Summary
The petition squarely presents the scope of the “ongoing emergency” doctrine under the Confrontation Clause in a critically important setting: a 911 call after a domestic violence assault where the victim suffered head injury and strangulation. The authorities cited in the Petition (at 17–22) indicate that the federal and state appellate courts conflict in their analysis of both 911 calls and statements by injured declarants. The distinctions between statements found to be testimonial and statements found to be nontestimonial appear brittle to nonexistent. This case presents the Court with an important opportunity to provide necessary guidance that will be crucial to many prosecutions of those who commit domestic violence.
The context of this case underscores the recurring importance of the question presented. Incidents of severe domestic violence remain all too frequent in the United States, and Confrontation Clause issues often arise in those prosecutions. Head injuries and nonfatal strangulation occur in a very large proportion of domestic violence assaults. The constitutional issues arising from this common setting warrant this Court’s attention and guidance.
The Court has identified the physical condition of the declarant as an important factor in determining whether the primary purpose of an out-of-court statement was testimonial. This case presents an opportunity to address how the common presence of head injury and strangulation in domestic violence assaults not only affects the scope and persistence of the relevant ongoing emergency but directly affects the formation of testimonial intent.
This case is an excellent vehicle to resolve the important question presented. As in the Court’s other recent Confrontation Clause decisions, the factual setting here permits the Court to resolve a division among the lower co
Argument
This Court has repeatedly held that out-of-court “[s]tatements are nontestimonial”—and thus their admission at trial does not violate the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause—when the statement was “made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.” Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237, 244 (2015) (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006)).
The Court has further explained that “the existence vel non of an ongoing emergency is not the touchstone of the testimonial inquiry.” Id. at 245 (quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 374 (2011) (cleaned up). Rather, “the question is whether, in light of all the circumstances, viewed objectively, the ‘primary purpose’ of the conversation was to ‘create an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.’” Ibid. (quoting Bryant, 562 U.S. at 358).
In Bryant, this Court noted that courts should take “into account a victim’s injuries” when assessing whether a statement was made with a primarily testimonial purpose. 562 U.S. at 369. In many cases, the Court observed, “a severely injured victim may have no purpose at all in answering questions posed; the answers may be simply reflexive.” Id. at 368–69. And some victims’ “injuries could be so debilitating as to prevent [them] from thinking sufficiently clearly to understand whether [their] statements are for the purpose of addressing an ongoing emergency or for the purpose of future prosecution” (id. at 369)—which should preclude a conclusion that the primary purpose of the statement was testimonial.
This case raises significant issues, largely overlooked or undervalued by the court below, central to the “objective inquiry” under the Confrontation Clause into “the understanding and purpose of a reasonable victim in the circumstances of the actual victim— circumstances that prominently include the victim’s physical state.” Ibid.
The court below applied an “unduly narrow understanding of ‘ongoing emergency,’” id. at 362, a constricted understanding shared by too many lower courts. See Pet. 17–19. This Court should grant the petition and provide the guidance needed to ensure that nontestimonial statements to first responders are not erroneously excluded.