SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Respondent is being held in Ohio’s Chillicothe Correctional Institution and is facing the death penalty. Last year, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed an order issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, in favor of Respondent. That order, Pet. App. 23a-33a, directed Petitioner, the Warden of the prison, to transport Respondent to The Ohio State University Wexner Medical Center for functional neurological imaging.

This imaging is highly likely to reveal data not only relevant to Respondent’s underlying clinical condition, but to brain abnormalities existing at the time of his crime, trial, and sentencing that bear on his petition for habeas corpus relief. Respondent cannot obtain such imaging in prison. CLBB therefore submits this brief amicus curiae in support of Respondent with respect to the decision of the Sixth Circuit upholding the District Court’s order of transportation.

In addition to its own arguments on this point, CLBB supports the position of Respondent, and of the United States as amicus curiae supporting neither party, that the All Writs Act empowers a District Court to order the transport of a state prisoner for medical testing in appropriate circumstances not covered by the specific habeas corpus authorization of 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5). CLBB also agrees with Respondent that the particular situation presented to the District Court by Respondent was such an appropriate circumstance. This means that the United States is not correct that this Court should impose additional hurdles on Respondent’s effort to obtain the requested imaging of his own brain.

The nature of functional neuroimaging indicates why this is so. First, an individual’s access to his or her own neurological condition is not a matter of “discovery.” The presence of overlapping clinical and legal rationales for the neuroimaging in this case underscores both that Respondent legally possesses the contents of his own brain and its activity, and that imaging those personal neurophysiologic processes is different than Respondent obtaining data from someone else. The order of the District Court was therefore entirely “agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).

Second, Petitioner (and the United States) fail adequately to account for the nature of neurological and psychiatric analysis, including that based on functional neuroimaging, when they seek to impose requirements (as the United States puts it), of first “identifying a[] specific claim to which the resulting evidence would relate” and “establishing that the district court would be able to consider that evidence.” Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, Shoop v. Twyford, No. 21–511, at 8-9 (March 2022). Absent an examination, an individual such as Respondent likely would not be able to determine to what specific claim any resulting data might relate. So the answer is not to require counsel to match a litany of hypothetical data to a litany of “specific claim[s].” The answer is first to determine if a scientific basis exists for seeking the data; if so, to obtain the data; and only then to make an evidentiary decision about whether the data would be admissible (and for what purpose).

CLBB sees, in the record below and in the District Court, a clear medical basis for the proposed imaging and a clear nexus between any potential brain findings from that imaging and the substance of Respondent’s post-conviction challenges. Indeed, the data from the imaging is highly likely to be relevant, particularly as to Respondent’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Whether it had a full scientific understanding of this likelihood, the Court of Appeals correctly addressed the issues in its requirement that Respondent show (as he did) that what he sought would at least “plausibly relate[]” to his habeas claims. Pet. App. 16a. This is not, contrary to Petitioner’s argument, a “dangerous” standard that “if allowed to stand, . . . will require States to bring dangerous criminals to public settings so that they may collect irrelevant, unusable evidence.” Pet. Br. at 17.

Indeed, Petitioner’s own arguments demonstrates one reason why: until the functional neuroimaging occurs, there is no way to conclude that the data it produces will be “irrelevant” or “unusable.” The Court of Appeals’ standard is therefore little different in risk than “commonsense” standards such as “reasonable suspicion” or “probable cause,” e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695-96 (1996), where something is not knowable without further examination. But whatever the standard, its “substantive content” should derive “from the particular context[]” in which it is “being assessed.” Id. at 696. The exceptional facts in this particular case certainly establish a context strongly supporting the functional neuroimaging requested by Respondent.

Summary

An individual held at Ohio’s Chillicothe Correctional Institution, facing the death penalty, was granted an order by a U.S. District Court. This order, affirmed by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, directed the prison Warden to transport the individual to The Ohio State University Wexner Medical Center for functional neurological imaging.

This imaging is expected to provide important information about the individual's current medical condition and potential brain abnormalities that existed at the time of the crime, trial, and sentencing. This information could be relevant to a petition for habeas corpus relief. Since this imaging cannot be done in prison, a legal brief was submitted to support the Sixth Circuit's decision to uphold the transportation order.

The All Writs Act gives District Courts the authority to order the transport of a state prisoner for medical testing when appropriate, even if specific habeas corpus laws do not cover it. The situation presented to the District Court in this case was deemed appropriate. This means that imposing additional obstacles for the individual to obtain the requested brain imaging is not correct.

The nature of functional neuroimaging explains why this is the case. Firstly, an individual's access to information about their own brain condition is not merely "discovery." The presence of both medical and legal reasons for the neuroimaging in this case shows that the individual legally owns the information about their own brain and its activity. Imaging these personal brain processes is different from obtaining information from someone else. Therefore, the District Court's order was consistent with legal principles.

Secondly, the Warden and the United States do not fully consider the nature of neurological and psychiatric analysis, including that based on functional neuroimaging. They suggest requirements such as "identifying a specific claim" and "establishing that the district court would be able to consider that evidence" before the imaging is done. Without an examination, an individual would likely not be able to determine what specific claim any resulting data might relate to. The correct approach is to first determine if there is a scientific reason to seek the data, then obtain the data, and only then decide if the data is admissible and for what purpose.

There is a clear medical reason for the proposed imaging and a strong connection between potential brain findings from that imaging and the individual's post-conviction legal challenges. The data from the imaging is highly likely to be relevant, especially regarding claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeals correctly required the individual to show that what was sought would at least "plausibly relate" to the habeas claims. This standard is not "dangerous" or one that will force states to bring dangerous criminals to public settings for irrelevant evidence.

The Warden's own arguments show why this is true: until the functional neuroimaging occurs, there is no way to know if the data produced will be "irrelevant" or "unusable." The Court of Appeals' standard is similar in risk to "commonsense" standards like "reasonable suspicion" or "probable cause," where something cannot be known without further examination. The specific facts of this case strongly support the requested functional neuroimaging.

Summary

An individual held in Ohio's Chillicothe Correctional Institution, facing the death penalty, seeks permission for specific medical testing. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit confirmed a lower court's decision, which used the All Writs Act to order the prison warden to transport the individual to The Ohio State University Wexner Medical Center. The purpose of this transport is for functional neurological imaging.

This imaging is expected to provide important information about the individual's current health and potential brain issues that may have existed at the time of the crime, trial, and sentencing. This information could be relevant to a petition for habeas corpus, a legal challenge to the legality of the detention. Since such imaging cannot be done within the prison, an amicus curiae brief supports the individual's request for transportation.

The All Writs Act gives a District Court the power to order the transport of a state prisoner for medical testing in certain situations, even if these situations are not specifically covered by other legal provisions. The specific circumstances of this case are considered appropriate for such an order. Therefore, additional hurdles should not be placed on the individual's efforts to obtain this brain imaging.

The nature of functional neuroimaging highlights why this is the case. First, an individual's access to information about their own brain condition is not merely a matter of "discovery." The presence of both medical and legal reasons for the imaging in this case shows that the individual has a right to the information about their own brain and its activity. Imaging these personal brain processes is different from seeking information about someone else. The District Court's order was therefore consistent with legal principles.

Second, arguments made by the prison warden and the United States do not fully consider the nature of neurological and psychiatric analysis, especially when based on functional neuroimaging. They suggest that an individual must first identify a specific legal claim to which the evidence would relate and prove that the court could consider that evidence. However, without an examination, an individual would likely not know what specific claim any resulting data might relate to. The proper approach is to first determine if there is a scientific reason to seek the data, then obtain the data, and only then decide if the data is admissible in court.

There is a clear medical reason for the proposed imaging and a strong connection between potential brain findings from that imaging and the individual's legal challenges after conviction. It is highly probable that the imaging data will be relevant, particularly for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeals correctly determined that the individual needed to show that the requested imaging would at least "plausibly relate" to the habeas claims. This is not a "dangerous" standard that would force states to transport dangerous criminals to public places for irrelevant evidence. Until the functional neuroimaging is done, it is impossible to say whether the data will be "irrelevant" or "unusable." This standard is similar to "reasonable suspicion" or "probable cause," where further examination is needed to gain knowledge. The unique facts of this case strongly support the requested functional neuroimaging.

Summary

A person facing the death penalty is being held at Ohio's Chillicothe Correctional Institution. Last year, a federal appeals court upheld a lower court's order. This order told the prison warden to transport the person to The Ohio State University Wexner Medical Center. The purpose was to undergo special brain imaging.

This imaging is expected to provide important information about the person's medical condition. It could also reveal brain problems that existed at the time of the crime, trial, and sentencing. This information could be important for the person's request for a new review of the case. Such imaging cannot be done in prison. Therefore, this brief supports the appeals court's decision to allow the transportation for this testing.

The court has the power to order the transport of a state prisoner for medical testing when appropriate. This is true even if the situation is not specifically covered by laws about prisoner requests. The specific situation in this case was an appropriate circumstance for such an order. This means that no additional obstacles should be placed on the person's effort to get this brain imaging.

The nature of this brain imaging shows why this is important. First, a person's access to information about their own brain condition is not simply a matter of "discovery." There are both medical and legal reasons for this imaging, which highlights that the person legally owns the information within their own brain. Imaging these personal brain processes is different from getting information from someone else. Therefore, the lower court's order followed legal principles.

Second, arguments made against the imaging do not fully consider the nature of brain analysis. It is not reasonable to demand that someone identify a specific legal claim the evidence would relate to before the examination. Without an examination, a person would likely not know what specific claim any results might support. The correct approach is to first determine if there is a scientific reason to seek the data. If so, the data should be obtained. Only then should a decision be made about whether the data can be used as evidence.

There is a clear medical reason for the proposed imaging and a clear link between potential brain findings and the person's legal challenges after conviction. It is very likely that the imaging data will be relevant, especially for claims that the legal help received was ineffective.

The appeals court correctly required the person to show that the imaging would at least "plausibly relate" to the legal claims, which was demonstrated. This is not a "dangerous" standard that will force states to bring dangerous criminals to public places for irrelevant evidence.

In fact, arguments against the imaging show why this is incorrect: until the brain imaging happens, there is no way to know if the data will be "irrelevant" or "unusable." The appeals court's standard is similar to "reasonable suspicion" or "probable cause," where something cannot be known without further investigation. The specific facts of this case strongly support the requested brain imaging.

Summary

A man in prison in Ohio is set to face the death penalty. A court last year said the prison must take him to a medical center for special brain scans.

These brain scans are very likely to show important facts about the man's brain at the time of his crime, trial, and sentencing. This information could help with his case. The prison cannot do these scans. A group called CLBB agrees with the court's decision to have the man moved for these scans.

CLBB believes that courts can order prisoners to be moved for medical tests like these. The group also believes this specific case is a good reason for such an order. This means the court should not make it harder for the man to get these brain scans.

Looking at someone's own brain is not like asking for information from someone else. The court's order was therefore proper under the law.

The prison and the United States government do not fully understand how brain tests work. They say the man needs to know exactly how the scan results will help his case before getting the scan. But without the scan, it is hard to know what the results will show. It is better to first see if there's a good reason for the science test, then do the test, and then decide if the results can be used in court.

CLBB sees a clear medical reason for the scans and believes the results will be important for the man's case. The results could show that his lawyer did not do a good job helping him.

The court was right to say the man only needed to show that the scans would likely be connected to his case. This is not a dangerous rule that would make states bring criminals out for no good reason.

Until the scans are done, no one can say the results will be useless. This standard is similar to "reasonable suspicion" in other legal cases, where more checking is needed to find out information. The facts of this case strongly support the man getting the brain scans he asked for.