INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
At early English common law and in its current form, public nuisance has comfortably covered situations like that alleged here: injury to the common good caused by unreasonably harmful product sales. Amici write to share their informed views—based on legal scholarship and teaching experience—about the historical and current scope of the wrongful conduct and conditions covered by public nuisance actions, the complementary relationship between public nuisance suits and other forms of governmental intervention, and the wide range of equitable remedies available.
Going back centuries, the common law recognized public nuisance claims based on interference with the public welfare, not just public property. The type of claim here is thus not a novel modern invention, but fully consistent with historical authorities, including a seventeenth-century treatise recognizing claims against “apothecaries” for unsafe products. It also falls comfortably within the scope of the modern tort as applied in Ohio, as Judge Polster correctly held.
Contrary to the arguments raised by appellants’ amici, this consensus view risks no opening of litigation floodgates, as the scope of public nuisance doctrine and the criterion of unreasonableness appropriately cabin liability. With respect to claims predicated on the sale of products, the requirement that the product result in an unreasonable condition which interferes with a right common to the public also keeps the floodgates closed. As with other torts, an unreasonableness standard recognizes that duties can evolve, and that conduct which is reasonable at the outset can become unreasonable as circumstances change.
The wide-ranging harms to public health and welfare resulting from the opioid epidemic have been widely chronicled, Kendrick, supra, at 753-54, and appear to be undisputed here. The jury’s finding that the pharmacy defendants here shared responsibility for “unreasonable interference” with public health and safety is fully consistent with black letter tort principles and does not threaten unbounded liability in future cases.
Nor does recognizing the validity of public nuisance doctrine for the wrongful conduct here pose a risk of irreconcilable conflict with regulatory prerogatives. Rather, state courts—including Ohio courts—have continued to give life to public nuisance claims because they are an important complement to regulatory efforts. Breach of regulatory duties, like those the jury found here, can constitute an absolute public nuisance under Ohio law. What’s more, when and if conflict arises with other regulatory approaches, it can be mediated by doctrines that are designed precisely for that purpose. The district court correctly determined that no such doctrine foreclosed liability here.
Finally, the abatement remedy awarded here falls well within the heartland of public nuisance remedies. The traditional remedy for public nuisance is abatement— that is, the prospective remediation of the offending condition. Because abatement focuses upon prospective relief rather than redress of past injuries, it is distinct from damages. Abatement is the traditional remedy for public nuisance because public nuisances result in ongoing wrongful conditions which must be rectified, as opposed to money damages which repair past harms. Nor is this distinction blurred by the fact that the abatement process often requires defendants to expend funds. Rather, as correctly noted by the district court, requiring defendants to contribute funds for abatement is an established remedial approach, with its specific features subject to the court’s broad discretion. In this case, appellants did not submit a serious abatement plan for the district court’s consideration, and the plan the court ultimately crafted fell within its discretion.
In sum, in amici’s view, the district court’s careful analysis of public nuisance law is consistent with the historical and contemporary scope of the claim, and the district court’s thoughtfully tailored abatement remedy falls well within the historic contours and current broad scope of equitable relief allowed for public nuisance claims.