Brief of Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner
Robert S. Chang
Melissa R. Lee
Jessica Levin
SimpleOriginal

Summary

A child is less culpable than an adult and deserves a mitigated sentence, both with respect to the standard range and any enhancements.

2022 | State Juristiction

Brief of Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner

Keywords mitigation; transfers; diminished culpability; children; Houston-Sconiers; Ramos; presumption of mitigation; adult court
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Summary of Argument

Though State v. Houston-Sconiers was a significant step toward ensuring that sentencing courts exercise their discretion to treat children differently than adults, this discretion is not being exercised as the Court intended in Houston-Sconiers. Both a changed legal landscape and new data require the Court to consider whether article I, section 14 mandates a presumption that children are entitled to mitigated sentences.

Since Ramos held that the Eighth Amendment did not require the State to prove that a standard range sentence is appropriate, this Court’s interpretation of both the Eighth Amendment and article I, section 14 have changed dramatically. Since Ramos was decided, this Court has expanded the protections afforded to youth in a number of contexts beyond the narrow issue presented in that case. Nor has the Ramos Court’s assumption that most children would receive a sentence below the standard range due to their youth come to pass. 187 Wn.2d ¶¶ 18, 32. And indeed, Caseload Forecast Council data gathered after Houston-Sconiers suggests the overwhelming majority of children convicted in adult court do not receive mitigated sentences.

Flipping the presumption is necessary because Houston-Sconiers did not directly alter the presumption of adult-equivalent culpability that exists when a child is declined into adult court. Instead of placing the burden on children to prove their own diminished culpability under RCW 9.94A.535(1), a sentencing court must begin with a rebuttable presumption that children are entitled to a mitigated sentence, both with respect to the standard range and any applicable enhancements. Flipping the presumption of adult-equivalent culpability that inheres in auto-decline brings the promise of Houston-Sconiers into alignment with the heightened protection of article I, section 14.

Finally, flipping the presumption is also sensible because it is more likely to ensure the constitutional treatment of children than will the status quo, which leaves this Court as the final arbiter as to whether a sentencing court erred in its consideration and weighting of the mitigating circumstances associated with youth.

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Summary of Argument

The State v. Houston-Sconiers decision represented a significant step toward ensuring that sentencing courts exercised discretion when treating children differently from adults. However, the current application of this discretion does not align with the Court's original intent in Houston-Sconiers. A shift in the legal landscape, coupled with new data, necessitates a reassessment of whether article I, section 14 mandates a presumption that children are entitled to mitigated sentences.

The Ramos case established that the Eighth Amendment does not require the State to prove the appropriateness of a standard range sentence. This ruling has fundamentally altered the Court's interpretation of both the Eighth Amendment and article I, section 14. Since Ramos, the Court has expanded protections for youth in various contexts beyond the specific issue addressed in the case. Furthermore, the Ramos Court's assumption that most children would receive a sentence below the standard range due to their youth has not materialized. Data from the Caseload Forecast Council, collected after Houston-Sconiers, indicates that a vast majority of children convicted in adult court do not receive mitigated sentences.

To remedy this disparity, a shift in the presumption is necessary. Houston-Sconiers did not directly alter the presumption of adult-equivalent culpability that arises when a child is transferred to adult court. Instead of requiring children to prove their diminished culpability under RCW 9.94A.535(1), a sentencing court should begin with a rebuttable presumption that children are entitled to a mitigated sentence, considering both the standard range and any applicable enhancements. This shift in the presumption of adult-equivalent culpability associated with automatic transfers aligns the promise of Houston-Sconiers with the heightened protections afforded by article I, section 14.

Finally, flipping the presumption is the most prudent approach because it ensures the constitutional treatment of children. The current status quo leaves the Court as the ultimate arbiter of whether a sentencing court appropriately considered and weighed the mitigating circumstances related to youth. By reversing the presumption, the Court can better ensure that the sentencing process takes into account the unique characteristics and vulnerabilities of children.

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Summary of Argument

The court case State v. Houston-Sconiers sought to ensure that judges consider the unique circumstances of juveniles when sentencing them, treating them differently than adults. However, recent changes in legal precedent and new data suggest that judges are not consistently applying the principles intended by Houston-Sconiers.

Following the Ramos case, the Eighth Amendment no longer requires the state to prove the appropriateness of standard range sentences. This shift has resulted in a broader interpretation of both the Eighth Amendment and article I, section 14, with expanded protections for juveniles in various legal contexts. However, the Ramos court assumed that most juveniles would receive sentences below the standard range, an assumption that has not materialized.

Data collected after Houston-Sconiers shows that a significant majority of juveniles convicted in adult court do not receive mitigated sentences. This data supports the need to flip the presumption of adult-equivalent culpability, which still prevails when a juvenile is transferred to adult court.

By flipping the presumption, sentencing courts would begin with the assumption that juveniles are entitled to a reduced sentence, both in terms of the standard range and any applicable enhancements. This shift aligns the promise of Houston-Sconiers with the enhanced protections of article I, section 14.

Shifting the burden of proof to demonstrate the need for a mitigated sentence to the prosecution, rather than placing the onus on juveniles to prove their diminished culpability, would more effectively ensure constitutional treatment of juveniles. This approach avoids placing the ultimate burden on the court to determine whether a sentencing court properly considered mitigating factors related to youth.

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Summary of Argument

The State v. Houston-Sconiers case aimed to ensure that courts would treat children differently than adults during sentencing. However, the way the courts are currently using the case's rulings does not reflect its original intent. Therefore, the court needs to reconsider whether Article I, Section 14 of the Washington State Constitution should require a presumption that children deserve reduced sentences.

The Ramos case changed the legal landscape, impacting how the court interprets the Eighth Amendment and Article I, Section 14. The Ramos decision led to expanded protections for youth in various situations beyond the specific issue addressed in the case. Additionally, the Ramos court assumed that most children would receive sentences below the standard range due to their age. However, this hasn't happened. Data collected after Houston-Sconiers shows that most children convicted in adult court don't receive reduced sentences.

Reversing the presumption is necessary because Houston-Sconiers didn't directly change the existing assumption that children are equally responsible as adults when they're transferred to adult court. Instead of forcing children to prove their reduced culpability, the court should start with the assumption that children deserve a reduced sentence, considering both the standard range and any possible enhancements. Changing this presumption would align the promises of Houston-Sconiers with the stronger protections of Article I, Section 14.

Finally, changing the presumption is logical because it's more likely to ensure that children are treated fairly. This approach would avoid the current situation, where the court acts as the final judge on whether a sentencing court properly considered and weighed the mitigating factors related to a child's age.

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Summary of Argument

In the case of State v. Houston-Sconiers, the court decided that judges should treat children differently than adults when deciding how long they should go to jail. However, judges aren't always following this rule. This means the court needs to consider whether judges should automatically assume that children should get shorter jail sentences.

Since a different case called Ramos, the court has changed how it thinks about the Eighth Amendment and Article I, Section 14. The court has protected young people in more situations than just the one in Ramos, but judges haven't always given shorter sentences to children like they thought they would. Data shows that most children who are tried as adults don't get shorter sentences.

The court should change the way judges think about these cases by assuming children deserve shorter sentences. Right now, children have to prove why they deserve a shorter sentence. By assuming children deserve a shorter sentence, judges will treat them more fairly according to the law.

This change would also help the court make sure children are treated according to the law. The court should make sure that judges consider all the reasons why children should get shorter sentences.

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Footnotes and Citation

Cite

Brief of Amicus Curiae Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality in Support of Petitioner, Miller v. Alabama, No. 10-9646 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2022).

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