Brief of Amici Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Mississippi Office of the State Public Defender, and Mississippi Public Defenders Association in Support of Petitioner
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
Mississippi Office of the State Public Defender
Mississippi Public Defenders Association
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Summary

Mississippi courts sentence juvenile offenders to life without parole without considering "permanent incorrigibility," but a determination of permanent incorrigibility is critical to consistently impose life without parole sentences.

2020 | Federal Juristiction

Brief of Amici Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Mississippi Office of the State Public Defender, and Mississippi Public Defenders Association in Support of Petitioner

Keywords permanent incorrigibility; incapable of rehabilitation; Miller; Montgomery; transient immaturity; LWOP; attendant characteristics of youth; capacity for change
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Summary of Argument

Miller v. Alabama held that a court considering whether to sentence a juvenile to life without parole must “distinguish[] … between ‘the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.’ ” 567 U.S. 460, 479–80 (2012) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005)). While the Court “d[id] not foreclose a sentencer’s ability to make th[e] judgment” that a juvenile is irreparably corrupt, thereby justifying a life-without-parole sentence, the Court warned that the sentence would be “uncommon”—because “children’s diminished culpability” and “heightened capacity for change” create “great difficulty” in concluding, at the outset, that a child is beyond rehabilitation. Id.

Montgomery v. Louisiana confirmed that “irreparable corruption” (or “irretrievable depravity,” or “permanent incorrigibility”—terms the Court has used interchangeably) is a gating requirement for a constitutional sentence of life without parole for a juvenile offender. 136 S. Ct. 718, 733, 734 (2016). Montgomery explained that Miller announced a substantive rule because it “rendered life without parole an unconstitutional penalty for ‘a class of defendants because of their status’—that is, juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of youth.” Id. at 734 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989)). Consistent with precedent, that substantive rule was retroactive “because it necessarily carries a significant risk that a defendant—here, the vast majority of juvenile offenders—faces a punishment that the law cannot impose.” Id. (quoting Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004)) (alterations and quotation marks omitted).

Montgomery also addressed the procedural component of Miller’s rule, explaining that a sentencing hearing in which “youth and its attendant characteristics are considered” would be necessary to “separate those juveniles who may be sentenced to life without parole from those who may not.” 136 S. Ct. at 735 (citation omitted). Addressing Louisiana’s argument that Miller did not require trial courts to make a factual finding of permanent incorrigibility, the Court confirmed that it would “limit the scope” of procedural requirements that “intrud[e] more than necessary” on the States’ criminal justice systems. Id. At the same time, the substantive rule of Miller would be paramount: States are not “free to sentence a child whose crime reflects transient immaturity to life without parole” because “this punishment is disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment.” Id.

Four years after Montgomery, states that do not require a determination of permanent incorrigibility in order to sentence a child to life without parole are not reliably implementing the substantive rule of Miller. Mississippi cases illustrate the problems with that approach. Generally speaking, Mississippi courts presume a life-without-parole sentence is justified, and either avoid the question of permanent incorrigibility altogether, or require the juvenile offender to prove he will never reoffend. The resulting sentences of life without parole violate Miller’s substantive rule because they do not rest on a finding that the offender is more likely than not “permanently incorrigible.”

The safeguard of a finding of permanent incorrigibility is necessary to ensure that juvenile offenders receive life-without-parole sentences only when that sentence is proportionate and lawful. The finding requirement brings purpose and structure to a sentencer’s review of the juvenile offender’s individualized circumstances, ensuring that the sentencing analysis is not overwhelmed by the heinousness of the crime, or by the potential risk of immediate release (a consideration that should be left to a later parole board). Sentencers retain discretion to impose life without-parole sentences on juvenile offenders, but that discretion is properly bounded by “Miller’s central intuition—that children who commit even heinous crimes are capable of change.” Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736.

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Summary of Argument

In Miller v. Alabama (2012), the Supreme Court held that sentencing courts must distinguish between juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect "transient immaturity" and those whose crimes indicate "irreparable corruption." Only the latter category may be constitutionally sentenced to life without parole (LWOP). Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) reaffirmed this principle, establishing "irreparable corruption" as a prerequisite for LWOP sentences for juveniles.

Miller's Substantive Rule and Its Retroactivity

Montgomery characterized Miller's holding as a substantive rule that prohibits LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders whose crimes stem from transient immaturity. This rule was deemed retroactive because it protects against the imposition of an unlawful punishment on a class of defendants.

Procedural Requirements under Miller

Montgomery acknowledged the need for a sentencing hearing that considers the juvenile's characteristics to distinguish those eligible for LWOP from those who are not. However, the Court emphasized that procedural requirements should not unduly intrude on state criminal justice systems. Nonetheless, the substantive rule of Miller remains paramount, prohibiting LWOP sentences for juveniles whose crimes reflect transient immaturity.

Noncompliance in States Without Permanent Incorrigibility Determinations

States that do not require a determination of permanent incorrigibility fail to implement Miller's substantive rule reliably. Mississippi, for example, presumes the appropriateness of LWOP sentences and either ignores or shifts the burden of proof to the juvenile offender to demonstrate future rehabilitation. This approach violates Miller because it does not ensure that LWOP sentences are imposed only on offenders who are more likely than not permanently incorrigible.

The Importance of the Permanent Incorrigibility Finding

The requirement for a finding of permanent incorrigibility serves as a safeguard, ensuring that LWOP sentences for juveniles are proportionate and lawful. It structures the sentencing analysis, preventing it from being unduly influenced by the severity of the crime or the perceived risk of immediate release. While sentencers retain discretion, it is appropriately constrained by Miller's recognition that even juveniles who commit serious crimes possess the capacity for change.

Summary of Argument

In Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court ruled that courts must consider the unique characteristics of juvenile offenders before sentencing them to life without parole. The Court recognized that juveniles are less mature and have a greater capacity for rehabilitation than adults. Therefore, life-without-parole sentences should be reserved for only the most "irreparably corrupt" juveniles.

Montgomery v. Louisiana reaffirmed this principle, stating that "irreparable corruption" is a necessary condition for a constitutional life-without-parole sentence for a juvenile offender. This rule applies retroactively, meaning that it applies to all juvenile offenders who were previously sentenced to life without parole.

Montgomery also requires that courts hold a hearing where the juvenile's age and characteristics are considered before imposing a life-without-parole sentence. However, the Court allows states some flexibility in how they conduct these hearings.

In Mississippi, courts often presume that life without parole is appropriate for juvenile offenders. They may not explicitly consider the question of "permanent incorrigibility" or require the juvenile to prove that they will never reoffend. This approach violates the rule established in Miller, as it does not ensure that life-without-parole sentences are only imposed on juveniles who are truly beyond rehabilitation.

Requiring a finding of permanent incorrigibility helps to ensure that life-without-parole sentences are proportionate and lawful for juvenile offenders. It forces courts to focus on the individual characteristics of the offender, rather than solely on the crime they committed. This safeguard is essential for protecting the rights of juvenile offenders and ensuring that they have a meaningful opportunity for rehabilitation.

Summary of Argument

The Supreme Court has said that kids who commit crimes should be treated differently than adults. They're not as mature, and they have a better chance of changing their behavior. So, the Court has ruled that it's unconstitutional to sentence kids to life in prison without parole unless they're "irreparably corrupt," meaning they're so bad that they'll never be able to change.

But in Mississippi, courts often sentence kids to life without parole without making sure they're truly "irreparably corrupt." They either ignore the question altogether or make the kids prove that they'll never commit another crime. This is a problem because it means that kids who might be able to change are being locked up for life.

It's important to make sure that kids who are sentenced to life without parole are truly beyond help. Otherwise, we're just throwing away their lives. The Court has said that even kids who commit serious crimes have the potential to change, and we should give them a chance to prove it.

Summary of Argument

Sometimes, kids commit really bad crimes. The court says that judges need to make an important decision before saying that a kid should go to prison for the rest of their life. That is because kids are different from adults because they're still growing and learning. Even kids who do terrible things can change and become better people. So, judges need to think carefully about whether a kid is so bad that they'll never be able to change.

Before a judge can sentence a kid to life in jail, they have to decide if the kid is "permanently incorrigible." That's a fancy way of saying that the kid will never be able to be a good person.To make sure this decision is fair, the judge has to listen to all the facts about the kid, like their age, their family, and why they did the bad thing. The judge also has to think about how the kid might change in the future.

The court says that it's very rare for a kid to be so bad that they deserve to be locked up for life. Judges have the power to give this punishment, but they have to be very careful and make sure that the kid really can't change before they do it.

Footnotes and Citation

Cite

Brief of Amici Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Mississippi Office of the State Public Defender, and Mississippi Public Defenders Association in Support of Petitioner, Jones v. Mississippi, No. 18-1259 (U.S. 2020).

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