Summary of Argument
Should triers of fact consider juvenile brain science?
The purpose of this amicus brief is to move the issue of juvenile mens rea out of the realm of what "any parent knows" (Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 569 (Roper)), and into the area of scientific theory, where defined terms and precise explication of brain physiology provide a more complex, more complete picture. While that was the focus of Dr. Elizabeth Cauffman's testimony at petitioner's evidentiary hearing (RT 130-182), the trial court's and prosecution's comments on the record suggest that her cogent explanation of the science behind juvenile brain development did not find its way into the court's reasoning. Had it done so, the result of the hearing would have been different.
The commitment to considering juvenile brain development touches nearly every area in which children come in contact with the law. Moreover, the particular issue in this case - a child's ability to evaluate risk - is a primary reason the law distinguishes between adults and children. The law limits a child's capacity to engage in inherently risky activities, such as buying or consuming alcohol and drugs, purchasing or using firearms, executing contracts, or consenting to sexual activity. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25658; Pen. Code, § 29610; Fam. Code, § 6701; Pen. Code, § 261.5.)
More pertinently, a child is considered less responsible for his actions in the criminal justice context - specifically, in the areas of sentencing (Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 (Miller) and its progeny), in-custody interrogation .D.B. v. North Carolina (2011) 564 U.S. 261 U.D.B.); In re Art T. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 335 (Art T.)), parole (S 4801, subd. (c).), felony murder resentencing, where it is widely accepted that the defendant's "youth and its hallmark characteristics" must be accounted for when deciding whether he is a major participant (People v. Harris (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 939, 960 (Harris.) or acted with reckless indifference to human life (In re Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 434 (Moore)), and finally, with specific regard to Reyes, in the Welfare and Institutions Code, which states that - were Reyes charged today - his case could only be adjudicated in juvenile court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a).)
Despite this widespread agreement by the courts that juvenile brain development is relevant to a minor defendant's mens rea, the People argue that this Court should confine its consideration of juvenile brain development to the mens rea element of felony murder only: whether the defendant displayed "reckless indifference to human life" rather than
"conscious disregard for human life." (Respondent's Answer Brief on the Merits (RABM at 38-39 & n.5.) The People argue that, "[while the two standards are similar and youth may be relevant to both, they are not identical, and the law is not yet clear that substantial evidence of one would necessarily suffice to meet the other." (Ibid.)
Leaving aside the similar phrasing, and the fact that "indifference" and "disregard" are basically synonymous nouns, it defies logic to suggest that a child’s brain development should be considered only in the context of the more culpable mens rea required for felony murder, and not the less culpable mens rea required for implied malice murder. Therefore, the answer to the first question is, “Yes, of course.”
To what extent should triers of fact consider juvenile brain science?
During the past decade, it has become commonplace to order courts and parole boards to “consider youth” in making criminal justice decisions. (See, e.g., Pen. Code § 1170, subd. (a)(6)(B) (eff. Jan. 1, 2022) (ordering the sentencing court to impose the low term of a determinate sentence if “[t]he person is a youth, or was a youth as defined under subdivision (b) of Section 1016.7 at the time of the commission of the offense.”)) The content of the word “consider,” however, is frequently left up to the court’s discretion, with varying results. The court’s discretion is complicated by the fact that the scientific literature explaining juvenile brain development is highly technical, abstruse, and – particularly frustrating for the legal mind – seemingly unable to come to clear conclusions.
Nonetheless, the clinical literature on brain science is necessary. It clearly demonstrates a physiological basis for juveniles’ impulsivity and lack of temperance or perspective. Functional magnetic resonance imaging vividly illustrates how the juvenile brain struggles to communicate with itself. None of these brain processes is a “choice,” though they do affect what we call choice.
Juvenile brain function is complex, and the scientific evidence is hard to interpret. As a result, psychologists find themselves explaining complex scientific findings in language tailored to a layperson’s understanding – and there the trouble begins, because the layperson terms used carry with them their own baggage – as do the laypersons themselves.
One particularly problematic example of translating juvenile brain science to legal doctrine is how to describe “conscious disregard for human life” in a way that considers the unique properties of the juvenile brain. One common – and unfortunate - simplification is this: juveniles have the same “knowledge” of danger as adults because their cognitive development is complete by age 16.5 Despite this “knowledge,” however, juveniles have poor “impulse control”6 and therefore choose to do that which they “know” to be dangerous.
In fact, what is really dangerous is the oversimplification the above statements represent. To say that a child “knows” the risks involved with a certain activity overemphasizes the role of cognitive function in this element and discounts the very real part played by psychosocial maturity in assessing risk.7 In fact, as discussed below, adolescent evaluation of risk is a complex hybrid of cognitive and psychosocial functions, with the emotional centers of the brain laboring to communicate with the reasoning centers, both impaired by immaturity.
It is also dangerous to use ordinary terms in a specialized way, without explaining their particular meaning, or their context. For example, the term “impulse control” is a term freighted with cultural bias. For some conservative criminal justice theorists, it invokes a bygone age, where youth prioritized “self-control” over “free expression”; only to give in to impulse during a morally degraded era of “cultural relativism.”8 When scientists use everyday terms because they are less threatening than actual scientific terms, they forget that these terms are less threatening because they have been used repeatedly in other context, and in the service of other ideologies. Theorists such as John DiIulio used “juveniles” and “impulsivity” to formulate a social condition of “moral poverty” and predict a coming surge of homicidal violence in the 1990s; this in turn led to the “super-predator” theory, which contributed heavily to mass incarceration of youth in California and across the country.9
It is understandable that actors in the legal system bring their philosophies to legal decision-making; but that cannot justify ignoring a well-established model of the human brain in adolescence. It is very easy for the conversation about juvenile brain development to slide into this type of formulation: “He knew what he was doing was bad, but he just couldn’t (or didn’t) stop himself.” But this oversimplification results in serious injustices – as it did in this case. Contrary to the above formulation, the “knowing” part of the brain and the “impulsive part of the brain are deeply intertwined. Rather than let the rule dictate the science, the science should inform the rule.
This Court should explicitly acknowledge the reality that brain science -- in all its complexity – has a role to play in evaluating implied malice mens rea in cases involving youthful defendants. According, it should reject the People’s attempt to limit Moore and Ramirez to their facts.