Summary of Argument

In State v. Bassett, this Court advanced article I, section 14 jurisprudence by adopting a categorical bar analysis to determine that this state’s robust protection against cruel punishment led to but one conclusion: juvenile life without parole is never constitutional. 198 Wn. App. 714, 394 P.3d 430 (2017), review granted, 189 Wn.2d 1008 (2017). Because the Washington Supreme Court requires Washington courts to treat de facto juvenile life without parole sentences as they do actual life without parole sentences, State v. Ramos, 187 Wn.2d 420, 438–39, 387 P.3d 650 (2017), it follows both naturally and necessarily that de facto life without parole is also categorically barred.

Even if this Court declines to apply the categorical bar analysis to de facto life without parole, article I, section 14 is more protective than the Eighth Amendment in the juvenile sentencing context and mandates concurrent sentencing in Mr. Leo’s case. Under the Eighth Amendment, life without the possibility of parole for a juvenile offender is constitutional only in the “rarest” of cases. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 718, 726, 193 L. Ed. 2d 599 (2016). Thus, if the heightened protection of article I, section 14 is to have continuing vitality, article I, section 14 must never permit mandatory consecutive minimum sentences that result in imposition of an effective life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender under RCW 10.95.030(3)(a)(ii). Employing the Gunwall factors as interpretive tools to determine the specific nature of the heightened protection in this juvenile sentencing context reaffirms that de facto juvenile life without parole sentences— whether through mandatory consecutive minimum sentences or otherwise—violate article I, section 14.

Because this Court must adopt a reading of the statute that is constitutional, amici urge this Court to affirm Mr. Leo’s sentence by applying Bassett’s categorical bar on juvenile life without parole under RCW 10.95.030(3)(a)(ii) to de facto life without parole sentences under the same statute. Alternatively, amici urge this Court to recognize that the heightened protection of article I, section 14 forecloses any reading of the statute that would permit mandatory consecutive minimum sentencing resulting in an effective life sentence for a juvenile.

Summary of Argument

This brief argues that the Washington State Constitution's Article I, Section 14, provides greater protection against cruel punishment for juveniles than the Eighth Amendment, prohibiting the imposition of de facto life without parole sentences. It cites State v. Bassett, 198 Wn. App. 714, 394 P.3d 430 (2017), which established a categorical bar against juvenile life without parole sentences in Washington. The brief contends that this categorical bar should also apply to de facto life without parole sentences, which are effectively the same as actual life without parole sentences under Washington law.

The brief further argues that even if the categorical bar is not applied to de facto life without parole, Article I, Section 14's heightened protection against cruel punishment prohibits mandatory consecutive minimum sentences that result in a de facto life without parole sentence for juveniles under RCW 10.95.030(3)(a)(ii). This argument emphasizes the Montgomery v. Louisiana standard, which allows for life without parole for juveniles only in the "rarest" of cases, and applies the Gunwall factors to demonstrate the heightened protection afforded by Article I, Section 14.

Finally, the brief urges the court to either affirm the categorical bar against juvenile life without parole to include de facto sentences under RCW 10.95.030(3)(a)(ii), or to recognize the heightened protection of Article I, Section 14 and interpret the statute to prohibit mandatory consecutive minimum sentences that result in a de facto life sentence for a juvenile.

Summary of Argument

The amicus brief argues that under Washington law, de facto life without parole sentences for juveniles are unconstitutional. This argument is based on two primary arguments. First, the Washington Supreme Court’s categorical bar analysis in State v. Bassett regarding juvenile life without parole should be extended to de facto life without parole sentences. Second, even if the categorical bar analysis is not extended, the heightened protection of article I, section 14 of the Washington State Constitution, which prohibits cruel punishment, must be applied to preclude mandatory consecutive minimum sentences that result in effective life without parole sentences for juveniles.

The brief contends that the Bassett ruling has established that Washington State’s Constitution provides greater protection against cruel punishment than the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Therefore, the court should interpret Washington law to be more protective of juveniles than the federal constitution. This includes preventing the imposition of effective life without parole sentences on juveniles.

The amicus brief ultimately urges the court to affirm the sentence imposed in the case of Mr. Leo, which was a sentence that did not impose a de facto life without parole sentence. They argue that the court should either apply the Bassett ruling to de facto life without parole sentences or interpret the statute in question to prohibit mandatory consecutive minimum sentences that would result in life sentences for juveniles.

Summary of Argument

In the case of State v. Bassett, the Washington Court of Appeals decided that juvenile life without parole sentences are unconstitutional. This decision was based on the state's strong protection against cruel punishment, outlined in article I, section 14 of the Washington State Constitution.

The Washington Supreme Court has ruled that de facto (essentially the same as) juvenile life without parole sentences must be treated the same way as actual life without parole sentences. Therefore, it logically follows that de facto life without parole is also unconstitutional.

Even if the Court decides not to apply the Bassett ruling to de facto life without parole, article I, section 14 provides stronger protections than the Eighth Amendment when it comes to sentencing juveniles. The Eighth Amendment only allows life without parole for juveniles in the rarest of cases. Therefore, if the Washington State Constitution's protections are to be upheld, the Court must rule that article I, section 14 prevents mandatory consecutive minimum sentences for juveniles under RCW 10.95.030(3)(a)(ii). This is because such sentences effectively create life without parole for juveniles, which violates article I, section 14.

Therefore, the Court should either follow Bassett and apply the categorical ban on juvenile life without parole to de facto life without parole sentences or recognize that article I, section 14 prevents mandatory consecutive minimum sentences that result in an effective life sentence for juveniles.

Summary of Argument

This case is about a law that says kids and teens who commit crimes could get life in prison without ever being able to get out. In the case of State v. Bassett, the Washington Court of Appeals decided that life without parole sentences for kids is not okay. This brief says that giving a kid a sentence so long that they will likely die in prison, called a "de facto" life sentence, is not okay.

Even if the court doesn't think that giving kids life in prison without parole is never okay, it still might not be okay because of how the law protects kids. The law says that giving kids life in prison without parole is only okay in the rarest of cases. If that law is meant to protect kids, it can't let someone stay in prison for life just because of how the law is written.

The court needs to decide if the law needs to be changed so it doesn't let kids get stuck in prison for life. The court should make sure that the law protects kids and doesn't let them get life in prison without parole, even if it's not called that.