Summary of Argument

I. The relief granted in the Miller and Jackson cases was to reverse the judgments of the state courts, and to remand for further proceedings “not inconsistent” with the Court’s opinion. See, pp. 11-12. It would be inconsistent with the Miller opinion to deny relief to JLWOP defendants who seek relief from their unconstitutional sentences on collateral review. The Jackson case itself arose on collateral review from state court proceedings, and the Supreme Court ordered the same relief as it did for Miller, which arose from a direct appeal from the state’s high court. Where the Supreme Court ordered such relief in a case arising on collateral review, and where the Court’s decision announced a rule of substantive constitutional criminal law, relief is clearly warranted for all defendants including those seeking relief from an unconstitutional sentence in collateral proceedings. See, pp. 12-16. The principles as discussed in the Miller opinion support remand to the trial courts that need not be limited to re-sentencing, and may include a new trial, and in any case must afford an opportunity to develop relevant legal and factual issues. See, pp. 17-24. New trial proceedings may be appropriate when requested by a JLWOP defendant who did not have advance notice of the nature of the proceedings against him or the opportunity to develop a trial strategy, and to conduct pre-trial, and trial proceedings with knowledge of the actual sentencing scheme and the principles of Miller that would ultimately apply to him. In such circumstances the JLWOP defendants have been denied due process of law, the right to a jury trial, and the right to effective assistance of counsel, as guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions. See, pp. 24-28.

II. Any sentence to be imposed on remand must be in accordance with existing constitutional and statutory law and it must appropriately consider the juvenile status of the defendant. Any sentence must recognize the JLWOP defendant’s status as a juvenile. Where the statutes of the Commonwealth require a sentence of “mandatory life without parole,” M.G.L. Ch. 265, § 2; M.G.L. Ch. 127, § 133A, those provisions are unconstitutional, and must be viewed as a nullity. Pursuant to M.G.L. Ch. 279, § 5, the Court should look to the other statutes of the Commonwealth for guidance in sentencing. The most applicable statutes to provide such guidance are the laws relating to juveniles, and the laws relating to manslaughter, because each is consistent with the principles discussed in the Miller opinion. See, pp. 28- 38. Neither the legislature nor the Courts may create a new sentencing scheme applicable to defendants who have already been convicted as that would violate the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws. The existing statutes allow for sentencing of JLWOP defendants either as juveniles, taking guidance from the penalties in the juvenile court system, or to a term of years taking guidance from the most serious homicide offense which permits a trial court to use judgment, consider evidence, and impose an indeterminate sentence. See, pp. 38-44.

Summary of Argument

The relief granted in the Miller and Jackson cases was to reverse the judgments of the state courts and remand for further proceedings “not inconsistent” with the Court’s opinion. It would be inconsistent with the Miller opinion to deny relief to JLWOP defendants who seek relief from their unconstitutional sentences on collateral review. The Jackson case itself arose on collateral review from state court proceedings, and the Supreme Court ordered the same relief as it did for Miller, which arose from a direct appeal from the state’s high court. Where the Supreme Court ordered such relief in a case arising on collateral review, and where the Court’s decision announced a rule of substantive constitutional criminal law, relief is clearly warranted for all defendants including those seeking relief from an unconstitutional sentence in collateral proceedings.

The principles as discussed in the Miller opinion support remand to the trial courts that need not be limited to re-sentencing, and may include a new trial, and in any case must afford an opportunity to develop relevant legal and factual issues. New trial proceedings may be appropriate when requested by a JLWOP defendant who did not have advance notice of the nature of the proceedings against him or the opportunity to develop a trial strategy, and to conduct pre-trial, and trial proceedings with knowledge of the actual sentencing scheme and the principles of Miller that would ultimately apply to him. In such circumstances, the JLWOP defendants have been denied due process of law, the right to a jury trial, and the right to effective assistance of counsel, as guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions.

Any sentence to be imposed on remand must be in accordance with existing constitutional and statutory law and it must appropriately consider the juvenile status of the defendant. Any sentence must recognize the JLWOP defendant’s status as a juvenile. Where the statutes of the Commonwealth require a sentence of “mandatory life without parole,” those provisions are unconstitutional, and must be viewed as a nullity. The Court should look to the other statutes of the Commonwealth for guidance in sentencing. The most applicable statutes to provide such guidance are the laws relating to juveniles, and the laws relating to manslaughter, because each is consistent with the principles discussed in the Miller opinion. Neither the legislature nor the Courts may create a new sentencing scheme applicable to defendants who have already been convicted as that would violate the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws. The existing statutes allow for sentencing of JLWOP defendants either as juveniles, taking guidance from the penalties in the juvenile court system, or to a term of years taking guidance from the most serious homicide offense which permits a trial court to use judgment, consider evidence, and impose an indeterminate sentence.

Summary of Argument

The Miller and Jackson cases required the reversal of state court judgments and remand for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's rulings. This precedent necessitates relief for juvenile life without parole (JLWOP) defendants seeking to overturn unconstitutional sentences through collateral review.

The Jackson case involved collateral review, where the Supreme Court ordered the same relief as in Miller, which stemmed from a direct appeal. Given this parallel, the principle of consistency demands relief for all defendants, including those pursuing collateral review to challenge unconstitutional sentences.

The Miller opinion supports a broader remand to trial courts, potentially encompassing new trials, beyond simply re-sentencing. This allows for a comprehensive examination of legal and factual issues.

JLWOP defendants who lacked advance notice of proceedings, trial strategy development, and knowledge of the sentencing scheme and Miller principles have experienced due process violations. This includes the right to a jury trial and effective counsel.

Upon remand, sentencing must comply with constitutional and statutory law while acknowledging the juvenile status of the defendant. Existing state statutes mandating life without parole are unconstitutional and void.

Alternative sentencing frameworks should be explored, drawing inspiration from juvenile sentencing guidelines and manslaughter statutes. These approaches are consistent with Miller principles.

The courts cannot create new sentencing schemes for previously convicted defendants due to separation of powers and ex post facto law concerns. Existing statutes permit sentencing of JLWOP defendants as juveniles, guided by juvenile court penalties, or with a term of years based on the most serious homicide offense. This approach allows for judicial discretion, evidence consideration, and indeterminate sentences.

Summary of Argument

The Supreme Court rulings in the Miller and Jackson cases ordered state courts to reconsider sentences for life without parole (JLWOP) for juvenile offenders. This means that those convicted of crimes as juveniles and sentenced to JLWOP have the right to have their sentences reviewed. In the Jackson case, the Supreme Court specifically ordered this review on collateral review, which means it can happen even after the original trial.

These rulings have important implications for defendants who were sentenced to JLWOP. The Supreme Court's decision in Miller established a rule of law that applies to all cases involving juvenile offenders sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. This means that all such defendants, including those whose cases are currently being reviewed, should be granted relief.

The Supreme Court’s rulings mean that state courts must reconsider JLWOP sentences for juvenile offenders, which may involve a new trial. A new trial might be necessary if a defendant did not have adequate legal representation or was not fully informed about the potential sentencing outcomes. This would ensure that the defendant's rights to due process, a fair trial, and effective legal representation are protected.

The sentences imposed on remand must be consistent with the principles established in the Miller case. This means that sentencing should consider the age of the offender at the time of the crime and acknowledge that their brains are still developing. State laws that mandate JLWOP for juveniles are now considered unconstitutional and cannot be enforced.

State courts should look to existing laws that address juveniles or serious crimes such as manslaughter. These laws provide guidance for sentencing that considers the offender's age and the severity of the crime. It is important to note that creating new sentencing laws specifically for juveniles who have already been convicted would violate the principle of separation of powers and the ban on ex post facto laws.

Summary of Argument

In the Miller and Jackson cases, the Supreme Court told the state courts to go back and relook at the cases because the original sentences were not fair. The court said it would be unfair to not help kids who were given life sentences without parole. This means even if these cases come up again in court, they need to be reviewed based on the new rules.

The Supreme Court’s decision means that kids who got these unfair sentences should get another chance in court. This could mean a new trial or just a new sentence. In some cases, a new trial might be needed because the kids didn’t know what they were facing before. They didn’t have a fair chance to defend themselves or plan their defense. Because of this, their rights to a fair trial and a good lawyer were not respected.

When these cases are looked at again, any new sentence must follow the law and recognize that the person was a kid when the crime happened. If the law says a kid must get life without parole, that part of the law is now considered wrong. The courts should look at other laws for guidance.