INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Ninth Circuit correctly held that, when both the immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decline to find that an asylum applicant is non-credible, appellate courts cannot—for the first time on appeal—make an adverse credibility finding themselves. Appellate courts must accept that testimony as credible. As Respondents explain, this holding accords with both the asylum statute and bedrock principles of administrative law. Amici write here to underscore why it is so important that appellate courts refrain from stepping into the shoes of an immigration judge and make a credibility determination in the first instance.
In asylum cases, credibility determinations are both essential and fraught. On the one side, asylum seekers are often fleeing the specter of persecution or torture, including horrors such as domestic violence, sexual abuse, and human trafficking. In U.S. immigration courts half a world away, non-testimonial evidence may be hard to come by—so the most important evidence will often be the asylum seekers’ own words about what they experienced.
On the other side, however, science teaches that traumatic experiences—which are often what trigger asylum applications in the first place—can have longlasting effects on how survivors recount their experiences, as asylum seekers must do in asylum interviews and hearings. The survivor’s demeanor may be detached, nervous, or hesitant. The survivor may have gaps in memory or may be too ashamed, or afraid, to provide a detailed account. Or the survivor’s narrative may shift over time, as the survivor comes to terms with horrific experiences. An appellate judge reviewing a cold transcript, untrained in trauma, can mistake these effects for red flags that the survivor is not credible. But in fact, far from undermining credibility, these effects are consistent with suffering the kind of persecution that asylum exists to protect against.
Immigration judges are far better placed than appellate judges to evaluate an asylum seeker’s testimony and place the effects of trauma into the context of the overall record. Not only do immigration judges observe an asylum seeker first hand, but during their time on the bench, they often acquire significant experience with asylum cases and the trauma that such cases often implicate. Specialized training also exists to help immigration judges understand how to account for trauma in assessing witnesses. When that training is properly administered and deployed, immigration judges can learn to recognize the difference between lay stereotypes about credibility and what credibility actually looks like when a trauma survivor testifies in an asylum case (or indeed, any matter adjudicated by an immigration judge).
Appellate courts lack these critical tools. They have not seen the applicants, nor can they assess the tenor of the applicants’ testimony in the context of the whole record. And appellate courts do not receive any training as scaffolding against mistaking trauma’s artifacts for lack of credibility. If an appellate court attempts to assess an applicant’s credibility when the immigration judge has not explicitly done so on the record, the court may be faced with a case in which the applicant lacks traditional indicia of credible testimony—for example, because the applicant testified inconsistently about details like dates or the number of attackers at a specific event. And on a cold record, the appellate court will be unable to reliably weigh whether such inconsistencies indicate non-credible testimony, or whether these inconsistencies are foreseeable side effects of trauma.
For these reasons, Congress allocated to appellate courts the responsibility to review adverse credibility determinations, but it placed the role of making those determinations in the first instance with immigration judges, who can draw on both their experience with asylum cases—cases often accompanied by trauma—and their ability to directly hear the testimony. That is not to say that immigration judges always get it right. Appellate courts review adverse credibility determinations under established appellate standards and sometimes properly reverse adverse credibility determinations that fail to pass muster under those standards. But just as it is important that appellate judges faithfully carry out their duty to review credibility determinations, it is critical that appellate judges refrain from stepping into immigration judges’ shoes by making initial credibility determinations on a cold record.
Amici thus respectfully submit that the correct approach is the one the Ninth Circuit adopted: When neither the immigration judge nor the BIA has made a non-credibility finding, reviewing courts should not do so. Instead, they should treat the applicant’s testimony as credible. That does not mean the applicant will win— because even credible testimony may be insufficient to carry the applicant’s burden to show error in the denial of asylum. But it does mean that appellate judges must stick to their assigned role and decline to make their own credibility judgments when Congress vested the responsibility for doing so elsewhere.