Brief of the Juvenile Innocence & Fair Sentencing Clinic in Support of Appellant Reyes
Christopher Hawthorne
Marisa Harris
SimpleOriginal

Summary

The court should explicitly hold that the science of juvenile brain development is relevant to whether petitioner exhibited "conscious disregard for human life" in the case against him for implied malice murder.

2022 | State Juristiction

Brief of the Juvenile Innocence & Fair Sentencing Clinic in Support of Appellant Reyes

Keywords hallmark characteristic of youth; risk-taking; juvenile brain development; inability to appreciate risk; mens rea; brain maturity; murder; science
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Summary of Argument

Should triers of fact consider juvenile brain science?

The purpose of this amicus brief is to move the issue of juvenile mens rea out of the realm of what "any parent knows" (Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 569 (Roper)), and into the area of scientific theory, where defined terms and precise explication of brain physiology provide a more complex, more complete picture. While that was the focus of Dr. Elizabeth Cauffman's testimony at petitioner's evidentiary hearing (RT 130-182), the trial court's and prosecution's comments on the record suggest that her cogent explanation of the science behind juvenile brain development did not find its way into the court's reasoning. Had it done so, the result of the hearing would have been different.

The commitment to considering juvenile brain development touches nearly every area in which children come in contact with the law. Moreover, the particular issue in this case - a child's ability to evaluate risk - is a primary reason the law distinguishes between adults and children. The law limits a child's capacity to engage in inherently risky activities, such as buying or consuming alcohol and drugs, purchasing or using firearms, executing contracts, or consenting to sexual activity. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25658; Pen. Code, § 29610; Fam. Code, § 6701; Pen. Code, § 261.5.)

More pertinently, a child is considered less responsible for his actions in the criminal justice context - specifically, in the areas of sentencing (Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 (Miller) and its progeny), in-custody interrogation .D.B. v. North Carolina (2011) 564 U.S. 261 U.D.B.); In re Art T. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 335 (Art T.)), parole (S 4801, subd. (c).), felony murder resentencing, where it is widely accepted that the defendant's "youth and its hallmark characteristics" must be accounted for when deciding whether he is a major participant (People v. Harris (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 939, 960 (Harris.) or acted with reckless indifference to human life (In re Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 434 (Moore)), and finally, with specific regard to Reyes, in the Welfare and Institutions Code, which states that - were Reyes charged today - his case could only be adjudicated in juvenile court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a).)

Despite this widespread agreement by the courts that juvenile brain development is relevant to a minor defendant's mens rea, the People argue that this Court should confine its consideration of juvenile brain development to the mens rea element of felony murder only: whether the defendant displayed "reckless indifference to human life" rather than

"conscious disregard for human life." (Respondent's Answer Brief on the Merits (RABM at 38-39 & n.5.) The People argue that, "[while the two standards are similar and youth may be relevant to both, they are not identical, and the law is not yet clear that substantial evidence of one would necessarily suffice to meet the other." (Ibid.)

Leaving aside the similar phrasing, and the fact that "indifference" and "disregard" are basically synonymous nouns, it defies logic to suggest that a child’s brain development should be considered only in the context of the more culpable mens rea required for felony murder, and not the less culpable mens rea required for implied malice murder. Therefore, the answer to the first question is, “Yes, of course.”

To what extent should triers of fact consider juvenile brain science?

During the past decade, it has become commonplace to order courts and parole boards to “consider youth” in making criminal justice decisions. (See, e.g., Pen. Code § 1170, subd. (a)(6)(B) (eff. Jan. 1, 2022) (ordering the sentencing court to impose the low term of a determinate sentence if “[t]he person is a youth, or was a youth as defined under subdivision (b) of Section 1016.7 at the time of the commission of the offense.”)) The content of the word “consider,” however, is frequently left up to the court’s discretion, with varying results. The court’s discretion is complicated by the fact that the scientific literature explaining juvenile brain development is highly technical, abstruse, and – particularly frustrating for the legal mind – seemingly unable to come to clear conclusions.

Nonetheless, the clinical literature on brain science is necessary. It clearly demonstrates a physiological basis for juveniles’ impulsivity and lack of temperance or perspective. Functional magnetic resonance imaging vividly illustrates how the juvenile brain struggles to communicate with itself. None of these brain processes is a “choice,” though they do affect what we call choice.

Juvenile brain function is complex, and the scientific evidence is hard to interpret. As a result, psychologists find themselves explaining complex scientific findings in language tailored to a layperson’s understanding – and there the trouble begins, because the layperson terms used carry with them their own baggage – as do the laypersons themselves.

One particularly problematic example of translating juvenile brain science to legal doctrine is how to describe “conscious disregard for human life” in a way that considers the unique properties of the juvenile brain. One common – and unfortunate - simplification is this: juveniles have the same “knowledge” of danger as adults because their cognitive development is complete by age 16.5 Despite this “knowledge,” however, juveniles have poor “impulse control”6 and therefore choose to do that which they “know” to be dangerous.

In fact, what is really dangerous is the oversimplification the above statements represent. To say that a child “knows” the risks involved with a certain activity overemphasizes the role of cognitive function in this element and discounts the very real part played by psychosocial maturity in assessing risk.7 In fact, as discussed below, adolescent evaluation of risk is a complex hybrid of cognitive and psychosocial functions, with the emotional centers of the brain laboring to communicate with the reasoning centers, both impaired by immaturity.

It is also dangerous to use ordinary terms in a specialized way, without explaining their particular meaning, or their context. For example, the term “impulse control” is a term freighted with cultural bias. For some conservative criminal justice theorists, it invokes a bygone age, where youth prioritized “self-control” over “free expression”; only to give in to impulse during a morally degraded era of “cultural relativism.”8 When scientists use everyday terms because they are less threatening than actual scientific terms, they forget that these terms are less threatening because they have been used repeatedly in other context, and in the service of other ideologies. Theorists such as John DiIulio used “juveniles” and “impulsivity” to formulate a social condition of “moral poverty” and predict a coming surge of homicidal violence in the 1990s; this in turn led to the “super-predator” theory, which contributed heavily to mass incarceration of youth in California and across the country.9

It is understandable that actors in the legal system bring their philosophies to legal decision-making; but that cannot justify ignoring a well-established model of the human brain in adolescence. It is very easy for the conversation about juvenile brain development to slide into this type of formulation: “He knew what he was doing was bad, but he just couldn’t (or didn’t) stop himself.” But this oversimplification results in serious injustices – as it did in this case. Contrary to the above formulation, the “knowing” part of the brain and the “impulsive part of the brain are deeply intertwined. Rather than let the rule dictate the science, the science should inform the rule.

This Court should explicitly acknowledge the reality that brain science -- in all its complexity – has a role to play in evaluating implied malice mens rea in cases involving youthful defendants. According, it should reject the People’s attempt to limit Moore and Ramirez to their facts.

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Summary of Argument

This brief argues that courts should consider juvenile brain science when determining a minor's criminal intent (mens rea). The brief counters the prosecution's argument that this consideration should be limited to felony murder cases by arguing that a child's brain development is relevant to all criminal intent evaluations.

Should Triers of Fact Consider Juvenile Brain Science?

This brief aims to shift the conversation about juvenile mens rea from relying on common sense assumptions about children to relying on scientific evidence. While expert testimony on this topic was presented at the petitioner's hearing, the court's decision did not incorporate this evidence.

The importance of considering juvenile brain development extends to nearly every legal interaction involving children. This is particularly relevant when evaluating a child's capacity to assess risk, as the law acknowledges children's limited ability to participate in risky activities like consuming alcohol, purchasing firearms, or entering contracts.

This is also relevant to the criminal justice system, where children are often held to a lower standard of responsibility. This principle applies to sentencing, interrogation, parole, felony murder resentencing, and juvenile court proceedings.

Despite this broad recognition of the importance of juvenile brain development, the prosecution argues that this consideration should be limited to felony murder cases, specifically focusing on the "reckless indifference to human life" standard. They claim that this standard is different from the "conscious disregard for human life" standard, and that evidence of one does not necessarily prove the other.

However, the argument that brain development should only be considered in the more serious context of felony murder is illogical. Juvenile brain development should be considered in all cases where a child's capacity to understand and evaluate risk is at issue.

To What Extent Should Triers of Fact Consider Juvenile Brain Science?

Courts and parole boards are increasingly encouraged to consider the "youth" of offenders when making legal decisions. However, the extent of this consideration often varies, leaving room for interpretation. This difficulty is compounded by the complex nature of scientific research on juvenile brain development, which can be challenging for legal professionals to interpret.

Despite the complexity, research clearly shows that juvenile brains are still developing, leading to impulsivity and limited ability to control emotions or think long-term. Brain imaging shows that juvenile brains struggle with communication between different parts of the brain, impacting decision-making processes.

However, applying this science to legal situations can be challenging due to the need for clear and understandable language. Simplified explanations of complex concepts like "conscious disregard for human life" can be misleading. For example, while juveniles may have the same cognitive understanding of risk as adults, they struggle with impulse control. This oversimplification ignores the role of psychosocial maturity in assessing risk.

Furthermore, everyday terms can be misinterpreted. For example, the term "impulse control" is often used to justify stricter punishments for youth, but this ignores the complex scientific understanding of brain development.

It is crucial to avoid using simplified language to explain complex scientific concepts. While legal actors may bring their own philosophies to their decision-making, these philosophies should not overshadow the scientific understanding of adolescent brain development.

The court should acknowledge the importance of brain science in evaluating criminal intent, regardless of the type of crime. The prosecution's attempt to limit this consideration to specific situations is misguided and could lead to injustice.

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Summary of Argument

This brief argues that the legal system should consider the science of juvenile brain development when evaluating a minor's criminal culpability, particularly regarding the mental state required for murder.

Should Triers of Fact Consider Juvenile Brain Science?

The legal system increasingly recognizes that juveniles' brains are still developing and may affect their decision-making abilities. However, the specific implications of this science are often overlooked or misinterpreted. This brief urges courts to embrace the scientific evidence on juvenile brain development and consider its implications when evaluating a minor's criminal culpability.

To What Extent Should Triers of Fact Consider Juvenile Brain Science?

The scientific literature on juvenile brain development demonstrates that adolescents are still developing crucial cognitive and emotional abilities. The juvenile brain struggles with impulse control, risk assessment, and emotional regulation. These developmental differences are not a matter of choice but are rooted in the biological structure and function of the adolescent brain.

The legal system often uses oversimplified terms to explain complex scientific concepts, leading to misconceptions. For example, the term "impulse control" is often used without acknowledging the nuances of the underlying biological processes. Oversimplifying these concepts can lead to biased interpretations and perpetuate harmful stereotypes about adolescents' behavior.

The science of juvenile brain development should inform legal decision-making, particularly when evaluating the mental state required for crimes. This brief advocates for a more nuanced understanding of the complexities of adolescent brain development and its implications for criminal culpability. By incorporating this scientific understanding into legal rulings, the legal system can ensure fairer and more just outcomes for juvenile offenders.

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Summary of Argument

This document argues that courts should consider scientific evidence about how the brains of teenagers develop when making decisions about a teenager’s criminal responsibility.

Should Triers of Fact Consider Juvenile Brain Science?

The purpose of this document is to explain that the brains of teenagers are different from the brains of adults and that this difference should be considered when deciding if a teenager is guilty of a crime. The document will use scientific evidence to support this idea. This evidence was presented in court, but the judge did not seem to consider it.

It is important to consider how the brains of teenagers develop because this development affects how teenagers behave. For example, the law limits what teenagers can do based on the idea that they don't have the same ability as adults to think about the consequences of their actions. This idea is used in many situations, including when teenagers are accused of crimes.

In criminal cases, courts often take into account the age of the defendant when making decisions about punishment, interrogation, and parole. It is generally accepted that the defendant's young age should be considered when making decisions about sentencing, especially in cases of felony murder, where the defendant's level of responsibility for the crime is important.

However, the state argues that this type of scientific evidence should only be considered in cases of felony murder, and not in other cases. This is illogical because the same scientific evidence can be used to understand how teenagers think in all types of crimes. So the answer to the question is yes, courts should consider scientific evidence about how the brains of teenagers develop in all cases.

To What Extent Should Triers of Fact Consider Juvenile Brain Science?

In recent years, courts have been told to consider the age of the defendant when making decisions about criminal justice, but it is not always clear how this should be done. This is complicated because scientific research about how the brains of teenagers develop is complex and sometimes hard to understand.

However, this research is important because it shows that the brains of teenagers work differently from the brains of adults. This difference can affect how teenagers think, make decisions, and control their impulses. The research also shows that the parts of the brain that are responsible for thinking and feeling don't always work together as well in teenagers as they do in adults. This makes it difficult for teenagers to think clearly about the consequences of their actions.

There are some common mistakes made when trying to explain this research in a way that judges and lawyers can understand. One common mistake is to say that teenagers know the difference between right and wrong, but they just can't control their impulses. This oversimplifies the research and doesn't take into account the complex way that teenagers' brains work.

Another mistake is to use everyday words in a scientific context without explaining what they mean. For example, the word "impulse control" can mean different things to different people. This can lead to misunderstandings and unfair decisions.

It is important for courts to use scientific evidence about how the brains of teenagers develop when making decisions about criminal responsibility. This research can help judges and juries to make more fair and accurate decisions. By ignoring this research, the court is making unfair decisions and ignoring important scientific knowledge.

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Summary of Argument

This brief talks about how the brains of teenagers are different from the brains of adults. It explains that teenagers don't always think the same way adults do, and that they might not understand the risks of their actions.

Should We Think About Teenager Brains in Court?

This paper says that we should consider how teenager brains work when we decide about crimes. It's like how we have special rules for teenagers when it comes to things like driving, drinking, or buying guns.

How Do Teenager Brains Work?

Teenagers are still learning how to make decisions and control their impulses. Scientists use special machines to see how their brains work. These pictures show that different parts of their brains don't always talk to each other very well. It's not like they're choosing to make bad decisions; it's how their brains are working.

Why Is It Hard to Explain Teenager Brains in Court?

Sometimes, it's hard to explain the science of teenager brains to people who aren't scientists. It's like trying to explain a complicated math problem to someone who hasn't learned math yet.

Why Can't We Just Say Teenagers "Know" What They're Doing?

That's not really accurate. It's not just about what they know, but also how they feel and how they make decisions. Teenagers' brains are still developing, and they don't always think the same way adults do.

Why Shouldn't We Oversimplify Teenager Brains?

It's not fair to say that teenagers just "know" what they're doing, but they can't stop themselves. That's not how their brains work. We need to understand how their brains are different from adult brains.

What Should We Do?

We need to understand that teenage brains are different and that this can influence their actions. We should not just ignore the science about how teenage brains work.

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Footnotes and Citation

Cite

Amicus Curiae Brief of the Juvenile Innocence & Fair Sentencing Clinic in Support of Appellant Reyes, People v. Reyes, No. S270723 (Cal. July 7, 2022).

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