Summary of Argument
Decades ago, the United States Supreme Court recognized that children must be afforded special consideration during interrogations because they are more vulnerable to the pressures of interrogation than adults. See Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948). Since then, Supreme Court jurisprudence has increasingly recognized the significance of adolescent brain development, including in the context of interrogations. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 272-73 (2011); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-70 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471-72 (2012); Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 206-208 (2016); Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1316 (2021).
In denying the motion to suppress Damian’s statements to the police, the trial court failed to recognize that “age is far ‘more than a chronological fact.’” J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 272 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)). Damian was 14 years old during the interrogations in April 2018. (Hauschultz’s Br. 10). Upheaval marked Damian’s early years. Damian’s biological parents separated, his mother married Tim Hauschultz, and foster siblings entered their home. (Id. at 8–10). Tim used abuse as discipline—forcing Damian to stand barefoot in the snow, kneel on a paint tray in the driveway, or carry logs for hours in the snow—for minor behaviors. (Id. at 9).
Damian’s brief explains why this Court should find that Damian was in custody during the interrogations and was therefore entitled to Miranda warnings, and why his statements to the police were involuntary. This brief builds on Damian’s brief to emphasize the impacts of Damian’s brain development and trauma on the interrogations.