Brief of Indiana, Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Montana, Nebraska, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner
Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Thomas M. Fisher
Kian J. Hudson
Julia C. Payne
SimpleOriginal

Summary

The Court should not expand its juvenile sentencing cases to intrude further into the state's sovereign sentencing authority.

2019 | Federal Juristiction

Brief of Indiana, Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Montana, Nebraska, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner

Keywords Miller; Montgomery; retroactive relief; resentencing; juvenile murderers; mandatory LWOP; juvenile life without parole; Eighth Amendment (U.S.)
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Summary of Argument

The decision below wrongly holds that the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits life-without-parole sentences for defendants who committed homicide before they turned 18—unless, so says the decision below, the sentencer makes an explicit finding that the “crimes reflected irreparable corruption or permanent incorrigibility.” Pet. App. 22a. The Eighth Amendment contains no such magic-words requirement. Rather, this Court has held that the Eighth Amendment merely prohibits grossly disproportionate sentences and, in order to prevent the risk of such sentences, requires sentencers to consider a juvenile offender’s youth before imposing a sentence of life without parole. The Court has thus held that while the Eighth Amendment prohibits mandatory life without-parole sentences for juvenile offenders, it does not prohibit such sentences when they are discretionary: Sentencers exercising their discretion to impose a juvenile life-without-parole sentence will have considered the offender’s youth, and such sentences therefore comply with the Eighth Amendment. The below decision’s contrary conclusion misreads the Court’s precedents and should be reversed.

1. The origins of this case trace to a recent series of decisions in which the Court has—over vigorous and well-reasoned dissents—expanded Eighth Amendment doctrine to apply categorical restrictions to prison sentences imposed for crimes committed by juveniles. This case directly arises from the last two decisions in this sequence: Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), which held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits imposing mandatory life-without-parole sentences on juveniles, and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016), which held that Miller’s rule applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. The decision below stretched these decisions to apply a new categorical rule to discretionary juvenile life-without-parole sentences, requiring sentencers to make a specific finding of “permanent incorrigibility” before imposing such a sentence. Pet. App. 22a. Particularly given the doubtful expansions of the Eighth Amendment that underlie Miller and Montgomery, the Court should refuse to endorse this still further intrusion into States’ sovereign interests.

2. Moreover, whether or not the Court takes a skeptical view of Miller and Montgomery, these decisions merely prohibit mandatory juvenile life-without-parole sentences; they do not require sentencers imposing discretionary juvenile life-without-parole sentences to make an explicit finding of permanent incorrigibility. Miller held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits courts from imposing life-without-parole sentences without considering “youth (and all that accompanies it),” because doing so “poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment.” 567 U.S. at 479. And Montgomery recognized that, because Miller is fundamentally premised on the substantive right to be free from grossly disproportionate sentences, its rule is substantive and therefore retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.

Crucially, neither of these decisions held that the Eighth Amendment requires state sentencing bodies to adopt specific procedures or recite particular words. And rightly so: The Court has interpreted the Eighth Amendment only to prohibit disproportionate punishments. And while it has observed, most recently in Montgomery, that substantive rights sometimes necessitate procedural changes, the Court has long held that States, not federal courts, have the authority to define these procedures, in keeping with principles of federalism and respect for state sovereignty.

3. Because Miller merely requires sentencers to consider the offender’s youth before imposing a sentence of life without parole on a juvenile, when such sentences are discretionary they necessarily comply with Miller’s categorical rule. Sentencers with discretion to choose whether to impose such sentences will invariably consider the offender’s youth and any related circumstances; there is thus no need for the Court to require factual findings to recite precise formulations such as “permanent incorrigibility.” Such a requirement is unnecessary to protect the right announced in Miller and would improperly undermine States’ authority to set their own rules of criminal procedure. Miller announced a single, categorical Eighth Amendment rule prohibiting mandatory juvenile life-without-parole sentences. The Court should reverse the below decision’s holding that the Eighth Amendment also imposes a categorical magic-words requirement on discretionary juvenile life-without- parole sentences.

Open Amicus Brief as PDF

Summary of Argument

This article examines the recent decision that erroneously extended the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against life-without-parole sentences for juvenile offenders. The decision requires sentencers to make an explicit finding of "irreparable corruption or permanent incorrigibility" before imposing such sentences, despite the absence of such a requirement in Supreme Court precedent.

Expansion of Eighth Amendment Doctrine

The decision under scrutiny is part of a trend in which the Court has expanded the Eighth Amendment to impose categorical restrictions on sentences for juvenile offenders. In Miller v. Alabama (2012), the Court prohibited mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles, and in Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016), it extended this rule retroactively. However, the current decision goes beyond these precedents by imposing a new categorical rule on discretionary sentences.

Discretionary Sentencing and the Eighth Amendment

  1. Miller and Montgomery only prohibit mandatory juvenile life-without-parole sentences. They do not require sentencers to make an explicit finding of permanent incorrigibility when imposing discretionary sentences. Miller held that the Eighth Amendment requires consideration of youth before imposing such sentences to mitigate the risk of disproportionate punishment.

  2. When sentencers have discretion, they inherently consider the offender's youth. Therefore, discretionary juvenile life-without-parole sentences comply with Miller's categorical rule. The requirement for an explicit finding of "permanent incorrigibility" is unnecessary and infringes on states' authority to establish their own criminal procedures.

Conclusion

The decision under review misinterprets Supreme Court precedent by imposing a categorical magic-words requirement on discretionary juvenile life-without-parole sentences. This requirement is not supported by the Eighth Amendment and undermines the principles of federalism and state sovereignty.

Summary of Argument

The Eighth Amendment protects against cruel and unusual punishment. In recent years, the Supreme Court has ruled that this protection extends to juveniles who commit crimes. In Miller v. Alabama (2012), the Court held that mandatory life sentences without parole for juveniles are unconstitutional. Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) extended this ruling to cases where the sentence was imposed in the past. However, the court below has now gone further, requiring that judges make a specific finding of "permanent incorrigibility" before sentencing a juvenile to life without parole, even if the sentence is not mandatory.

The Miller and Montgomery decisions only prohibit mandatory life sentences for juveniles. They do not require judges to make a specific finding of permanent incorrigibility when the sentence is discretionary. The Eighth Amendment simply requires that judges consider the youth of the offender before imposing such a severe sentence.

When judges have the discretion to choose whether or not to impose a life sentence, they will naturally consider the offender's age and other relevant factors. Therefore, there is no need for a specific finding of "permanent incorrigibility." Such a requirement would interfere with the states' ability to set their own criminal procedures. The Supreme Court should overturn the lower court's decision and clarify that the Eighth Amendment only prohibits mandatory life sentences for juveniles, not discretionary ones.

Summary of Argument

The Supreme Court has recently made some decisions that limit the sentences that can be given to young people who commit crimes. This case is about the latest decision, which says that judges can't sentence young offenders to life in prison without parole (never getting out) unless they specifically say that the offender is "permanently incorrigible," meaning they can't be changed.

The Court has said that the Eighth Amendment, which protects against cruel and unusual punishment, doesn't allow judges to automatically sentence young offenders to life without parole. They have to consider the offender's age and other factors first. However, the Court has also said that judges can still choose to give this sentence if they think it's appropriate.

The decision in this case goes too far. It says that even when judges have the choice to give a life without parole sentence, they still have to say the magic words "permanent incorrigibility." This is unnecessary because judges will already be considering the offender's age and other factors when they make their decision. It also takes away from the states' power to decide how to handle criminal cases.

The Court should overturn this decision and stick to its original rule that only prohibits automatic life without parole sentences for young offenders.

Summary of Argument

What's This Case About?

Some kids who do really bad things get sentenced to life in prison without the chance to get out. But some people think that's not fair because kids are still growing and changing. They say that judges should have to think about how young the kids are before giving them such a harsh punishment.

What's the Problem?

The problem is that some judges are still giving kids life in prison without thinking about their age. They're not even saying why they think the kids are so bad that they can never change.

What's the Solution?

The solution is to make sure that judges always think about how young the kids are before they give them life in prison. They should also have to say why they think the kids are so bad that they can never get better. This would help make sure that kids aren't getting punished too harshly.

Footnotes and Citation

Cite

Brief of Indiana, Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Montana, Nebraska, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Mathena v. Malvo, No. 18-217 (U.S. 2019).

    Highlights