SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Constitution’s prohibition on vague laws protects the separation of powers by ensuring that Congress, rather than police, prosecutors, or judges, defines what conduct is criminal. It also protects ordinary people by requiring a criminal law to be sufficiently definite to provide notice of what the law prohibits.
The statute at issue here, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) (the Statute), violates this precept because it prohibits an “unlawful user” of “any controlled substance” from possessing a firearm, without defining the quantity, frequency, or timing of the use that triggers its application. The Government disagrees. It reasons that, if this Court reads certain terms into the Statute, then that modified version of § 922(g)(3) is not unconstitutionally vague, as applied to Mr. Hemani. It argues, without relevant authority, that the Statute operates as a “temporary” disarmament that reaches only “habitual” drug users. The Government’s interpretation does not remotely reflect the Statute’s capacious reach.
Under a plain reading of § 922(g)(3), a recreational marijuana user faces all the consequences of a felony conviction, including a maximum 15-year prison sentence, for possessing a firearm in an otherwise lawful manner. That result follows even if the marijuana use occurs entirely separately from obtaining or handling a firearm.
In substance, § 922(g)(3), as applied here, punishes drug use under the guise of firearm regulation. The Statute potentially implicates tens of millions of Americans, and it fails to provide them fair notice of the consequences of their conduct.
Nor can the Statute be justified on assumptions about marijuana use and violence. § 922(g)(3) provides no standard linking drug use to dangerousness, impairment, or firearm misuse, and it offers no guidance on when a person becomes (or ceases to be) an “unlawful user.” That indeterminacy exposes ordinary people to felony liability while leaving law enforcement with unguided discretion, a dynamic that predictably amplifies existing disparities produced by inconsistent application.
In our constitutional order, a vague law is no law at all. Congress is the only branch that has the power to enact federal criminal laws. Allowing this prosecution to proceed under § 922(g)(3) as applied here would require this Court to supply the limiting principle Congress omitted and to decide when the Statute applies and to whom. That approach only furthers the inequitable, selective criminalization of drug use. It has little, if anything, to do with regulating firearms.
This Court should affirm.