PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Judges have long cast a suspicious eye on uncorroborated eyewitness identifications. The Supreme Court cautioned that “[t]he vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification.” United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967). And then-Professor Frankfurter warned: “The identifications of strangers are proverbially untrustworthy.” Felix Frankfurter, The Case of Sacco and Vanzetti 27 (1927).
The advent of DNA testing has shown that this suspicion was justified. In this Court’s words, “[m]istaken eyewitness identifications are ‘the single greatest cause of wrongful convictions in this country.’” People v. Boone, 30 N.Y.3d 521, 527 (2017) (citation omitted). Misidentifications have played a part in more than two-thirds of the wrongful convictions overturned by DNA, far more than any other cause.
Driven in large part by the proven risk of misidentifying the innocent, a body of scientific research has emerged that helps explain the fallibility of eyewitness memory. Over the course of thousands of studies since the 1970s, psychologists have discovered a set of variables that affect the accuracy and eliability of eyewitness identifications. This research provides, for the first time, a scientific basis for identifying those eyewitness identifications that are especially unreliable—and likely to lead to wrongful convictions. Courts across the country have accepted this body of research and incorporated it into their jurisprudence.
The science of eyewitness identification and memory indicates that the identification of a stranger here was patently unreliable. It involved a cross-racial identification made after a highly stressful incident involving multiple perpetrators, during which the complainant focused on the knife being wielded by one of Appellant’s co-defendants—all factors that, as discussed below, researchers now recognize reduce the accuracy of identifications. Moreover, the complainant could only describe the assailant later identified as Appellant as a “Hispanic male” to the police, and only identified Appellant after a highly suggestive collective showup, where he was surrounded by police and clumped next to two other men matching the complainant’s more detailed descriptions—a procedure that has been demonstrated to increase the likelihood of mistaken identification. And Complainant’s identification was uncorroborated.
A conviction that rests solely on such an identification is too weak to stand. This Court should adopt a rule analogous to the rules that apply to accomplice testimony and confessions: Uncorroborated stranger identifications that show substantial scientific indicia of unreliability are legally insufficient for conviction. Relying on such unreliable evidence alone poses an unacceptable risk of wrongful conviction.