Juvenile Law Center, Children & Family Justice Center, et al.’s Amicus Curiae Brief on Behalf of Respondent-Appellee
Marsha L. Levick
Kacey Mordecai
Shobha L. Mahadev
Scott Main
SimpleOriginal

Summary

The Violent Offender Against Youth Registration Act (VOYRA) is unconstitutional as applied to the Respondent.

2015 | State Juristiction

Juvenile Law Center, Children & Family Justice Center, et al.’s Amicus Curiae Brief on Behalf of Respondent-Appellee

Keywords violent offender registration; culpability; adolescent development; Miller; rehabilitation; developmental differences; youthful offenders; equal protection; public registries; juvenile offenders; Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)
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Summary of Argument

By imposing registration as a violent offender on youth without consideration of either the characteristics that distinguish youth from their adult counterparts or a youth’s individualized circumstances, Illinois’ Violent Offender Against Youth Registration Act (VOYRA) violates both state and federal constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process because it is inconsistent with recent United States Supreme Court case law recognizing how kids are different from adults in the application of our criminal laws and constitutional provisions. See U.S. Const. Amends. V, XIV; Ill. Const. Art. 1, § 2; see e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).

As the site of the nation’s first juvenile court over a century ago, Illinois was the first state to establish a system that treated children differently than adults and prioritized rehabilitation over punishment. Towards that end, Illinois has shielded children in juvenile court from adult consequences, such as criminal stigma, so that children may become productive members of society. Because of the rehabilitative aims of the juvenile court, juvenile offenders are not afforded the full panoply of procedural rights that criminal defendants receive. They lack, for example, the right to trial by jury. Yet M.A. faces potential lifetime stigmatization, harm to her reputation and serious adult consequences as a result of an isolated incident in her childhood that requires her to register for ten years as a violent offender. As a result, M.A. and others in her position receive “the worst of both worlds.” See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 n.23 (1967) (expressing concern for those in a juvenile system where the child “gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children”).

The Illinois General Assembly recognized that juveniles in M.A.’s position should not be subject to a lifetime of harsh restrictions from a simple childhood incident when it amended the similar Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), to allow for petitions to terminate registration after five years and eliminated provisions requiring juvenile sex offenders to register as adults at age 17. See 730 ILCS 150. Yet VOYRA maintains an adult registration provision and does not include any discharge provision violating juveniles’ right to equal protection.

Given the immediate and long-term harm to a child’s reputation at stake, VOYRA’s registration requirements can only stand if they provide the notice and meaningful opportunity to be heard necessary to comport with state and federal due process requirements. VOYRA does not meet this standard. The Act provides no opportunity for juveniles to rebut the presumption of their dangerousness either during the adjudication hearing, at the initial order to register, at adult registration at 17, or at the imposition of a mandatory ten-year extension if any of the Act’s strict provisions are violated. Furthermore, research and findings from the Illinois Juvenile Justice Commission show that registration of juvenile offenders neither improves public safety nor rehabilitates youth. For these reasons, Amici urge this Court to affirm the appellate court’s decision and find sections 730 ILCS 154/5(a)(2) and 730 ILCS 154/10 unconstitutional for all juvenile registrants.

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Summary of Argument

The Illinois Violent Offender Against Youth Registration Act (VOYRA) violates both state and federal constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process by imposing registration as a violent offender on youth without considering the distinct characteristics of youth or their individual circumstances. This argument relies on recent United States Supreme Court case law, such as Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, J.D.B. v. North Carolina, and Miller v. Alabama, which recognize the distinct developmental characteristics of youth and the need for tailored application of criminal laws and constitutional provisions.

Illinois, known for its pioneering role in establishing a juvenile court system, historically prioritizes rehabilitation over punishment for youth, shielding them from adult consequences and stigma to facilitate their reintegration into society. Despite this emphasis on rehabilitation, VOYRA subjects youth to potentially lifelong stigmatization and adverse consequences based on a single childhood incident, creating a situation where juveniles experience "the worst of both worlds," lacking the protections afforded adults while also being denied the rehabilitative focus of the juvenile justice system. This is inconsistent with the principles established by In re Gault, which expressed concern about the lack of both adult protections and appropriate care for children in the juvenile justice system.

Further highlighting the potential harm of VOYRA, the Illinois General Assembly amended the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) to allow for petitions to terminate registration after five years and removed provisions requiring juvenile sex offenders to register as adults at age 17. However, VOYRA lacks any such provisions for discharge, resulting in a discriminatory application of registration requirements for juveniles.

Given the potential for immediate and long-term harm to a child's reputation, VOYRA's registration requirements necessitate due process safeguards, including notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. However, the Act fails to provide any opportunity for juveniles to challenge the presumption of dangerousness during the adjudication hearing, initial registration, adult registration at age 17, or the imposition of a mandatory ten-year extension for violating VOYRA's provisions. Additionally, research and findings from the Illinois Juvenile Justice Commission indicate that registration of juvenile offenders does not improve public safety or contribute to youth rehabilitation. Based on these arguments, Amici urge the court to affirm the appellate court's decision and declare sections 730 ILCS 154/5(a)(2) and 730 ILCS 154/10 unconstitutional for all juvenile registrants.

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Summary of Argument

The Illinois Violent Offender Against Youth Registration Act (VOYRA) mandates registration as a violent offender for youth without considering individual circumstances or the developmental differences between youth and adults. This violates both state and federal constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process, as established by recent Supreme Court rulings.

Illinois has a long tradition of protecting children through a juvenile justice system focused on rehabilitation. However, VOYRA subjects youth to lifetime stigmatization and potential adult consequences for a childhood incident. This contradicts the rehabilitative aims of the juvenile court and creates a situation where youth receive "the worst of both worlds" – neither the protections of adults nor the specialized care and treatment provided to children.

While Illinois has amended the Sex Offender Registration Act to allow for petitioning to terminate registration and eliminated provisions requiring juvenile sex offenders to register as adults, VOYRA lacks similar provisions, thus violating the equal protection rights of juveniles.

Furthermore, VOYRA fails to meet due process requirements by not providing juveniles with the opportunity to challenge the presumption of dangerousness or rebut the requirements of registration. Research shows that juvenile offender registration neither enhances public safety nor aids in rehabilitation. Therefore, the authors advocate for the Court to uphold the appellate court's decision and deem sections 730 ILCS 154/5(a)(2) and 730 ILCS 154/10 unconstitutional for all juvenile registrants.

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Summary of Argument

This argument claims that Illinois’ Violent Offender Against Youth Registration Act (VOYRA) violates the Constitution. The argument focuses on how VOYRA treats young people the same as adults, even though the Supreme Court has said that young people are different. The argument also says that VOYRA violates due process rights because it doesn't give young people a chance to explain their side of the story. Finally, the argument says that VOYRA doesn't actually improve public safety or help young people change their behavior.

The argument makes several points against VOYRA. First, it claims that VOYRA violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution by treating young people the same as adults, even though the Supreme Court has said that young people are different. The argument points to cases like Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, J.D.B. v. North Carolina, and Miller v. Alabama, which all recognized that young people are less mature and have different levels of culpability than adults.

Second, the argument claims that VOYRA violates the Due Process Clause of the Constitution because it doesn't give young people a chance to explain their side of the story. The argument notes that VOYRA doesn't provide any opportunity for young people to rebut the presumption of their dangerousness, either during the adjudication hearing, at the initial order to register, at adult registration at 17, or at the imposition of a mandatory ten-year extension if any of the Act's strict provisions are violated.

Finally, the argument claims that VOYRA doesn't actually improve public safety or help young people change their behavior. The argument cites research and findings from the Illinois Juvenile Justice Commission which show that registration of juvenile offenders neither improves public safety nor rehabilitates youth.

The argument concludes by urging the court to uphold the appellate court's decision and find sections 730 ILCS 154/5(a)(2) and 730 ILCS 154/10 unconstitutional for all juvenile registrants.

Open Amicus Brief as PDF

Summary of Argument

This document talks about a law in Illinois called the Violent Offender Against Youth Registration Act (VOYRA). The law says that kids who commit violent crimes have to register as violent offenders. The document argues that this law is unfair because it doesn't take into account that kids are different from adults.

The document says that the law violates a kid's rights to equal protection and due process. This means the law doesn't treat everyone fairly and it doesn't give kids a fair chance to defend themselves. The document uses examples of other laws and court cases to show that the VOYRA law is not fair.

The document also says that the law doesn't actually help keep people safe. It says that the law doesn't make kids less likely to commit crimes in the future. It also says that the law can actually hurt kids by making them feel like they can't change.

The document asks the court to say that the VOYRA law is unfair and should not be used. It wants the court to protect kids from being treated unfairly because of the law.

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Footnotes and Citation

Cite

Amicus Curiae Brief on Behalf of Juvenile Law Center and Children & Family Justice Center in Support of Respondent-Appellee, In re M.A., No. 118049 (Ill. Jan. 16, 2015).

    Highlights