PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
It is well-settled that an eyewitness identification is among the most persuasive forms of evidence that can be presented at a criminal trial. As U.S. Supreme Court Justice Brennan observed: “[T]here is almost nothing more convincing than a live human being who takes the stand, points a finger at the defendant, and says ‘That’s the one!’” Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 352 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Troublingly, the persuasiveness of eyewitness identifications is frequently accompanied by a significant risk of unreliability; eyewitness identifications are now understood to be “among the least reliable forms of evidence.” See United States v. Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131, 142 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Indeed, eyewitness identification evidence plays a significant role in a strikingly high percentage of wrongful convictions exposed by post-conviction DNA testing nationwide; it is in fact the leading cause of wrongful conviction in those cases.
As set forth below, extensive scientific research demonstrates not only that eyewitness identifications are inherently fallible, but also that certain law enforcement practices and procedures can amplify the risk of misidentification. Many of the factors that contribute to the vulnerability of eyewitness identification evidence are not well understood by lay jurors, and in some cases are counterintuitive, often directly contradicting supposedly “common sense” beliefs. Accordingly, it is critical that this Court make clear that trial courts should permit expert testimony addressing these factors in appropriate cases. Without such testimony as background, juries are frequently unable to appropriately and fully evaluate eyewitness evidence.
This Court’s governing opinions on the admissibility of expert testimony relating to eyewitness evidence were decided more than thirty years ago. State v. Lawhorn, 762 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. 1988); State v. Whitmill, 780 S.W.2d 45 (Mo. 1989). Although Lawhorn and Whitmill did not impose a per se rule excluding expert testimony on eyewitness identification, Missouri’s trial courts often treat them as having done so. Consequently, jurors in this state routinely are denied the guidance necessary to evaluate properly the reliability of eyewitness identification testimony.
Based on the extensive body of scientific evidence on the factors that contribute to the frequent unreliability of eyewitness identification testimony—much of it developed in the thirty years since this Court last addressed the issue—courts across the country now regularly allow expert testimony explaining the reasons for that unreliability. These courts recognize that experts can equip jurors to evaluate the reliability of eyewitness testimony without invading the province of the jury, as expert testimony properly concerns the reliability of eyewitness identifications generally, not the credibility of the specific eyewitness in the case. That distinction is critical in the context of eyewitness testimony, where traditional protections like cross-examination are ineffective when an eyewitness is sincere and testifies honestly, but is simply mistaken.
Missouri law permits the admission of such expert testimony pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. § 490.065, the state’s recently-amended statute governing the admissibility of expert testimony. In light of the scientific research and with that statute’s provisions in mind, amici respectfully ask this Court to clarify that trial courts should generally admit expert testimony on factors that affect the reliability of eyewitness identifications in cases where that is at issue.