INTRODUCTION
Eyewitness identification testimony is some of the most compelling evidence a jury can hear, but it can also be some of the most unreliable. A review of DNA exoneration cases demonstrates that mistaken identifications are a leading cause of wrongful convictions. The scientific study of eyewitness identification and memory helps to explain why. Researchers have unearthed a set of risk factors that make witnesses more likely to be mistaken—known as “estimator” and “system” variables.
Yet despite the frailties of eyewitness identification testimony, recognized by this Court and courts across the country, it remains powerfully persuasive to jurors. Juries have even convicted innocent individuals based on mistaken identifications in the face of exculpatory DNA evidence. Moreover, although the scientific community has come to a consensus about certain variables that make eyewitness identifications less likely to be accurate, many of their findings continue to prove counterintuitive to laypeople. Expert testimony is needed to educate jurors about these risk factors.
This Court has recognized the role that misidentifications play in wrongful convictions and “encouraged” the admission of eyewitness expert testimony. People v. Santiago, 17 N.Y.3d 661, 669 (2011). Nonetheless, lower courts (like the courts here) have taken this Court’s decision in People v. LeGrand, 8 N.Y.3d 449 (2007), as license to exclude eyewitness experts whenever the trial court thinks there is “sufficient corroborating evidence” supporting the identification—even when expert testimony would in fact aid the jury. This corroboration rule treats eyewitness expert testimony unlike any other type of evidence and is fundamentally flawed.
Precluding or limiting eyewitness expert testimony based on the supposed strength of the other evidence—evidence that has not yet been tested at trial — deprives jurors of the opportunity to make fully informed judgments about the evidence and, accordingly, increases the probability of wrongful convictions. In cases where identification is at issue and estimator or system variables are implicated, experts can offer crucial evidence, explaining the frequent flaws of eyewitness identifications and illuminating the often-counterintuitive factors that undermine their reliability. The admissibility of such probative evidence should not depend on how a court views the strength of the prosecution’s case, but instead on whether it would aid the jury in making a reliable determination.