Brief of Pacific Juvenile Defender Center et al. on Behalf of Appellant
Jonathan Laba
Maureen Pacheco
Marsha L. Levick
Neha Desai
Jessica Feierman
SimpleOriginal

Summary

The use of prior juvenile adjudications as strike "convictions" is inconsistent with the purpose of juvenile court and disregards California's carefully drawn boundaries between juvenile and adult court jurisdiction.

2008 | State Juristiction

Brief of Pacific Juvenile Defender Center et al. on Behalf of Appellant

Keywords developmental differences; due process; rehabilitation; Three Strikes Law; fitness hearing; risk-taking

Screenshot 2024-05-18 at 9.09.59 PM

Summary of Argument

Many who labor on behalf of delinquent children in California justifiably take pride in our state's system of juvenile justice. It is a system which can produce positive, sustained, and life-changing benefits for the children who are subject to its care. California's provision of "care, treatment and guidance" that is consistent with the child's and the public's best interests can heal families who benefit from the positive development and reform of their children. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 202(a) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 8 of 2008 Reg. Sess. and Ch. 6 of 2007-2008 Third Ex. Sess., and Props. 98 and 99). It can improve communities who profit from the transformation of delinquent children into productive and law-abiding citizens. As child advocates, Amici Pacific Juvenile Defender Center et al. recognize and support the rehabilitative ideals which have been an integral part of California's juvenile justice system for over a century. And while the system has transformed in recent decades to one that more closely resembles the adult criminal justice system, the ideals of education and reformation of the child remain at the juvenile system's core.

These benefits are not available to the many youth who are directly charged in or transferred to California's criminal courts. California has a comprehensive set of laws that provide for the arrest, prosecution and sentencing of certain juveniles as adults. These laws reflect California's decision to withhold from certain juveniles the benefits of the juvenile court's focus on rehabilitation. Yet equally important is that these laws provide for the retention of those benefits for a substantial class of juvenile offenders who commit delinquent acts and remain in the juvenile delinquency system. It is the rights of this latter class of offenders, who remain in juvenile court and who therefore lack the right to a jury trial, that are at stake in this appeal.

Those juveniles who remain in juvenile court are there for a reason. Following the passage of Proposition 21, the Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act of 1998, prosecutors have the discretion to directly charge as an adult any youth age 16 or older who commits an offense listed in section 707(b) of the Welfare and Institutions Code. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 707(d) (1); Manduley v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 4th 537, 549-50 (2002). For a juvenile adjudication to qualify as a "strike" under California's Three Strikes Law, one statutory prerequisite is that the youth must have been adjudicated a ward of the court while age 16 or older for an offense specified in section 707(b). Cal. Penal Code § 667 (d)(3)(D) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 8 of 2008 Reg. Sess. and Ch. 6 of 2007-2008 Third Ex. Sess., and Props. 98 and 99); People v. Garcia, 21 Cal. 4th 1, 4-5 (1999). In short, any youth prosecuted in juvenile court for an offense that would qualify as a "strike" is in juvenile court because the prosecution consented to that choice of forum. Amici expect that the prosecutor will make that choice following careful reflection about the circumstances of the offense, the nature of the offender, and the propriety of juvenile court treatment.

Thus, the youthful offenders eligible for prosecution in criminal court who remain in juvenile court are there because the prosecution, the court, or both have concluded that the youth is fit for juvenile court treatment--a less serious offender than a juvenile counterpart prosecuted as an adult. Yet this beneficence comes with an extraordinary cost: the loss of the right to a jury trial. That cost is magnified to an unconstitutional degree when those juvenile adjudications qualify as "strikes" under the Three Strikes Law.

The state cannot have it both ways: either there is a distinction between the juvenile and adult systems that justifies deprivation of a jury trial, or there is not a distinction, and the state must afford that right. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545-47 (1971) jury trial not constitutionally required for adjudicatory hearing; among other reasons, it would tend "to place the juvenile squarely in the routine of the criminal process.") Given the clear legislative choice to treat particular classes of juvenile offenders as adults and others as juveniles, equating a prior juvenile delinquency adjudication with a prior adult conviction for the purposes of the Three Strikes Law reduces California's transfer scheme to a mere formality, and makes a mockery of the historic trade-off between a more informal, treatment-centered juvenile court and the overtly punitive adult criminal justice system that is strictly bound by all federal constitutional mandates for due process.

Open Amicus Brief as PDF

Summary of Argument

The California juvenile justice system aims to rehabilitate delinquent youth, offering care, treatment, and guidance with the goal of promoting positive development and reform. However, the state also has laws allowing for the arrest, prosecution, and sentencing of certain juveniles as adults. This raises questions about the constitutional rights of juveniles who remain in the juvenile system, specifically their right to a jury trial.

While California's juvenile justice system emphasizes rehabilitation, it allows for the direct charging or transfer of certain juveniles to the adult criminal court system. This process reflects a deliberate choice by the state to withhold the benefits of the juvenile system's rehabilitative focus from certain youth. However, the state also retains these benefits for a significant class of juvenile offenders who remain within the juvenile delinquency system. This latter group of juveniles, who lack the right to a jury trial, are at the center of this appeal.

Following the passage of Proposition 21, prosecutors have the discretion to charge juveniles aged 16 or older as adults for specific offenses. Consequently, juveniles prosecuted in juvenile court for offenses that could qualify as "strikes" under California's Three Strikes Law are there because the prosecution chose that forum. This decision is likely based on careful consideration of the offense, offender, and the suitability of juvenile court treatment.

The prosecution's decision to keep certain juveniles in the juvenile system implies a belief that these offenders are amenable to rehabilitation. However, this decision comes with the significant consequence of denying them the right to a jury trial. This issue is particularly concerning when juvenile adjudications qualify as "strikes" under the Three Strikes Law.

The state cannot simultaneously maintain a distinction between the juvenile and adult systems justifying the deprivation of a jury trial while also equating juvenile adjudications with adult convictions for purposes of the Three Strikes Law. This practice reduces the state's transfer scheme to a formality and undermines the historical trade-off between the rehabilitative juvenile system and the punitive adult criminal justice system.

Open Amicus Brief as PDF

Summary of Argument

California's juvenile justice system is lauded for its rehabilitative focus, aiming to provide "care, treatment and guidance" in the best interests of both the child and the public. This system allows for the positive development and reform of youth, ultimately benefiting families and communities. While the system has shifted towards a more adult-like model in recent decades, the core principles of education and reformation remain.

However, juveniles who commit offenses that could lead to adult criminal charges may still be processed through the juvenile court system. This occurs when prosecutors exercise their discretion to retain these cases within the juvenile court, indicating that the youth is considered fit for juvenile court treatment. This decision reflects a belief that the youth is less serious of an offender than those who are prosecuted as adults.

Despite this distinction, juveniles who remain in the juvenile court system are denied the right to a jury trial. This loss of a fundamental right is particularly problematic when their juvenile adjudications are considered "strikes" under the Three Strikes Law, effectively equating a juvenile adjudication with an adult conviction.

This raises a critical constitutional question: if there is a meaningful distinction between the juvenile and adult systems, can the right to a jury trial be withheld from juveniles? Or, if no such distinction exists, should juveniles be afforded this constitutional right? The state's approach, which allows for both juvenile and adult processing for certain offenses, creates a disparity in treatment that undermines the purpose of the juvenile justice system and potentially violates constitutional guarantees.

Open Amicus Brief as PDF

Summary of Argument

In California, the juvenile justice system aims to help young offenders by providing "care, treatment and guidance" to support their positive development and reform. This system can benefit families and communities by helping young people become productive and law-abiding citizens. However, some young offenders are tried as adults in criminal court, where they don't have access to the same resources and support.

This document discusses the situation of young offenders in California who are prosecuted in juvenile court for crimes that could qualify as a "strike" under the Three Strikes Law. These young people are considered suitable for juvenile court treatment, meaning they are seen as less serious offenders than those who are tried as adults. However, they are denied the right to a jury trial.

The document argues that this situation is unfair because it undermines the distinction between the juvenile and adult justice systems. It suggests that if there is a genuine difference between the two systems, then juveniles in the juvenile court should not be deprived of the right to a jury trial. On the other hand, if there is no real difference, then the state should provide the right to a jury trial to all juveniles, regardless of whether they are tried in juvenile or adult court.

Open Amicus Brief as PDF

Summary of Argument

Many people in California who work with kids in the justice system are proud of their state's system of juvenile justice. This system can help kids make positive changes in their lives. California's system is supposed to help kids and keep everyone safe. It can even help families get better because their kids are learning and changing. These people who help kids, called "Amici", believe that the juvenile justice system should help kids learn and grow, even though it's become more like the adult justice system in recent years.

Some kids are sent to regular courts for adults, where they don't get the same help as kids in juvenile court. California has laws that allow this to happen, but those laws also say that many kids who get in trouble should stay in juvenile court. This case is about those kids who stay in juvenile court but don't get a jury trial.

Kids who stay in juvenile court are there because the prosecutors, who decide if a kid goes to court, believe that juvenile court is the right place for them. Prosecutors might decide this because the crime wasn't very serious or because the kid needs help. But this means that these kids don't get a jury trial. This is a big problem because it's unfair for kids who could be tried as adults to lose that right.

This is like saying that the adult and juvenile systems are the same, which isn't true. If the state wants to treat certain kids like adults, then they should give them the same rights as adults. Otherwise, they are just pretending that there's a difference between the two systems, when there really isn't.

Open Amicus Brief as PDF

Footnotes and Citation

Cite

Application of Pacific Juvenile Defender Center, Juvenile Law Center, Juvenile Division of the Los Angeles Public Defender, Alternate Public Defender, National Center for Youth Law and Youth Law Center for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief on Behalf of Appellant Nguyen and Brief, People of the State of California v. Vince Nguyen, S154847 (Cal.).

    Highlights