Brief of Amicus Curiae Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost in Support of Appellee State of Ohio
Stephen P. Hardwick
Dave Yost
Samuel C. Peterson
Paul J. Gains
Ralph M. Rivera
SimpleOriginal

Summary

The General Assembly's decision to transfer juveniles to adult criminal court without an amenability hearing does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.

2021 | State Juristiction

Brief of Amicus Curiae Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost in Support of Appellee State of Ohio

Keywords amenability hearing; transfer; transfer to adult court; juvenile; due process; Fourteenth Amendment (U.S.); res judicata; rape; kidnapping; mandatory bindover; mandatory transfer of juveniles into adult court
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Summary of Argument

The General Assembly has decided that certain juveniles must be transferred to adult criminal court without an amenability hearing. Its decision does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. That is because juveniles have no right to such a hearing before they are transferred to adult criminal court. Every court to have considered the question has held that “there is no constitutional right to any pre- ferred treatment as a juvenile offender.” Stokes v. Fair, 581 F.2d 287, 289 (1st Cir. 1978); see also, e.g., State v. Orozco, 483 P.3d 331, 337–39 (Idaho 2021). And so the General Assembly was free to decide when and how juveniles must be tried as adults.

This Court has reached the same conclusion, State v. Aalim, 150 Ohio St. 3d 489, 2017-Ohio-2956 (“Aalim II”) and Bunch offers no sound reason why it should revisit it. Bunch asserts a procedural due process challenge to the statutes that require that he be transferred, brought exclusively under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause (that is, and not under Ohio’s Constitution). See Bunch Br.28. His claim is with- out merit. To establish a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, Bunch would need to show that the absence of an amenability hearing before transfer “offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977) (quotation and citation omitted). It does not. Even if the Court were to apply the more permissive procedural- due-process test established by Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), the result would not change. The threshold requirement under Mathews is the existence of a pro- tected liberty interest. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 332, 335. Bunch has not identified one; his unsupported allegation that juveniles have a protected interest in having their case heard by a juvenile court does not suffice. See Bunch Br.29.

The Court should never get that far. It should not address the merits of Bunch’s claim. Bunch did not properly raise his constitutional challenge to R.C. 2152.10(A) and 2152.12(A), and he therefore failed to preserve his claim. If Bunch believed that due- process principles guaranteed him a right to an amenability hearing then he should have raised that claim on direct appeal. See Smith v. May, 159 Ohio St. 3d 106, 2020- Ohio-61, ¶¶31, 35. He did not. Instead, he waited until fifteen years after he was con- victed of a brutal rape and kidnapping to allege that the statutory requirement that cer- tain juveniles be tried as adults is unconstitutional. Because his claim could—and should—have been raised before, it is now barred by res judicata. See id.

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Summary of Argument

The General Assembly’s decision to transfer certain juveniles to adult criminal court without an amenability hearing does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. This decision is supported by the precedent set in Stokes v. Fair, 581 F.2d 287, 289 (1st Cir. 1978), which established that there is no constitutional right to preferential treatment as a juvenile offender. Subsequently, the General Assembly holds the authority to determine the circumstances and procedures for trying juveniles as adults.

The Court's previous ruling in State v. Aalim, 150 Ohio St. 3d 489, 2017-Ohio-2956 (“Aalim II”) aligns with this understanding. Bunch’s argument that the absence of an amenability hearing violates procedural due process lacks merit. To prove a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, Bunch must demonstrate that the absence of such a hearing “offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,” as stated in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977). The absence of an amenability hearing does not meet this criteria.

Even under the more lenient procedural due process test outlined in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), the conclusion remains unchanged. Mathews requires the existence of a protected liberty interest. Bunch has not presented evidence of such an interest. His unsupported claim that juveniles have a protected interest in having their cases heard by a juvenile court is insufficient.

Furthermore, Bunch’s constitutional challenge to R.C. 2152.10(A) and 2152.12(A) is barred by res judicata. This claim should have been raised on direct appeal, as he believed due process principles guaranteed him a right to an amenability hearing. His failure to raise this claim during the direct appeal process, fifteen years after his conviction for rape and kidnapping, prevents its consideration at this stage.

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Summary of Argument

The General Assembly's decision to transfer certain juveniles to adult criminal court without an amenability hearing does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. This is because juveniles do not have a constitutional right to such a hearing. Numerous courts have established that there is no inherent right to preferred treatment as a juvenile offender. Consequently, the General Assembly has the authority to determine the circumstances and procedures for trying juveniles as adults.

This court has already affirmed this conclusion in previous cases. The current case does not present compelling reasons to overturn that precedent. The argument presented focuses on a procedural due process challenge, arguing that the lack of an amenability hearing before transfer violates the Fourteenth Amendment. This claim, however, lacks merit. To prove a Fourteenth Amendment violation, the claimant must demonstrate that the absence of the hearing undermines fundamental principles of justice deeply rooted in American society.

The claim also fails to meet the criteria established by the Mathews v. Eldridge test, which requires a protected liberty interest as a prerequisite for procedural due process protection. The claimant's assertion of a protected interest in having their case heard by a juvenile court is unsupported and insufficient to meet this requirement.

Furthermore, the court should not address the merits of this claim because it was not properly raised in the original trial. The claimant failed to raise a constitutional challenge to the relevant statutes during the initial appeal, despite having the opportunity to do so. By delaying the constitutional argument until fifteen years after their conviction, the claimant has effectively waived their right to raise it now. This delay prevents the application of res judicata, a legal doctrine that prevents the relitigation of issues already decided in a previous court proceeding.

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Summary of Argument

The General Assembly made a decision about how some juveniles are tried in court. They said these juveniles can be transferred to adult court without a hearing about whether they’re ready. The courts have decided this is okay because juveniles don't have a right to a special hearing before being tried as adults.

The court also says that this decision doesn’t violate the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects due process. To show a violation, a person would have to show that the absence of a hearing is unfair and goes against what people think is right. There’s no evidence that this is true.

The court also says that the person challenging this law, Bunch, didn’t raise his concerns about it early enough. He waited a long time to say it was unfair. Because he could have brought this up before, it’s now too late for him to challenge it.

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Summary of Argument

The General Assembly decided that some young people should be tried in adult court without a special hearing. This doesn't violate the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects people's rights. The reason is that young people don't have the right to a special hearing before being tried as adults.

Many courts have said that there's no rule saying young people have to be treated differently in court. So, the General Assembly could decide when and how to try young people as adults.

Bunch, age 17 at the time of the crime and was tried as an adult, is arguing that this is unfair. He says that not having a special hearing before going to adult court violates his rights. But his argument is weak.

To win his case, Bunch needs to show that this rule goes against basic fairness and justice. He can't prove this. Even if we use a different way to look at the case, the result is still the same. Bunch needs to show that he has a right to be tried in juvenile court. He can't do that either.

Bunch waited a long time to bring up this issue. He didn't say anything when he was first convicted of rape and kidnapping. Now, because he waited so long, he can't bring up this issue in court anymore.

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Footnotes and Citation

Cite

Brief of Amicus Curiae Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost in Support of Appellee State of Ohio, State v. Chaz Bunch, No. 2021-0579 (Ohio Nov. 16, 2021).

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