Introduction
The scientific community has reached consensus that showups—and in particular, stationhouse showups—are inherently suggestive, dispense with scientifically-sound practices, and profoundly impact the reliability of eyewitness identification. Thus, it should be no surprise that mistaken identifications from showups have led to a large number of wrongful convictions. See Garrett, Convicting the Innocent: Where Criminal Prosecutions Go Wrong 55 (2011) (finding that among the first 250 wrongful conviction cases established by DNA evidence, 33 percent of mistaken identification cases involved a showup). The admission of highly unreliable testimony stemming from impermissibly suggestive stationhouse showup identifications casts significant doubt on the integrity of convictions such as that of Mr. Sammons. Indeed, given the close association between showups, witness misidentification, and wrongful convictions, showups should rarely—if ever—be conducted. In the limited circumstances in which evidence of a showup may be deemed admissible, courts should still review whether officers conducting the showup followed appropriate protocols.
This Court has asked the parties to address: (1) if the stationhouse showup identification procedure here was impermissibly suggestive; (2) if the identification itself was sufficiently reliable so that it was properly admitted even if the procedure itself was impermissibly suggestive; and (3) if the identification was improperly admitted, whether it was more probable than not that the erroneous admission of the identification affected the outcome of the trial. Otherwise put, this Court must decide if, under the totality of the circumstances involved in this case, the stationhouse showup caused a substantial likelihood of misidentification. People v Kurylczyk, 443 Mich 289, 302; 505 NW2d 528 (1993). In doing so, this Court must consider advances in scientific research that indicate that showups are profoundly suggestive, inherently unreliable, and present an elevated risk of wrongful conviction. If this Court finds the stationhouse showup was impermissibly suggestive and it was not necessary to conduct such a procedure, Perry v New Hampshire, 565 US 228, 238-239 (2012), it must then determine whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the witness’s ability to identify the offender is so reliable that it outweighs the corrupting effect of the suggestive circumstances. See id. at 232.
At the time that the showup was conducted in this case, Mr. Sammons was already in custody and being interviewed by the police, while the witness was available and already at the stationhouse with his legal guardian. Thus, it was completely unnecessary for the police to forgo the use of a proper, nonsuggestive lineup procedure5 and instead to use an inherently suggestive showup that scientific research now shows undoubtedly increased the chances of misidentification.
A properly-designed photo array that would test the accuracy of the witness’s memory was abandoned in favor of a highly suggestive showup. The witness thus very likely concluded that law enforcement must have had a reason for singling Mr. Sammons out, and the pressure to identify Mr. Sammons was only intensified when the witness was escorted past the interrogation room without his legal guardian present while being spoken to by law enforcement.
Most crucially, the witness himself did not identify Mr. Sammons as the shooter in court and testified that he could not and never did identify Mr. Sammons as the shooter. Therefore, the only testimony that the witness ever identified Mr. Sammons came from the detective who conducted the unconstitutionally suggestive showup. That testimony, which derives directly from the tainted showup procedure, cannot possibly erase the corrupting effect of the showup that took place in this case.