SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Every year, thousands of children in the United States are subjected to maltreatment. The numbers are staggering. By the age of 18, one in eight children is a victim; in 2013, approximately 3.2 million children were confirmed affected. Contrary to popular wisdom, maltreated infants and children do not simply “get over it.” Rather, the damage to developing minds can be cumulative and permanent. Here, the lower court acknowledged but then brushed aside this crucial consequence of petitioner’s maltreatment.
Joseph H., who was severely abused and neglected since before his birth, sought review in the California Court of Appeal of his adjudication for murdering his father at the age of ten. A key question on appeal was whether Joseph had sufficient capacity to make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights. The court of appeal acknowledged Joseph’s history of maltreatment, including exposure to “heroin, methamphetamine, LSD, marijuana and alcohol ingested by his biological mother prenatally,” physical and sexual abuse, and “numerous reports to Child Protective Services relating to neglect.” Pet. App. 3a.
Following this litany, the court wrote: “Joseph was a difficult child.” Ibid. But the same abuse that rendered Joseph “difficult” also severely damaged his cognitive capacity, compromising his ability to understand his rights to silence and counsel. By failing to adequately weigh the impact of Joseph’s maltreatment, the court violated his constitutional rights. This Court should grant review to provide direction to lower courts that mistakenly see maltreated children as difficult, but intelligent enough to waive their rights, rather than as damaged, and therefore easily confused and unable to understand the profound consequences of a Miranda waiver.
The science of child brain development provides ample ground for the Court to act. Studies in the fields of neurobiology and neuropsychology confirm that child maltreatment often negatively impacts the developing mind. Most pertinent to Joseph’s case, severe abuse frequently damages “executive function”: cognition, judgment, emotional regulation, and the ability to understand the consequences of an action. As little as the average ten-year-old child is able to understand the significance of Miranda warnings, see Pet. 20–24, a severely maltreated child like Joseph is entirely unequal to the task.
The court of appeal acknowledged research suggesting that even developmentally normal juveniles may be incompetent to waive their Miranda rights. Pet. App. 22a n. 11. But the court nonetheless found no evidence of “developmental incompetence” to support the premise that Joseph himself was “confused or suggestible.” Id. at 22a n. 11; 24a. The lower court’s formalistic approach—which relied solely on a few words regarding “right” and “wrong” spoken by a traumatized ten-year-old child—cannot suffice to overcome the body of replicated science demonstrating that severely abused young children most likely are simply incapable of understanding sophisticated concepts like Miranda rights.