ARGUMENT
Eyewitness testimony is often a critical part of the truth-seeking process. Accurate eyewitness identifications can provide powerful evidence of guilt or innocence. As this Court has "long recognized," however, "'eyewitness identification[s] ... present[] a substantial risk of misidentification'" and thus "`increase[] the chance of a conviction of an innocent defendant."' Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 796 (2009) (quoting Commonwealth v. Jones, 423 Mass. 99, 109 (1996)); see also, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967) ("The '' vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known[.]").
To mitigate the threat of erroneous convictions caused by mistaken identifications, this~Court has "recognized that, where the reliability of a positive eyewitness identification is an important issue at trial, a judge should instruct the jury regarding the evaluation of eyewitness identification -testimony." Commonwealth v. Franklin, 465 Mass. 895, 910 (2013), (citing Commonwealth v. Pressley, 390 Mass. 617, 619 (1983)). Over the last thirty years the Court has periodically revised those instructions to ensure their fairness and continued scientific accuracy. For example, in Commonwealth v. Pressley, 390 Mass. 617 (1983),-the Court held that the addition of an instruction that identifications can be "honest but mistaken" was compelled by "[f]airness to [the) defendant," id. at 620. And in Commonwealth v. Santoli, 424 Mass. 837 (1997), the Court eliminated from the approved instruction the suggestion of a correlation between witness confidence and accuracy, in light of "significant doubt" about such a correlation, id. at 845-846; see also Commonwealth v. i Rodriguez, 378 Mass. 296, 310-311 (1979) (adopting identification instruction from United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (per curiam)).
The cases now before the Court concern whether trial courts should instruct juries on four principles relating to eyewitness identifications: (1) that human memory is nit like a video recording; (2) that witnesses who are highly confident of their identifications are not therefore necessarily reliable; (3) that a witness's prior viewing of a suspect in an identification procedure, without making a positive identification, reduces the reliability of the witness's later identification of the same suspect; and (4) that the jury may consider the fact that an eyewitness to the crime has failed to identify a suspect in a police lineup.
In considering these issues, amici submit that this Court should take into account the extensive body of psychological research dedicated to eyewitness identifications--research that, as will be discussed at the outset, is highly reliable. That research supports a number of conclusions relevant here: First, each of the four scientific principles raised by the defendants in these cases has ample support in the psychological research. Second, despite the advent of DNA testing and a number of high-profile exonerations, jurors still lack an adequate understanding of human memory and of the factors that make identifications more or less susceptible to error. Third, while jury instructions alone will not solve the problem of false identifications, neither can other traditional safeguards of the adversary system-- cross-examination and expert testimony--by themselves counter in most cases the prejudicial effect of false identifications. Instructions, including those if the type requested here, are also needed.