Summary of Argument

The Eighth Amendment requires courts to assess a challenged sentencing practice in light of the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958). To determine evolving standards of decency, courts are to consider objective criteria and their own independent judgment. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 (2002). A court may exempt a class of offenders from a punishment if it finds a national consensus against the practice and it independently determines that the punishment is disproportionate to the level of culpability of the class members. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005).

After considering national trends and newly discovered developmental data, the United States Supreme Court declared the death penalty unconstitutional as applied to the mentally disabled in 2002, see Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304, and youths seventeen and under in 2005, see Roper, 543 U.S. at 577. In deciding those cases, the Court found a national consensus against the practice of executing such individuals and that members of each class were categorically less culpable than traditional adult offenders. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316; Roper, 543 U.S. at 571. Five years after Roper, the Court categorically exempted youths seventeen and under from life incarceration without the possibility of parole (Juvenile Life Without the Possibility of Parole, “JLWOP”) sentences for non-homicide crimes. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 50 (2010). In Graham the Court found a national consensus against JLWOP for non-homicide crimes where these practices were rarely imposed even where statutorily allowed, with one state imposing a “significant majority” (77 of 123 or 62.6%) of JLWOP sentences and ten others imposing the remainder (46 of 123 or 37.39%). Id. at 64. In Miller v. Alabama the Court categorically exempted youths seventeen and under from mandatory JLWOP sentences, emphasizing that youths presented greater possibility of rehabilitation than adults. 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012) (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 570).

A categorical exemption is proper in Mr. Bredhold's case as it was in Atkins, Roper, Graham and Miller. Youths aged 18-20 are frequently treated differently under the law than adults twenty-one and over. Data shows that capital punishment is imposed upon youths aged 18-20 at the time of their offense at a frequency similar to the imposition of JLWOP for non-homicide crimes in Graham. 560 U.S. at 64-66. Recent developmental research indicates that, like the youths in Roper, youths aged 18-20 are categorically less culpable than offenders twenty-one and over. The categorical ban on capital punishment should be extended to protect youths aged 18-20 from cruel and unusual punishment.

Summary of Argument

The Eighth Amendment requires courts to evaluate challenged sentencing practices based on the evolving standards of decency that reflect societal progress. To determine these standards, courts consider objective evidence and exercise independent judgment. This analysis can lead to exemptions for specific groups from certain punishments if a national consensus exists against the practice and the punishment is deemed disproportionate to the group's culpability.

The Supreme Court has previously found national consensus against imposing capital punishment on individuals with intellectual disabilities and minors under 18, exempting these groups from such sentences. Similarly, the Court has exempted minors under 18 from mandatory life sentences without parole for non-homicide crimes. This exemption was based on the infrequent use of such sentences across states and the recognition that minors are more amenable to rehabilitation than adults.

This argument proposes extending the categorical exemption from capital punishment to individuals aged 18 to 20. This group is frequently treated differently from adults under the law, and the frequency of capital punishment imposed on individuals in this age group mirrors the rate of JLWOP sentences for non-homicide crimes found objectionable by the Court in a prior case. Recent research indicates that individuals aged 18 to 20 are less culpable than older offenders due to ongoing neurological development. Thus, a categorical ban on capital punishment should be extended to protect this age group from cruel and unusual punishment.

Summary of Argument

The Eighth Amendment requires courts to assess sentencing practices based on evolving societal standards of decency. Courts consider objective criteria and their independent judgment to determine these standards. A court may exempt a class of offenders from punishment if a national consensus against the practice exists and the court independently determines the punishment is disproportionate to the offender's culpability.

The Supreme Court has previously declared the death penalty unconstitutional for the mentally disabled and for individuals under seventeen years old. These decisions were based on national consensus against the practice and the finding that these groups were categorically less culpable than traditional adults. The Court also ruled against mandatory life sentences without parole for non-homicide offenses committed by individuals under eighteen years old, finding a similar national consensus against the practice and emphasizing the rehabilitative potential of youth.

This argument proposes extending the categorical exemption of the death penalty to individuals aged 18-20. This age group is often treated differently under the law than adults, and data suggests that capital punishment is imposed on them at a rate comparable to JLWOP sentences for non-homicide offenses in past cases. Recent research indicates that individuals aged 18-20, like the youths in previous cases, are less culpable than adults over 21. This categorical ban would protect individuals aged 18-20 from cruel and unusual punishment.

Summary of Argument

The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution requires courts to consider how society's views on punishment have changed over time when deciding if a punishment is cruel and unusual. This means courts look at national trends and consider whether a particular punishment is disproportionate to the crime.

The Supreme Court has already ruled that the death penalty is unconstitutional for people with intellectual disabilities and for people under 18. The Court also ruled that life in prison without the possibility of parole (JLWOP) is unconstitutional for non-homicide crimes committed by people under 18. These rulings were based on the idea that these groups of people are less responsible for their actions due to their age and development.

The same argument can be made for people aged 18 to 20. Research shows that this age group is also less developed than adults and is treated differently under the law. Just as the Court has banned the death penalty and JLWOP for younger groups, it should extend these protections to people aged 18 to 20.

Summary of Argument

This is about the law and how it says that it's wrong to punish people in a way that is too harsh or cruel. The law looks at how society changes and what is considered right or wrong. There's a rule that says you can't punish people in a certain way if most people think it's wrong and if the punishment is too harsh for what they did.

The law has said that it's wrong to give the death penalty to people with disabilities and to people younger than 17 years old. This is because these people are less responsible for their actions than adults.

The law has also said that it's wrong to give people younger than 17 years old a life sentence in prison without the possibility of getting out, unless they killed someone.

This document argues that the law should also say that it's wrong to give the death penalty to people who are 18, 19, or 20 years old. This is because these people are still not fully grown up and are less responsible for their actions than adults. Just like the law said it was wrong to give the death penalty to people younger than 17 years old, it should also say it's wrong to give it to people who are 18, 19, or 20.