Brief of Juvenile Law Center; The Center on Children and Families; The Central Juvenile Defender Center; The ChildLaw Center et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of the Respondent-Appellee
Marsha L. Levick
Nina W. Chernoff
SimpleOriginal

Summary

The EJJ statute’s vague language creates an opportunity for youth to be inappropriately stripped of their juvenile status.

2005 | State Juristiction

Brief of Juvenile Law Center; The Center on Children and Families; The Central Juvenile Defender Center; The ChildLaw Center et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of the Respondent-Appellee

Keywords right to counsel; minor; EJJ; Extended Juvenile Jurisdiction; transfer; Juvenile Court Act; vagueness; brain; adolescent development; Fifth Amendment (U.S.); neurological research; adolescent psychology
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Summary of Argument

The Extended Juvenile Jurisdiction (EJJ) provision of the Illinois Juvenile Court Act is void for vagueness because the requirement that EJJ-prosecuted youth not “violate the provisions of the juvenile sentence” fails to put juveniles on proper notice as to prohibited conduct and fails to provide even minimal guidance to government actors in its appropriate application and enforcement. Among states with comparable statutory provisions, Illinois stands almost alone in its failure to provide notice and guidelines as to what conduct will trigger imposition of the adult sentence; eight of the ten states with comparable sentencing statutes provide clarifying guidance that is missing from the ambiguous Illinois EJJ statute. The vagueness of its language undermines the EJJ statute’s goals of protecting the community and preserving rehabilitative opportunities for youth who can benefit from them. Principles of effective rehabilitation require clear rules and sanctions; and the ambiguity of the EJJ provision allows for youth to be inappropriately stripped of the benefits of the juvenile system on the basis of technical violations that have no bearing on the youths’ amenability to rehabilitation.

Additionally, allowing a hearing on an EJJ motion to occur after a motion to transfer a case to criminal court has been heard and denied is contrary to the policies underlying blended sentencing statutes because such statutes were designed to reduce the number of transfers to adult court by providing juvenile court judges with an additional dispositional option. Successive hearings on the same essential issue (whether a juvenile should be subjected to an adult sentence) do not serve to expand the dispositional authority of juvenile courts. Instead, subsequent hearing undercut the ability of a juvenile court to evaluate the appropriateness of transfer or EJJ and compare their relative suitability to the juvenile in question. Furthermore, conducting separate EJJ and transfer hearings undermines the Balanced and Restorative Justice Principles embraced by the Juvenile Court Act because disrupting the finality of the transfer decision harms victims and the community and interferes with the rehabilitation of juveniles. Conducting separate EJJ and transfer hearings is also illogical in light of the similarity of the legal questions involved and is a waste of judicial resources.

Finally, research in adolescent development supports a finding that Christopher invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel when he stated, “I think I should have a lawyer” or “Do I need a lawyer.” Academic studies in adolescent psychology demonstrate that there are distinct differences between adults and juveniles such that youth have greater difficulty understanding their Fifth Amendment rights and asserting them in a straightforward, direct manner. In light of these findings, Christopher’s statements were a sufficient invocation under prevailing law of his desire to speak to a lawyer and, as a result, further questioning by the police should have ceased. This conclusion is supported by groundbreaking findings in adolescent neurology which demonstrate that the human brain continues to develop well into the late teens and early twenties, particularly in areas governing tasks related to a request for counsel. U.S. Supreme Court case law and jurisprudence also distinguishes between adults and minors by extending greater protections or fewer rights to juveniles based upon their distinct developmental differences and supports consideration of Christopher’s 14 years, lack of experience in the criminal justice system and lack of assertiveness before authority as part of the calculus to be undertaken by a court in determining that Christopher had invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel.

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Summary of Argument

The EJJ provision of the Illinois Juvenile Court Act is considered void for vagueness due to its failure to clearly define prohibited conduct and provide adequate guidance for its application and enforcement. The vagueness of this provision undermines its goal of community protection and rehabilitation opportunities for youth. This ambiguity can lead to juveniles being subjected to adult sentences based on technical violations that are not indicative of their amenability to rehabilitation.

The EJJ statute's allowance for a hearing on an EJJ motion after a motion to transfer to criminal court has been denied contradicts the policy underlying blended sentencing statutes. These statutes were designed to reduce adult court transfers by providing juvenile court judges with an alternative dispositional option. Holding separate hearings on the same issue undermines the juvenile court's ability to assess the appropriateness of transfer or EJJ and diminishes the effectiveness of the Balanced and Restorative Justice Principles.

Research in adolescent development suggests that Christopher's statement expressing a desire for legal representation constituted a valid invocation of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel. Studies in adolescent psychology highlight the distinct developmental differences between adults and juveniles, demonstrating that youth may experience difficulty understanding and asserting their Fifth Amendment rights in a direct manner. Christopher's statement, considered in the context of his age and lack of experience with the criminal justice system, warrants recognition as a valid request for legal counsel. This interpretation aligns with evolving understandings of adolescent brain development and aligns with legal precedent that acknowledges the unique developmental needs of juveniles.

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Summary of Argument

The EJJ provision of the Illinois Juvenile Court Act is vague and ambiguous, undermining its intended purposes of protecting the community and facilitating rehabilitation. The statute's lack of clarity regarding prohibited conduct and enforcement guidelines creates confusion for both juveniles and law enforcement officials. Furthermore, allowing a hearing on an EJJ motion after a transfer motion has been denied contradicts the underlying principles of blended sentencing statutes, which aim to reduce transfers to adult court. Such sequential hearings undermine the effectiveness of the juvenile court in determining the most appropriate disposition for a juvenile.

Additionally, research in adolescent development suggests that Christopher's statement, "I think I should have a lawyer," constitutes a valid invocation of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel. Studies in adolescent psychology and neurology demonstrate that youth may struggle to understand and assert their rights as clearly as adults. The ambiguity of Christopher's statement should be interpreted in light of his age, lack of experience with the criminal justice system, and possible hesitance before authority figures.

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Summary of Argument

The Extended Juvenile Jurisdiction (EJJ) provision in Illinois law is problematic for several reasons.

The law is too vague, which makes it unclear what conduct will lead to an adult sentence. This makes it difficult for young people to know what they can and cannot do, and it also gives judges too much discretion in applying the law. The law also undermines the purpose of juvenile court, which is to rehabilitate young people. The law allows for young people to be punished as adults for minor offenses, which can make it harder for them to turn their lives around.

Another issue is that the law allows for a separate hearing on an EJJ motion after a motion to transfer a case to criminal court has been denied. This means that a young person can be sentenced as an adult even after a judge has decided that they should not be tried as an adult. This is unfair and inefficient, and it goes against the principles of restorative justice.

Finally, the law fails to properly protect the rights of young people. It's unclear whether young people fully understand their Fifth Amendment rights, which include the right to a lawyer. In light of this, the law needs to be clearer and more protective of young people's rights.

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Summary of Argument

The Extended Juvenile Jurisdiction (EJJ) provision of the Illinois Juvenile Court Act is confusing because it doesn't clearly say what actions will lead to a youth facing adult sentencing. This is a problem because it doesn't give youth clear instructions on how to avoid adult sentencing and leaves judges with little guidance on how to use EJJ properly. Other states have similar laws but they are clearer about what conduct will lead to adult sentencing.

The confusing language of the EJJ law also makes it difficult to determine if a youth should be tried in adult court or juvenile court. It is also unfair to the youth because it may lead to them being unfairly sent to adult court for minor offenses. This contradicts the purpose of the juvenile court system, which is to help youth get back on track and avoid adult court.

Also, the law allows for separate hearings on whether a youth should be tried in adult court and whether they should be subjected to EJJ. This is a problem because it can lead to the youth being tried in adult court even if they were initially found to be suitable for the juvenile system. This process is confusing and can be unfair to both the youth and the victim.

It is also difficult for young people to understand their rights and make good decisions when dealing with the legal system. Christopher, a young person, tried to ask for a lawyer, but his request was not clearly understood. This is because young people often struggle to understand and communicate their rights in a clear way. As a result, it is important to understand that a youth's request for a lawyer should be taken seriously even if it is not always expressed perfectly.

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Footnotes and Citation

Cite

Brief of Juvenile Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae in 98597 of the Respondent-Appellee, State v. Christopher K., No. S206780 (Ill. Feb. 16, 2005).

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