Summary of Argument

Amici respectfully argue that Illinois statutes that require fifteen and sixteen year- old youth charged with murder by accountability to be tried and sentenced in the same manner as adults are unconstitutional in light of recent United States Supreme Court jurisprudence.

As explained in detail infra, Illinois’s transfer and mandatory sentencing statutes are unconstitutional because they 1) create an irrebuttable presumption in favor of culpability and against the child’s capacity for change and rehabilitation and 2) do not allow for individualized sentencing of minors transferred to adult court and convicted of murder by accountability. Unlike Illinois, most state transfer schemes require some individualized determination by a court prior to a youth’s prosecution in adult court. Illinois is an outlier in not allowing a court to consider constitutionally relevant factors before subjecting a youth to prosecution and sentencing in the adult criminal system.

While the intermediate appellate court affirmed Defendant-Appellant Maria Pacheco’s conviction, the majority acknowledged that “it may be time for our supreme court to consider [the] important issue” of whether the holdings in Miller v. Alabama, __ U.S. __, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), Graham v. Florida, __ U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010), and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) call into question Illinois statutes that require automatic transfer of minors and the consequent imposition of mandatory sentences. People v. Pacheco, 2013 IL App (4th) 110409, ¶68. Indeed, the dissent below found that the mandatory transfer of youth under the Illinois statute violates the holdings of Miller, Graham, and Roper. Id. at ¶94 (Appleton J., dissenting). As the dissent stated, “While there are juvenile offenders who may, based on the totality of the circumstances, be eligible for adult prosecution, an automatic transfer provision based on age and offense alone, without consideration of the wide variance in the maturity, sophistication, intelligence, and social adjustment of any particular juvenile offender, cannot pass constitutional muster.” Id. at ¶98.

Recent United States Supreme Court case law, Illinois’s variance from the national norm, and the fact that several hundred organizations have denounced the automatic transfer and mandatory sentencing of certain youth as adults, all align with the dissent’s reasoning below. This Court last reviewed Illinois’ automatic transfer laws long before the United States Supreme Court’s watershed decisions of the last eight years that are discussed in this brief. See People v. J.S., 103 Ill.2d 395 (1984); People v. M.A., 124 Ill.2d 135 (1988). This case provides this Court the opportunity to revisit its prior decisions regarding juvenile transfer and subsequent exposure to mandatory sentences in light of this recent United States Supreme Court jurisprudence. See, e.g., Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2031. Amici respectfully submit that an examination of this statutory scheme against the backdrop of this jurisprudence demonstrates that it is constitutionally defective.

Summary of Argument

Amicus curiae argue that Illinois statutes mandating adult prosecution and sentencing for fifteen and sixteen-year-old youth charged with murder by accountability violate the United States Constitution in light of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence.

Amicus curiae contend that Illinois’s transfer and mandatory sentencing statutes are unconstitutional because they:

• Create an irrebuttable presumption in favor of culpability and against the child’s capacity for change and rehabilitation.

• Fail to allow for individualized sentencing of minors transferred to adult court and convicted of murder by accountability.

Unlike most states with transfer schemes, Illinois does not require a court to make individualized determinations before subjecting a youth to prosecution and sentencing in the adult criminal justice system. The court’s failure to consider constitutionally relevant factors before subjecting a youth to the adult criminal system makes Illinois an outlier.

Recent United States Supreme Court cases, such as Miller v. Alabama, Graham v. Florida, and Roper v. Simmons, have established that mandatory life sentences for juvenile offenders violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. The dissent in People v. Pacheco recognized that these holdings may call into question Illinois statutes requiring automatic transfer and mandatory sentences for minors.

Amicus curiae argue that the Illinois statutory scheme, in light of this recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, is constitutionally deficient. They urge the Court to reconsider its prior decisions regarding juvenile transfer and subsequent exposure to mandatory sentences. The Court has an opportunity to revisit its prior decisions in light of the Supreme Court’s recent precedent.

Summary of Argument

Amici argue that Illinois statutes requiring fifteen and sixteen-year-old youth charged with murder by accountability to be tried and sentenced as adults are unconstitutional. These statutes violate recent Supreme Court rulings by creating an irrebuttable presumption of culpability and failing to allow for individualized sentencing.

Amici argue that the Illinois statutes create an irrebuttable presumption against the youth’s capacity for change and rehabilitation. The statutes do not allow for individualized sentencing, a departure from most other state transfer schemes that require judicial determination of individual circumstances prior to adult prosecution. Illinois is an outlier in not allowing courts to consider constitutionally relevant factors before subjecting a youth to adult court proceedings and sentencing.

The dissent in the case below acknowledged the potential unconstitutionality of the statute under recent Supreme Court precedent. While the court upheld the conviction, it recognized the need for the state Supreme Court to revisit the issue of automatic transfer of minors and mandatory sentences in light of Supreme Court decisions in Miller v. Alabama, Graham v. Florida, and Roper v. Simmons. The dissent argued that automatic transfer based solely on age and offense without considering the unique characteristics of each youth is unconstitutional.

The amici contend that recent Supreme Court case law, the divergence of Illinois from national norms, and widespread condemnation of automatic transfer and mandatory sentencing for youth align with the dissenting opinion. They argue that the Court should revisit its previous decisions on juvenile transfer and sentencing in light of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence. They conclude that an examination of the statute within the context of recent Supreme Court precedent demonstrates its constitutional defects.

Summary of Argument

This legal brief argues that Illinois laws requiring 15 and 16-year-olds charged with murder by accountability to be tried and sentenced as adults are unconstitutional.

The brief claims these laws are unconstitutional because they:

1. Assume guilt: These laws automatically assume the youth is guilty and doesn't consider their potential for change.

2. Don't allow for individual sentencing: The laws don't consider each individual's circumstances before sentencing.

Unlike Illinois, most states have laws that require a judge to review each case individually before sending a youth to adult court. Illinois is different because it automatically sentences young people to adult court without considering individual factors.

The brief also points out that the Supreme Court has recently ruled that automatic transfer and mandatory sentencing of minors for certain offenses are unconstitutional. These decisions, along with the fact that many organizations oppose automatic transfer and mandatory sentencing, support the arguments made in the brief.

Summary of Argument

This is about a court case where someone is trying to prove that Illinois laws about sentencing kids who are 15 and 16 years old for murder are not fair. They say these laws are against what the United States Supreme Court has said about how to treat young people in court.

The laws in Illinois are not fair because they don't let the judge consider if the child can change and become better, and they don't let the judge give a different sentence based on what the child did.

A lot of other states have laws that let judges decide if a young person should be tried as an adult, but Illinois doesn't. This makes Illinois different from almost all other states.

There are many groups who think these laws in Illinois are bad and should be changed. The court hasn't looked at these laws for a long time, and it should look at them now because of what the Supreme Court has said recently.