Summary of Argument

Recent neuroscience and precedent from the United States Supreme Court demonstrate that young people have different characteristics relevant to mitigation which should be considered during criminal sentencing. While not all youth will be eligible for a downward departure, the Sentencing Reform Act, RCW 9.94A.535(1)(e), grants courts the authority to consider whether a particular defendant’s youth mitigated his individual culpability for a crime, even if, like Mr. O’Dell, the young person has reached his 18th birthday.

In the last decade, the United States Supreme Court has handed down four landmark decisions profoundly altering the treatment of youth in the criminal justice system: Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2005) (abolishing the death penalty for all youth under the age of 18);1 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010) (life without parole sentences for youth who commit non-homicide crimes ruled unconstitutional); J.D.B. v. North Carolina, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 180 L. Ed. 2d 310 (2011) (holding that the Miranda custody take into account the age of a juvenile); and Miller v. Alabama, __ U.S. __, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012) (mandatory life without parole sentence for juveniles convicted of homicide crimes is unconstitutional). Each of these cases was premised on the scientific fact that adolescents as a group are neurologically, significantly different than adults and therefore generally less culpable for their crimes.

As the United States Supreme Court recognized in these cases, neurological development affects how young people think and act. That development impacts their understanding of consequences, their abilities to control their emotions, the relative influence of peers, and their decision-making. Recent neuroscience has proven that these transformational processes continue well into a young person’s twenties. These scientific facts render many youth less culpable than adults due to the innate qualities of their age and the manner in which those qualities affect them.

Undoubtedly, a defendant’s youth will not always result in a downward departure – youth is not an excuse for criminal behavior.However, it is relevant to a young person’s culpability for a particular crime and to the proportionality of the sentence.

Proportionate punishment for culpable behavior lies at the core of the criminal justice system generally, and the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) specifically. See RCW 9.94A.010. The SRA allows a court to grant an exceptional sentence downward when “[t]he defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct, or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of the law, was significantly impaired.” RCW 9.94A.535(1)(e).

This case illustrates this point. Because Mr. O’Dell was 10 days beyond his 18th birthday at the time of the offense, his possible sentencewent from a maximum sentence of 36 weeks as a juvenile to a potential life sentence. Nonetheless, the sentencing court felt that it could not consider Mr. O’Dell’s youth or the science discussed herein when it sentenced him. In fact, the SRA grants courts the discretion to evaluate the particular individual circumstances in cases like Sean O’Dell’s in order to reach a decision that reflects modern science and achieves a proportionate, just outcome.

In the past, Washington courts have rejected the argument that youth is a valid mitigating factor in cases that predate the scientific breakthroughs in juvenile neuroscience discussed herein and the Roper/Graham/Miller line of cases. See e.g., Ha’mim 132 Wn.2d at 836 (young age at time of offense not a valid basis for a downward departure). This Court should reexamine those holdings and reach a result more in keeping with the language and intent of the SRA and one that accommodates modern science and more recent legal thinking.

While a defendant’s youth and its impact on his culpability for a particular crime is one factor that courts should be able to consider during sentencing, there are others as well. As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, a defendant’s intellectual disability may require a lesser sentence than would otherwise be imposed. See e.g. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319-21, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 153 L. Ed. 2d 335 (2002) (death penalty may not be imposed upon person with intellectual disabilities and IQ of 70 or below). The SRA reflects this principle and allows courts the discretion necessary to reach a proportionate and just sentence in particular circumstances.

In this brief, amici first offer an examination of the effects of youthfulness on culpability. Second, amici show how the SRA allows youth to be considered at sentencing on a case by case basis. Third, amici discuss how other individual attributes, like the presence of an intellectual disability, should also be the basis for a downward departure in particular circumstances.

Summary of Argument

Recent advancements in neuroscience and legal rulings from the United States Supreme Court have shed light on the distinct characteristics of young individuals that warrant consideration in criminal sentencing. This article examines the mitigating role of youth in determining culpability and the authority granted to courts under the Sentencing Reform Act (RCW 9.94A.535(1)(e)) to depart from standard sentencing guidelines based on a defendant's youthful status.

Neurological Development and Youthful Culpability

Landmark Supreme Court cases (Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, J.D.B. v. North Carolina, and Miller v. Alabama) have recognized the significant neurological differences between adolescents and adults. These differences impact young people's cognitive abilities, emotional regulation, susceptibility to peer influence, and decision-making processes. Neuroscience has established that these developmental transformations extend well into the early twenties. Consequently, many youth possess diminished culpability compared to adults due to the inherent qualities associated with their age.

Youth as a Mitigating Factor under the Sentencing Reform Act

While youth does not absolve individuals of criminal responsibility, it is a relevant factor in assessing culpability and determining proportionate sentences. The Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) empowers courts to consider a defendant's "capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct" (RCW 9.94A.535(1)(e)) when imposing exceptional sentences downward.

In cases involving young defendants, courts have the discretion to evaluate the specific circumstances and consider the scientific evidence regarding youthful brain development. This approach aligns with the SRA's goal of achieving proportionate and just outcomes.

Analogous Considerations: Intellectual Disability

Similar to the mitigating role of youth, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that intellectual disability can necessitate lesser sentences (Atkins v. Virginia). The SRA incorporates this principle, allowing courts to depart from standard sentencing guidelines in cases where a defendant's intellectual capacity warrants such consideration.

Conclusion

The intersection of neuroscience and legal precedent supports the consideration of youth as a mitigating factor in criminal sentencing. The SRA grants courts the authority to tailor sentences based on individual circumstances, including the defendant's age and its impact on culpability. By recognizing the unique characteristics of young people, the justice system can achieve more proportionate and equitable outcomes.

Summary of Argument

Youthful Brains and Culpability

Recent scientific studies and legal decisions have shown that young people have unique brain development that affects their decision-making, impulse control, and understanding of consequences. These differences make them generally less responsible for their actions compared to adults.

Sentencing Reform Act and Youth Mitigation

Washington state's Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) allows courts to consider a defendant's youth as a factor that may reduce their sentence. This is because youthfulness can significantly impair a person's ability to understand the wrongfulness of their actions or control their behavior.

Case Example

In the case of Mr. O'Dell, who was 18 at the time of his crime, the court was unable to consider his youth as a mitigating factor. However, the SRA does allow courts to evaluate individual circumstances and consider the impact of youth on a defendant's culpability.

Other Mitigating Factors

In addition to youth, other factors such as intellectual disability can also be considered as reasons for a reduced sentence. The SRA recognizes that certain individual attributes may require a more proportionate and just sentence.

Conclusion

Courts should have the discretion to consider the unique characteristics of young people during sentencing. This is supported by scientific evidence and legal precedent, and it allows for a more fair and equitable justice system that takes into account the developmental differences between youth and adults.

Summary of Argument

Recent studies and court cases have shown that young people's brains are still developing, which affects how they think and act. This means they may not fully understand the consequences of their actions or be able to control their emotions as well as adults.

In recent years, the Supreme Court has made several important decisions that recognize these differences:

• No death penalty for people under 18

• No life sentences without parole for young people who commit crimes other than murder

• Police must consider a person's age when questioning them

• Mandatory life sentences without parole for young people convicted of murder are unconstitutional

In Washington state, courts can consider a person's youth when deciding their sentence, even if they're over 18. This is because the law recognizes that young people may be less responsible for their actions due to their developing brains.

Being young doesn't excuse criminal behavior. However, it's important to consider how a person's youth might have affected their actions and whether a lesser sentence is appropriate.

Besides youth, courts can also consider other factors, such as intellectual disability. People with intellectual disabilities may not fully understand the wrongfulness of their actions and may deserve a lesser sentence.

The law recognizes that young people and people with intellectual disabilities may be less responsible for their actions. Courts have the power to consider these factors when deciding on a fair and appropriate sentence.

Summary of Argument

Did you know that young people's brains are still growing and changing, even into their early 20s? This means that they don't always think or act like adults. They might not understand the consequences of their actions as well, or they might be more easily influenced by their friends.

Because of these brain differences, young people are generally less responsible for their crimes than adults. That's why the law sometimes treats them differently.

In Washington state, judges can consider a person's youth when deciding their sentence for a crime. Even if the person is 18 or older, the judge can still think about how their young age might have affected their actions.

Besides age, judges can also consider other things that might make a person less responsible for a crime, like having an intellectual disability.

The goal is to give people a fair punishment that fits the crime they committed and their individual situation. By considering things like age and intellectual disability, judges can make sure that the punishment is just and appropriate.