Brief of the Center for Children's Advocacy and Juvenile Law Center in Support of Defendant David A. Fernandes
Marsha L. Levick
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Summary

Due process requires a hearing when juveniles are transferred to the adult criminal system, and juveniles should be afforded the opportunity to show they are amenable to treatment in the juvenile system.

2010 | State Juristiction

Brief of the Center for Children's Advocacy and Juvenile Law Center in Support of Defendant David A. Fernandes

Keywords due process; juveniles; transfers; transfer to adult court; youth; adolescent development
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Summary of Argument

The difference in possible outcomes in juvenile versus adult prosecution and sentencing is profound, resulting in life-altering consequences for juveniles treated as adults. Connecticut statute, C.G.S. §46b-127(b), unlawfully delegates to the prosecutor the power to choose the forum in which juvenile offenders are prosecuted without providing standards to guide that choice, without requiring a statement of reasons for that choice, and without affording an opportunity for review of that choice. As a matter of forum selection, not charging, prosecutorial discretion does not provide any special justification for the denial of process. The need for process is even greater when a prosecutor, who is inherently adversarial, rather than a judge, who is inherently neutral, chooses adult court over juvenile court. The transfer statute that divested the juvenile court of jurisdiction over Defendant David Fernandes is constitutionally defective because it deprives youth of their vested liberty interest guaranteed them by C.G.S. §46b-120 et seq. (juvenile docket has original jurisdiction over youth under age sixteen until prosecutor moves for and judge orders transfer) without due process. For that reason, this court must affirm his conviction’s reversal.

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Summary of Argument

The disparity in potential outcomes between juvenile and adult prosecution and sentencing for juveniles tried as adults is substantial, leading to significant ramifications for their lives. Connecticut law, C.G.S. §46b-127(b), inappropriately grants prosecutors the authority to determine the venue for juvenile offender prosecutions without establishing guiding criteria, demanding justifications for their decisions, or offering opportunities for reviewing these choices. The exercise of prosecutorial discretion in forum selection, as opposed to charging, lacks any unique justification for denying procedural safeguards. The need for procedural safeguards is even more critical when an adversarial prosecutor, as opposed to a neutral judge, decides to pursue adult court rather than juvenile court. The transfer statute that stripped the juvenile court of jurisdiction over Defendant David Fernandes is constitutionally flawed due to its violation of due process by depriving youth of their vested liberty interest as guaranteed by C.G.S. §46b-120 et seq. (juvenile court maintains original jurisdiction over individuals under sixteen until a prosecutor requests and a judge approves transfer). Consequently, the court must uphold the reversal of his conviction.

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Summary of Argument

The prosecution of juveniles as adults has a significant impact on their lives, potentially leading to different outcomes and harsher consequences than if they were tried in juvenile court. In Connecticut, the law delegates the authority to determine the forum for prosecution of juvenile offenders to the prosecutor, without providing clear standards, requiring a justification, or allowing for review. This process can be considered a violation of due process, particularly because the prosecutor is an adversarial party, unlike a neutral judge. The transfer statute that removed jurisdiction from the juvenile court in Defendant David Fernandes’ case lacks due process because it deprives youth of their vested liberty interest in being tried in juvenile court without a proper hearing. This court must affirm the reversal of his conviction due to the constitutional deficiencies of the statute.

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Summary of Argument

This legal argument focuses on the potential consequences of prosecuting juveniles as adults. The state of Connecticut has a law that allows prosecutors to decide whether to charge juveniles in adult or juvenile court. This argument claims that this law is unconstitutional because it doesn't provide clear guidelines for the prosecutor's decision and it doesn't require them to explain their reasoning. The argument also emphasizes the importance of due process, especially when a prosecutor (who is adversarial) makes the decision instead of a judge (who is neutral). It argues that the law violates a juvenile's right to be treated in the juvenile court system, which provides specific protections for young people. The argument concludes that the court should uphold the reversal of David Fernandes' conviction because the law used to transfer him to adult court is flawed.

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Summary of Argument

David Fernandes was a teenager when he was charged with a crime. Instead of being tried in juvenile court, he was moved to adult court. The law that allowed this move is unfair because it gives too much power to the prosecutor, who wants to punish people, instead of a judge, who wants to be fair. The law doesn't give the teenager a chance to explain why they should be tried in juvenile court instead of adult court. This means that the teenager is not getting a fair chance to defend themselves. Since the law is unfair, the judge should overturn the conviction.

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Footnotes and Citation

Cite

Brief of the Center for Children's Advocacy and Juvenile Law Center in Support of Defendant David A. Fernandes, State v. Fernandes, S.C. 18449 (Conn. Apr. 6, 2010).

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