Proposed Amicus Brief of the Sentencing Project in Support of William N. Palmer
Kristen Bell
SummaryOriginal

Summary

Imposing an indeterminate, mandatory sentence of life with the possibility of parole on juveniles convicted of kidnapping for the purpose of robbery violates the Eighth Amendment and the California Constitution.

2020 | State Juristiction

Proposed Amicus Brief of the Sentencing Project in Support of William N. Palmer

Keywords mandatory life with the possibility of parole; lifetime imprisonment with the possibility of parole; Eighth Amendment (U.S.); cruel and unusual punishment; indeterminate sentences; 17-year-old; kidnapping; Miller; Graham; LWOP
Screenshot 2024-06-27 at 10.23.43 AM

Summary of Argument

Amici argue in Part I of this brief that imposing a mandatory sentence of life with the possibility of parole on juveniles convicted of kidnapping violates the Eighth Amendment. In determining whether a punishment is cruel or unusual as applied to a category of people convicted of a type of crime, the Eighth Amendment calls for a two-step analysis. See Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 61, as modified (July 6, 2010). First, the court looks to evidence of a national consensus against the punishment in question by reviewing the numbers of people serving it and applicable statutes nationwide. Second, the court applies its independent judgment in analyzing whether the punishment is justified by any of the traditional rationales for punishment - retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation. In both steps of the analysis, the Court distinguishes punishment that is imposed on a mandatory basis from punishment that is imposed on a discretionary basis. (See Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 477, 483.)

To assist the Court in this analysis, Appendix B lists jurisdictions where a life sentence is mandatory, discretionary, or not available for the most severe type of kidnapping as defined by each jurisdiction. Appendix A lists the numbers of people serving a life sentence for the controlling offense of kidnapping as a juvenile. These appendices provide evidence of a national consensus against mandatory life sentences for juveniles convicted of kidnapping that is stronger than the evidence of consensus that the Supreme Court relied on in Miller and Graham. (See infra at 20.) Further, amici show that a mandatory life sentence with the possiblity of parole for juveniles convicted of kidnapping is not justified by any of the traditional rationales for punishment.

In Part II of this brief, amici argue that section 209(b) is unconstitutional as applied to juveniles under Article I, section 17 of the California Constitution. The analysis is guided by In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, in which this Court held that Penal Code section 314 violated the cruel or unusual punishment because it imposed a sentence of one year to life for the conviction of second-offense indecent exposure. (See id. at 413.) The Lynch court applies a settled rule of California constitutional law which amici is that, when determing whether a statute is unconstitutional, courts consider whether the maximum period of incarceration authorized by statute is proportionate to the offense. (See id. at 415-416.) The question under Article 1 thus should be framed as follows: is the maximum period of incarceration authorized by section 209(b) an entire lifetime of imprisonment disproportionate to the offense of kidnapping for the purpose of robbery committed by a juvenile? The answer is yes: an entire lifetime behind bars, beginning at age 17, is grossly disproportionate to an offense that need not include any actual, attempted, or intended bodily injury to a victim.

In Part III of this brief, amici turn to the alternative argument that even if section 209(b) is constitutional particular application , section 17 as well as the Eighth Amendment. The analysis here involves three steps: first, looking to the characteristics of the individual and the offense, second to punishments for more serious crimes within the state, and third to punishments for similar crimes in other jurisdictions. (See id.) Amici focus only on the third part, the interstate comparison. Appendix C details the range of sentences that a person similarly situated to Mr. Palmer would have received in 52 jurisdicitons under statutes current as of March, 2020. Unlike Appendix B, which considers sentencing for the most severe type of kidnapping available in a given jurisdiction, Appendix C is tailored to the facts of Mr. a kidnapping committed by a juvenile for the purpose of robbery, with a firearm, and without bodily injury or other aggravating factors.

A mandatory sentence of life with the possibility of parole is extremely rare for such an offense. It is available in only two other jurisdicitons Lousiaiana and Utah and there are only 8 individuals serving a life sentence for kidnapping as juveniles in those jurisdictions. (See Appendices A and C.) In stark contrast to the one-size-fits-all approach taken by California, other jurisdictions provide a range of sentencing options for juveniles convicted of a a crime similar to Mr. between the minimum sentence a juvenile can receive and the maximum sentence an adult can receive for a crime similar to Mr (See infra at 63.)

For these reasons, an indeterminate life sentence under section 209(b) at age 17 In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424.)

Open Amicus Brief as PDF

Summary of Argument

Amici curiae argue that imposing a mandatory sentence of life with the possibility of parole on juveniles convicted of kidnapping violates the Eighth Amendment. This argument is based on the two-step analysis established in Graham v. Florida (2010), which evaluates a punishment's constitutionality based on national consensus and the justification for the punishment. Amici contend that the mandatory nature of the sentence, combined with the lack of justification in retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation, renders it unconstitutional.

Further, amici argue that section 209(b) of the California Penal Code violates Article I, section 17 of the California Constitution as applied to juveniles, referencing the precedent set by In re Lynch (1972). This analysis considers whether the maximum period of incarceration authorized by the statute is proportionate to the offense, concluding that a lifetime sentence for kidnapping without bodily injury is disproportionate.

Finally, amici argue that, even if section 209(b) is constitutional as applied to juveniles, a life sentence for a kidnapping committed by a juvenile without bodily injury or aggravating factors violates the Eighth Amendment and the California Constitution. They highlight the rarity of such a sentence in other jurisdictions, emphasizing the disproportionate nature of the California statute. Amici argue that the lack of a range of sentencing options for juveniles convicted of kidnapping in California stands in stark contrast to the practices of other jurisdictions, making the mandatory life sentence an outlier.

Open Amicus Brief as PDF

Summary of Argument

Amici argue that imposing a mandatory life sentence with the possibility of parole on juveniles convicted of kidnapping violates the Eighth Amendment and Article I, section 17 of the California Constitution. They support their argument by analyzing national and California state sentencing practices for kidnapping and comparing them to the sentence imposed on Mr. Palmer.

Amici argue that a mandatory life sentence for juveniles convicted of kidnapping fails the two-step analysis required by the Eighth Amendment. First, they argue that there is a national consensus against such sentences, evidenced by the low number of jurisdictions imposing them and the limited number of individuals serving such sentences nationwide. Second, they argue that mandatory life sentences for juveniles are not justified by the traditional rationales for punishment - retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation.

Amici argue that section 209(b) of the California Penal Code is unconstitutional as applied to juveniles under Article I, section 17 of the California Constitution because the maximum period of incarceration authorized by the statute is disproportionate to the offense of kidnapping for the purpose of robbery committed by a juvenile. They argue that an entire lifetime behind bars for such an offense is grossly disproportionate, especially considering that the offense does not require any actual, attempted, or intended bodily injury to the victim.

Amici further argue that even if section 209(b) is constitutional under the Eighth Amendment, it is unconstitutional as applied to Mr. Palmer under Article I, section 17 of the California Constitution. They focus on the interstate comparison aspect of the analysis, arguing that the mandatory life sentence imposed on Mr. Palmer is extremely rare for a similar offense in other jurisdictions. They highlight the significant disparity in sentencing practices across the country, demonstrating that California's approach is an outlier.

Amici contend that a mandatory life sentence for a juvenile convicted of kidnapping for the purpose of robbery, without bodily injury or other aggravating factors, is an excessive and cruel punishment, violating both the Eighth Amendment and the California Constitution.

Open Amicus Brief as PDF

Summary of Argument

This brief argues that a mandatory life sentence with the possibility of parole for juveniles convicted of kidnapping violates the Eighth Amendment and Article I, Section 17 of the California Constitution.

The brief argues that a mandatory life sentence for juveniles convicted of kidnapping is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The Eighth Amendment requires a two-step analysis:

  1. National Consensus: The court examines whether there is a national consensus against the punishment, looking at statistics and laws across the country.

  2. Punishment Rationales: The court independently assesses whether the punishment is justified by the traditional rationales for punishment: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation.

The brief argues that the appendices included provide strong evidence of a national consensus against mandatory life sentences for juveniles convicted of kidnapping. Additionally, the brief argues that such a sentence is not justified by any of the traditional rationales for punishment.

The brief further argues that the sentence violates Article I, Section 17 of the California Constitution, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. The brief cites In re Lynch (1972), in which the California Supreme Court held that a sentence of one year to life for second-offense indecent exposure violated the California Constitution. The brief argues that the maximum sentence authorized by section 209(b) – an entire lifetime of imprisonment – is disproportionate to the offense of kidnapping for the purpose of robbery committed by a juvenile.

The brief also argues that the sentence is unconstitutional based on an interstate comparison of sentencing practices. The brief highlights the rarity of mandatory life sentences for juveniles convicted of kidnapping in other jurisdictions. In contrast to California's one-size-fits-all approach, other states offer a wider range of sentencing options, allowing for tailored sentences based on the individual circumstances of the case.

In conclusion, the brief argues that a mandatory life sentence with the possibility of parole for juveniles convicted of kidnapping is unconstitutional under both the Eighth Amendment and Article I, Section 17 of the California Constitution.

Open Amicus Brief as PDF

Summary of Argument

A law in California that says that young people who are convicted of kidnapping must spend their whole lives in prison, but this law is unfair and goes against the Constitution.

The paper is divided into three parts:

  • Part 1: This part argues that the law is against the 8th Amendment, which says that punishments cannot be cruel or unusual. This part shows that a lot of other states don't have laws like this, and that this law is not fair to young people.

  • Part 2: This part argues that the law goes against the California Constitution, which also says that punishments cannot be cruel or unusual. This part says that it's not fair to make a young person spend their whole life in prison for something that might not even have involved hurting anyone.

  • Part 3: This part looks at how other states punish people who commit similar crimes. This part shows that California's law is much harsher than laws in other states, and that most other states don't give people life sentences for this kind of crime.

The paper ends by saying that California's law is too harsh and that it's not fair to young people who commit this crime.

Open Amicus Brief as PDF

Footnotes and Citation

Cite

Brief of Amici Curiae The Sentencing Project, Juvenile Law Center, and the Roderick and Solange MacArthur Justice Center in Support of Appellant, In re Palmer, No. S256149 (Cal. Apr. 27, 2020).

    Highlights