sentencing jurisprudence. The decision's potential to increase harsh sentences, exacerbate racial disparities, and undermine the consideration of scientific evidence regarding brain development requires a robust response. Eliminating de facto life sentences for young adults under twenty-five, coupled with clear guidelines for assessing mitigating factors, represents a critical step toward ensuring fairer and more equitable sentencing practices.

Summary

Justice Yu's dissent and the Washington Supreme Court's majority opinion in State v. Anderson present a significant divergence in juvenile sentencing jurisprudence. The majority upheld a sixty-one-year sentence for a seventeen-year-old, a stark reversal of previous rulings concerning the constitutionality of lengthy sentences for minors. Justice Yu's dissent powerfully argues against this decision, highlighting implicit racial bias, disparate racial outcomes, and the neurobiological developmental differences between adolescents and adults. This note examines the legal and scientific basis for challenging such harsh sentences, comparing Washington's approach to other jurisdictions and ultimately recommending a categorical ban on de facto life sentences for individuals under twenty-five.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Constitutionality of Long Sentences for Young Offenders

The Anderson case contrasts with a national trend against harsh sentences for young offenders, established by Supreme Court decisions like Miller v. Alabama (prohibiting mandatory life without parole for juveniles) and Montgomery v. Louisiana (making Miller retroactive). Washington's Supreme Court previously aligned with this trend in State v. Bassett and State v. Haag, declaring LWOP and de facto life sentences unconstitutional for juveniles. However, Anderson represents a departure, leaving open questions regarding acceptable sentence lengths and the definition of "irreparable corruption" in juvenile offenders. The core reasoning in Miller centered on the developing brain's diminished executive functioning and behavioral control compared to adults, leading to a conclusion of diminished moral culpability.

B. Scientific Consensus on Juvenile Brain Development

Extensive research demonstrates significant structural and functional differences between adolescent and adult brains, particularly in the prefrontal cortex responsible for inhibitory control and rational decision-making. Adolescents exhibit greater immaturity, malleability, vulnerability to external influences, and susceptibility to peer pressure than adults. Their developing brains are less capable of controlling behavior and reasoned judgment, a fact supported by behavioral research showing adolescents' overrepresentation in reckless behavior. The malleability of youth identities also increases their capacity for rehabilitation, making youth intervention programs more effective than traditional correctional settings.

C. Application of Youth Brain Development Research in Assessing the Constitutionality of Harsh Sentences

The Supreme Court's recognition of juvenile brain development in sentencing began in Roper v. Simmons (banning the death penalty for juveniles), followed by Graham v. Florida (banning LWOP for non-homicide juvenile offenses), and culminated in Miller v. Alabama. Miller established factors to consider in juvenile sentencing, including immaturity, impetuosity, environmental influences, and the potential for rehabilitation. These decisions reflect the scientific consensus that children are constitutionally different from adults in sentencing. The inherent tension in Miller lies in its exception for "rare" juveniles exhibiting "irreparable corruption," a concept challenging to define and apply consistently.

D. Multi-State Responses to Long Juvenile Sentences After Miller

Following Montgomery's retroactive application of Miller, states adopted diverse approaches to resentencing juveniles. Some states, such as California, Oregon, and others, implemented parole eligibility after fifteen to twenty-five years, considering the Miller factors. Others adopted stricter measures with parole eligibility after thirty to fifty years. Washington's approach, initially aligned with the trend toward leniency, shifted with Anderson, becoming an outlier among jurisdictions. Prior Washington Supreme Court decisions, such as State v. Ramos and State v. Bassett, emphasized the unconstitutionality of de facto life sentences for juveniles, but Anderson overturned this precedent.

II. THE FUTURE OF DE FACTO LIFE SENTENCES FOR JUVENILES AND YOUNG ADULTS IN WASHINGTON

Anderson leaves the future of juvenile sentencing in Washington uncertain. The majority opinion narrowed the scope of Haag, allowing de facto life sentences for juveniles whose crimes don't reflect the mitigating qualities of youth. This creates a subjective standard for determining “irreparable corruption,” leaving juveniles vulnerable to excessively harsh sentences. This subjectivity, coupled with the potential for unconscious bias, particularly against youth of color, raises concerns about equitable application.

A. Increased Imposition of De Facto Life Sentences on Juveniles

Anderson could lead to an increase in de facto life sentences for juveniles, as sentencing courts might justify harsh sentences by claiming that the circumstances of the crime negate mitigating factors of youth. The lack of clear guidelines for evaluating these mitigating factors could hinder future challenges to such sentences. The concept of an “irredeemable juvenile” also lacks empirical support and relies on potentially biased assessments.

B. Other Potential Directions in De Facto Life Sentence Jurisprudence for Young Offenders after Anderson

Alternatively, Anderson may prove to be an anomaly. Future court decisions might revert to the previous trend of leniency towards juvenile offenders or the Washington Supreme Court could overturn Anderson. Legislative action, such as bills aiming to raise the age for sentence review, could also alter the legal landscape. The use of scientific data, particularly demonstrating racial disparities in sentencing, could also influence future rulings.

III. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Washington Should Eliminate De Facto Life Sentences for Offenders Under Twenty-Five Years Old

Policymakers should consider prohibiting de facto life sentences for individuals under twenty-five. Neuroscientific research supports the diminished culpability of young offenders, and excessively long sentences are disproportionate to their developmental stage. Establishing fixed review intervals, or tying them to the completion of rehabilitation programs, would offer a more equitable and data-driven approach.

1. Eliminating De Facto Life Sentences for Young Offenders Decreases the Risk of Racially Disparate Impacts

Eliminating de facto life sentences would reduce the risk of racially disparate impacts in sentencing, addressing the adultification bias against youth of color. Such a change would promote racial equity and align with the state's commitment to combatting racial discrimination within the criminal justice system.

2. Individual Differences in Cognitive Development Cannot Justify the Imposition of De Facto Life Sentences on Youth Offenders

While individual differences in cognitive development exist, these variations do not justify the imposition of de facto life sentences. The focus should be on a fair and consistent system that considers both the severity of the crime and the mitigating factors associated with youth, promoting rehabilitation and reducing the likelihood of racially biased outcomes.

B. Implement Tangible Guidelines to Assist Sentencing Judges in Recognizing the Mitigating Qualities of Youth

Clear guidelines are needed to assist judges in determining when a sentence is unconstitutionally long for a juvenile offender. The current standard is too subjective and prone to inconsistency and bias. A better approach is to abolish de facto life sentences, providing a structured system for review and potential release after serving a reasonable term.

CONCLUSION

Anderson represents a significant shift in Washington's juvenile sentencing jurisprudence. The potential for increased harsh sentences, the risk of racial bias, and the disregard for the potential for rehabilitation create a need for reform. Either through legislative action or judicial review, a categorical ban on de facto life sentences for individuals under twenty-five is essential to ensure fairness, equity, and alignment with current scientific understanding of brain development.

Summary

Justice Yu's dissent and the Washington Supreme Court's majority opinion in State v. Anderson are noteworthy. The majority upheld a sixty-one-year sentence for a seventeen-year-old, reversing previous juvenile sentencing precedents. Justice Yu's dissent powerfully argued against this, emphasizing implicit racial bias and the neurobiological differences between young people and adults. The court's decision raises significant questions about the constitutionality of harsh sentences for juveniles, especially in light of scientific understanding of brain development. This analysis examines the legal and scientific basis for challenging such sentences and proposes policy recommendations.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Constitutionality of Long Sentences for Young Offenders

Miller v. Alabama (2012) and Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) established that mandatory life without parole (LWOP) for juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment. Washington, initially following this trend in cases like State v. Bassett and State v. Haag, later created an exception in Anderson for "rare children whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption," leading to inconsistencies in sentencing. This raises concerns about the proportionality of sentences and the definition of "irreparable corruption."

B. Scientific Consensus on Juvenile Brain Development

Research shows significant differences between adolescent and adult brains, especially in the prefrontal cortex, impacting impulse control and decision-making. Youth are more susceptible to external influences and possess greater capacity for rehabilitation. This scientific consensus underpins Supreme Court decisions limiting harsh juvenile sentences.

C. Application of Youth Brain Development Research in Assessing the Constitutionality of Harsh Sentences

Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, and Miller v. Alabama highlight the importance of juvenile brain development in sentencing. The Miller factors—immaturity, impulsivity, environmental influences, and malleability—must be considered. The tension remains between acknowledging youth's diminished culpability and the exception for "irreparable corruption," a concept that's difficult to define and apply consistently.

D. Multi-State Responses to Long Juvenile Sentences After Miller

States have varied responses to Miller. Some have eliminated LWOP for juveniles and offer parole eligibility after 15–25 years, while others maintain harsher sentences with parole eligibility after significantly longer periods. Washington’s approach, as seen in Anderson, stands as an outlier among these varied responses.

II. THE FUTURE OF DE FACTO LIFE SENTENCES FOR JUVENILES AND YOUNG ADULTS IN WASHINGTON

Anderson raises concerns about the future of juvenile sentencing in Washington. It potentially allows more de facto life sentences by focusing on whether a crime reflects the mitigating qualities of youth. This subjectivity is problematic, potentially leading to biased application and challenges to the concept of an "irredeemable" juvenile.

A. Increased Imposition of De Facto Life Sentences on Juveniles

Anderson might lead to more de facto life sentences. The court's vague standards make it difficult to challenge sentences, and the idea of an "irredeemable juvenile" is itself questionable, especially given the possibility of rehabilitation over time.

B. Other Potential Directions in De Facto Life Sentence Jurisprudence for Young Offenders after Anderson

Alternative outcomes include the Washington Supreme Court overturning Anderson, the United States Supreme Court extending Miller, or the Washington State Legislature enacting reforms. Scientific research on racial disparities in sentencing could play a significant role in future challenges.

III. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Washington Should Eliminate De Facto Life Sentences for Offenders Under Twenty-Five Years Old

Eliminating de facto life sentences for those under 25 aligns with brain development research, promotes rehabilitation, and addresses racial bias. While acknowledging individual differences, a categorical ban would provide more consistent and equitable sentencing.

1. Eliminating De Facto Life Sentences for Young Offenders Decreases the Risk of Racially Disparate Impacts

Ending de facto life sentences helps combat racial bias in sentencing, aligns with Washington's commitment to racial justice, and reduces the likelihood of disproportionate impact on youth of color.

2. Individual Differences in Cognitive Development Cannot Justify the Imposition of De Facto Life Sentences on Youth Offenders

Individual differences in cognitive development don’t justify de facto life sentences. The potential for rehabilitation, the limitations of predicting future behavior, and the ethical concerns of irreversible sentences outweigh arguments for individual exceptions.

B. Implement Tangible Guidelines to Assist Sentencing Judges in Recognizing the Mitigating Qualities of Youth

Clearer guidelines are needed to help judges determine when sentences are unconstitutionally long for juveniles. The current standard is too subjective and prone to bias. Abolition of de facto life sentences is a more effective solution.

CONCLUSION

Anderson represents a significant shift in Washington's juvenile sentencing jurisprudence. Its potential implications for racial equity and the constitutionality of harsh sentences on youth require ongoing attention. Policy changes, either through legislative action or court decisions, are needed to ensure fairer and more equitable sentencing practices for juveniles.

Summary

A poem about hope starts this discussion about a court case, State v. Anderson. The court gave a 61-year sentence to a 17-year-old, which is almost a life sentence. A dissenting judge disagreed with this decision, saying it was unfair and might show bias against Black people. The judge pointed out that the court focused on the teen's actions instead of his difficult life. This raises questions about how we should punish young people.

I. BACKGROUND

The case is important because there's a trend against giving very long sentences to young people. The Supreme Court said that mandatory life sentences without parole for kids are against the law. Washington state courts also said this, but this case changed that. The Supreme Court's decisions were based on how kids' brains are different from adult brains. Kids' brains aren't fully developed, so they don't always make good decisions.

B. Scientific Consensus on Juvenile Brain Development

Scientists know that kids' brains aren't like adult brains. Kids' brains are still growing and changing, especially the part that helps them control their actions and think clearly. This means kids might not understand the consequences of their actions as well as adults. They're also more easily influenced by friends and family. Because kids' brains are still developing, they can change and learn better than adults. This is why many courts have agreed that harsher punishments for young people aren't fair.

C. Application of Youth Brain Development Research in Assessing the Constitutionality of Harsh Sentences

The Supreme Court has used this brain research in several cases. They said that giving kids the death penalty or life in prison without parole is wrong because it's too harsh. They said courts need to think about how kids are different when deciding on punishments. Even though a kid might do something terrible, they might not be as responsible for their actions as an adult would be. The problem is that some courts still give very long sentences to kids, even when this research shows it's not right.

D. Multi-State Responses to Long Juvenile Sentences After Miller

After the Supreme Court's decisions, many states changed their laws. Some gave young people a chance to get out of prison early if they showed they'd changed. Others still gave long sentences, making Washington an exception. Washington changed some of its laws, but the Anderson case showed that there are different ideas about how to deal with young people who commit serious crimes. Some states give them shorter sentences than Washington state has in some cases.

II. THE FUTURE OF DE FACTO LIFE SENTENCES FOR JUVENILES AND YOUNG ADULTS IN WASHINGTON

The Anderson case could mean that more young people will get very long sentences. The court said it's okay to give a kid a very long sentence if their actions show they're beyond hope for change. It is hard to say for certain what happens next. The Washington court could change its mind, or the state could make new laws to stop these long sentences for young people.

A. Increased Imposition of De Facto Life Sentences on Juveniles

The Anderson case makes it easier for courts to give long sentences to young people. It’s hard to decide if a young person is truly “beyond hope.” It's also possible that judges are unfair to young people of color because of unconscious bias.

B. Other Potential Directions in De Facto Life Sentence Jurisprudence for Young Offenders after Anderson

Things could change. The Washington court might overturn the Anderson decision. The state legislature might also make new laws about sentencing young people. It's important to use scientific research to show how unfair very long sentences for young people can be.

III. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The state should stop giving young people sentences that are almost life sentences. Kids' brains aren't fully grown, so they don't always make the best choices. It's also important to stop unfair treatment of kids based on their race. Judges need clear rules to help them decide what is a fair punishment for a young person. Even if a young person does something very bad, they should still have a chance to show they can change and be a good person again.