Brief of Juvenile Law Center et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellee Cameron Moon
Peri Alkas
Lourdes M. Rosado
SummaryOriginal

Summary

The practice of juvenile court waiving jurisdiction without conducting an individualized determination is unconstitutional, and U.S. Supreme Court has consistently recognized that youth are inherently less culpable.

2014 | State Juristiction

Brief of Juvenile Law Center et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellee Cameron Moon

Keywords homicide; court transfers; individualized determination; maturity; youth; capacity for change; rehabilitation; juvenile jurisdiction
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Summary of Argument

Amici respectfully argue that the State’s faulty contention – that a juvenile court may waive jurisdiction of a youth and transfer the youth to adult court based on the charged offense alone, and without an individualized determination of the youth’s maturity, culpability and capacity for change -- is constitutionally infirm in light of United States Supreme Court jurisprudence. Specifically, the State’s flawed interpretation of Texas’s waiver statute is unconstitutional because it (1) creates an irrebuttable presumption in favor of culpability and against the child’s capacity for change and rehabilitation and (2) does not allow for individualized determination’s prior to transfer, in accordance with the requirements of TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(a) and (f) (2012).

Like Texas, most state transfer statutes require some individualized determination regarding a youth’s age, developmental level, degree of culpability and capacity for change by a court prior to a youth’s prosecution in adult court. Thus, the Texas statute incorporates the holdings of Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), and of this court in Hidalgo v. State, 983 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), by mandating an inquiry into the youth’s particular attributes. But if this court were to accept the State’s flawed reading of the waiver statute, Texas would become an outlier in not requiring a court to consider constitutionally relevant factors before subjecting a youth to prosecution and sentencing in the adult criminal system. Moreover, once in adult court, youth such as Cameron are subject to sentencing statutes that prevent the youth from demonstrating his capacity for rehabilitation to a sentencing judge and a parole board so that he may seek a shortening of his time in confinement.

In essence, the State is urging this Court to adopt an interpretation of the waiver statute that would create automatic transfer to adult court at a time when public policy and opinion overwhelmingly opposes the automatic transfer of youth charged with certain crimes to adult courts.

All of these factors weigh in favor of this Court rejecting the State’s contention that a juvenile court may waive jurisdiction based on the sole factor of the alleged offense, and instead affirming the Court of Appeal’s holding that the juvenile court misapplied the Texas waiver statute and thus abused its discretion in waiving its jurisdiction over Cameron and transferring him to adult court.

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Summary of Argument

Amici argue that the State's contention regarding juvenile court jurisdiction is unconstitutional. The State asserts that a juvenile court may transfer a youth to adult court based solely on the charged offense, without considering the youth's individual maturity, culpability, or capacity for change. This argument, amici contend, violates established Supreme Court precedent.

Amici highlight two specific constitutional infirmities in the State's interpretation of Texas's waiver statute: (1) it creates an irrebuttable presumption of culpability and against the child's capacity for rehabilitation, and (2) it fails to mandate individualized determinations before transfer, as required by TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(a) and (f) (2012).

Amici assert that most state transfer statutes mandate individualized assessments of a youth's age, developmental level, culpability, and capacity for change before transferring them to adult court. Texas's statute, they argue, aligns with this principle, incorporating the holdings of Kent v. United States and Hidalgo v. State, which necessitate such individual inquiries. Accepting the State's interpretation would make Texas an outlier, failing to consider constitutionally relevant factors before subjecting youth to adult prosecution and sentencing.

Furthermore, amici emphasize that youth transferred to adult court face sentencing statutes that hinder their ability to demonstrate rehabilitation to a judge and parole board, potentially limiting opportunities for reduced confinement. The State's position, amici argue, contradicts public policy and opinion, which generally oppose automatic transfer of youth to adult courts.

Based on these arguments, amici urge the Court to reject the State's interpretation, affirming the Court of Appeal's ruling that the juvenile court misapplied the Texas waiver statute and abused its discretion in transferring Cameron to adult court.

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Summary of Argument

The State of Texas argues that juvenile courts can transfer youth to adult court based solely on the offense charged, without individual assessment of the youth's maturity, culpability, and potential for rehabilitation. This argument is legally flawed and unconstitutional according to Amicus. The State's interpretation of Texas's waiver statute creates an automatic assumption of guilt and disregard for the youth's ability to change, contradicting legal precedents set by the United States Supreme Court and Texas courts in Kent v. United States and Hidalgo v. State. These rulings emphasize the need for individualized assessments of youth before transferring them to adult court.

Texas's waiver statute, like those in most states, necessitates a court-led examination of a youth's age, maturity, culpability, and potential for rehabilitation. By advocating for a waiver based solely on the offense, the State is pushing for a process that deviates from the established norm and undermines constitutional safeguards. This departure would isolate Texas from other states and contradict public policy trends that oppose automatic transfers of youth to adult court.

The State's argument clashes with the broader legal framework, established precedents, and public sentiment. Amicus urges the court to reject the State's interpretation and uphold the appellate court's ruling that the juvenile court erred in transferring Cameron to adult court.

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Summary of Argument

The State argues that juvenile courts can automatically transfer youth to adult court based on the crime they are accused of, without considering the individual youth's maturity, responsibility for the crime, and potential for change. However, this argument is flawed because it ignores the importance of individual assessments and contradicts the rulings of the Supreme Court and Texas courts.

Most states require courts to assess a youth's individual circumstances before transferring them to adult court. This assessment considers factors like their age, development, culpability, and potential for change. Texas law similarly requires courts to consider these factors, but the State's interpretation of the law would disregard this requirement.

If the court adopts the State's interpretation, Texas would become an outlier in not requiring individual assessments before transferring youth to adult court. This would be a significant change, especially since public opinion opposes automatic transfer of youth to adult court.

The State's argument could have serious consequences for youth like Cameron. They could be sentenced in adult court, where they have less opportunity to demonstrate their rehabilitation potential and reduce their sentences.

Ultimately, the court should reject the State's argument and affirm the Court of Appeals' decision. The juvenile court should have considered Cameron's individual circumstances before waiving its jurisdiction and transferring him to adult court.

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Summary of Argument

This is a legal case about a young person named Cameron Moon who was moved from juvenile court to adult court. The lawyers arguing against this move say that Texas law is flawed because it allows a young person to be moved to adult court based only on the crime they're accused of, without considering if they're mature enough to understand the consequences or if they can be rehabilitated.

They argue that Texas law should follow the example of other states and require judges to consider the young person's age, maturity, and ability to change before sending them to adult court. They also point out that Texas law doesn't allow young people like Cameron to show that they can change in adult court, making it harder for them to get a shorter sentence.

In other words, the lawyers argue that Texas law should be changed to ensure that young people are only sent to adult court when it's truly necessary, not just because of the crime they're accused of. They want the court to overturn the decision to move Cameron to adult court.

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Footnotes and Citation

Cite

Brief of Juvenile Law Center et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellee, State v. Moon, No. PD-1215-13 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 24, 2014).

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