Summary of Argument
The sentence of life without the possibility of parole for youth under 18 convicted offelony murder under an aiding and abetting theory—meaning that these youth have not been proven to have killed or intended to kill—violates both the U.S. and the Michigan Constitutions.Three attributes of these defendants reduce their culpability: (1) their age at the time of the offense and age-related characteristics; (2) their conviction for felony murder, which does not require proof that the individual "intended to kill," and (3) their conviction under an aiding and abetting theory, which does not require proof that the individual personally caused the victim'sdeath, or even that the youth knew his or her co-defendant's intentions.
The limited requirements of the felony murder and aiding and abetting doctrines donothing to undermine the conviction of these youth, who remain convicted of first-degree murder. It does, however, affect the sentence to which they can be constitutionally subjected.
Under the U.S. Constitution, the confluence of the Court's cases on juvenile sentencing— Graham, Miller, and Roper and the Court's jurisprudence on the limits of the imposition of the death penalty on adults convicted of felony murder lead to the conclusion that the maximum sentence available for juveniles is not constitutional for this category of youths.
Under the unique language, history and interpretation of our Constitution, the sentence of life without parole for this category of youths also violates our ban on "cruel or unusual punishments." This most severe sentence is disproportionate to the thrice-reduced culpability ofthese offenders; a comparison of other jurisdictions and within Michigan shows that the sentence is cruel or unusual; and the punishment fails to meet the goals of rehabilitation, deterrence or retribution.
Finally, a categorical rule banning the punishment would be applied retroactively.