Summary of Argument

The Miller decision does not apply retroactively under Teague v Lane, 489 US 288 (2012), to cases that were final on direct review.

In determining whether a decision of the United States Supreme Court applies retroactively to cases that were final on direct review, this Court employs a two-step process. See Maxson, 482 Mich at 388-393. First, the Court examines whether the rule must apply retroactively under federal law as defined by Teague. Maxson, 482 Mich at 388. Second, the Court determines whether the rule should apply retroactively under state law, relying on the three factors under People v Sexton, 458 Mich 43, 60-61; 580 NW2d 404 (1998). Maxson, 482 Mich at 393.

Under the Teague analysis, the Miller decision is a new rule that is procedural in nature, and is not a watershed rule. Thus, it does not apply retroactively. Carp relies on the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court applied Miller to Kuntrell Jackson, whose case appeared on collateral review. But this issue was not joined because the State of Arkansas waived any claim about retroactivity under Teague by failing to raise it. The Miller Court did not address the issue of retroactivity. Carp's other arguments are also unavailing.

Summary of Argument

The Miller decision, which addresses the application of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in state criminal cases, does not apply retroactively to cases that were final on direct review under the Teague v Lane framework.

This conclusion stems from the two-step analysis used to determine retroactive application of Supreme Court decisions. The first step involves examining whether a rule must be applied retroactively under federal law, as defined by Teague. The second step involves evaluating whether the rule should be applied retroactively under state law, guided by the factors outlined in People v Sexton.

The Teague analysis dictates that the Miller decision constitutes a new rule, procedural in nature, and does not qualify as a watershed rule. Consequently, it is not subject to retroactive application.

While the U.S. Supreme Court applied Miller to the case of Kuntrell Jackson, which was on collateral review, this instance does not establish retroactive application. The State of Arkansas waived any argument regarding retroactivity under Teague by failing to raise the issue. The Miller Court did not explicitly address the question of retroactivity.

Other arguments presented in favor of retroactive application of Miller are similarly unpersuasive.

Summary of Argument

The Miller decision, which is procedural in nature, does not apply retroactively to cases that were final on direct review according to the Teague v Lane standard. This Court employs a two-step process to determine whether a Supreme Court decision applies retroactively to final cases. First, the Court analyzes whether the rule must be applied retroactively under federal law as defined by Teague. Second, the Court determines whether the rule should be applied retroactively under state law, considering three factors established in People v Sexton.

In this case, the Miller decision is considered a new rule that is procedural, not a watershed rule. Therefore, it does not apply retroactively. The Carp argument, relying on the application of Miller to Kuntrell Jackson's case on collateral review, is irrelevant. This is because the State of Arkansas waived any claims regarding retroactivity under Teague by failing to raise them, and the Miller Court did not address the issue of retroactivity. Other arguments put forward by Carp are also unconvincing.

Summary of Argument

The Miller decision does not apply to cases that were finalized before the decision was made.

When a Supreme Court decision is made, courts must decide if it applies to cases that were already decided. This is called "retroactive application." There are two steps to this process. First, courts look at federal law to see if the decision must be applied retroactively. This is based on the Teague case. Second, courts look at state law to see if the decision should be applied retroactively. This is based on the Sexton case.

In this case, the Miller decision is a new rule that is about how the law works, not what the law actually is. It is not a "watershed rule," which is a major change in the law. Therefore, the Miller decision does not apply retroactively.

The Miller Court did not address whether it applied retroactively. The Carp case relies on the fact that the Supreme Court applied Miller to the Jackson case, but this is not relevant because the State of Arkansas did not argue against retroactivity in that case.

Summary of Argument

The Miller decision does not apply to cases that were already finished when it was decided. To decide if a Supreme Court decision should apply to past cases, they use a two-step process. First, they check if the decision needs to apply to past cases under federal law. Second, they check if the decision should apply to past cases under state law.

The Miller decision is a new rule about how things are done, and it’s not a major rule that changes everything. So, it doesn’t apply to past cases.

Carp argues that the Supreme Court applied the Miller decision to Kuntrell Jackson, but Arkansas didn’t raise any arguments about whether the decision should apply to past cases. So, the Miller Court didn’t talk about whether the decision should apply to past cases. Carp’s other arguments are also not helpful.