INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The State of Louisiana sentenced Roderick White to die in prison on the basis of an out-of-court statement that another suspect, Brian Coleman, gave to the police when they brought him in for questioning. That statement was the only testimony that White was involved in the crime at all: At least two other witnesses failed to identify White as the perpetrator. And the forensic evidence—biological material taken from the victim’s clothing and fingernails, which did not match White’s DNA— similarly confirmed White’s lack of involvement.
Perhaps unsurprisingly in light of the inconsistencies between his testimony and the other evidence in the case, Coleman recanted. He executed an affidavit renouncing his inculpation of White, explaining that his statement was made while intoxicated and under extreme pressure from the police. Indeed, Coleman’s father was a police officer who was present in the interrogation room while Coleman was being questioned. The trial court, however, prohibited White from introducing that (sworn) affidavit—even as it allowed Louisiana to admit Coleman’s (unsworn) statements to the police.
Worse still—and of particular relevance here— White was unable to cross-examine Coleman about his now-recanted statement. Sometime after he executed his affidavit (which, of course, the jury was never able to see) renouncing the very testimony that Louisiana made the centerpiece of its case, a medical condition caused Coleman to experience a severe memory loss. As a result, he was (all agree) unable to recall either the details of the crime he claims to have witnessed or the circumstances under which he gave his statement implicating White (and exonerating himself). Thus, although Coleman was available to—and indeed did—appear on the witness stand at trial, he was unable to either defend or explain his crucial statement when asked about it by defense counsel. “After September [the year before the crime],” Coleman said, “I don’t remember nothing.” Pet. App. 4.
Because White had no meaningful opportunity to cross-examine Coleman about his prior testimony, introduction of that out-of-court statement violated the Sixth Amendment. The Confrontation Clause permits the State to offer an out-of-court testimonial statement against a criminal defendant only if the defendant has (or previously had) an “adequate” opportunity to cross-examine the declarant about it. And as this Court has explained, the physical act of appearing on the witness stand is, alone, insufficient to provide that “adequate” opportunity. If a witness appears at trial, but is unable or unwilling to answer the defense’s questions about his prior statement, the defendant has not had an adequate opportunity to cross examine him. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965) (no adequate opportunity for cross examination where declarant responded to defense counsel’s questions by invoking privilege).
The Louisiana Court of Appeal, however, held— directly contrary to that rule—that as long as “the declarant [is] available” to appear on the stand that is enough. Pet. App. 6. Because it found that “Coleman was available,” it thought White was guaranteed nothing further. Pet. App. 6. That conclusion is profoundly wrong and merits this Court’s review.