Brief of Amici Curiae Juvenile Law Center and National Juvenile Defender Center on Behalf of Appellant Matthew Aalim
Marsha L. Levick
Nadia N. Seeratan
Mathias H. Heck, Jr.
Andrew T. French
Amanda J. Powell
SummaryOriginal

Summary

Ohio’s mandatory bindover statutes are unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause.

2016 | State Juristiction

Brief of Amici Curiae Juvenile Law Center and National Juvenile Defender Center on Behalf of Appellant Matthew Aalim

Keywords automatic transfers to adult court; transfers; due process; mandatory bindover; individualized determinations; minors; risk of recidivism; unique characteristics of youth; Fourteenth Amendment (U.S.); juveniles; Kent v. United States
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Summary of Argument

Ohio Revised Code sections 2152.10(A)(2)(b) and 2152.12(A)(1)(b) violate the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by mandating that 16- and 17-year old youth be transferred to adult court for prosecution if there is probable cause to support that the youth has committed a category two offense with a firearm. Following this probable cause determination, which takes place in juvenile court, the transfer scheme requires adult prosecution for all such youth, based solely on the crime with which they have been charged and their age at the time the crime was allegedly committed. By depriving youth of any individualized determination of amenability, this scheme denies young people their due process rights. See U.S. Const., XIV Amend. It runs afoul of general due process principles, the Supreme Court’s determination in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), that youth are entitled to particularly strong due process protections when their cases are transferred from juvenile to adult court, and the Supreme Court’s precedents recognizing that juveniles possess unique characteristics that make adult sentences often inappropriate.

While procedural due process is a flexible notion which calls for such protections as demanded by the individual situation, the essential requirements are notice and an opportunity to be heard. Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (“An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property ‘be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing....”) (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)). Moreover, due process requires not just “any” hearing, but rather an “appropriate” hearing:

The hearing required by the Due Process Clause must be ‘meaningful,’ and ‘appropriate to the nature of the case.’ It is a proposition which hardly seems to need explication that a hearing which excludes consideration of an element essential to the decision . . . does not meet this standard.

Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1971) (citations omitted). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has made clear that “[t]he extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the recipient is influenced by the extent to which he may be ‘condemned to suffer grievous loss.’” Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-263 (1970).

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Summary of Argument

Ohio Revised Code sections 2152.10(A)(2)(b) and 2152.12(A)(1)(b) are challenged as violating the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The challenge centers around the mandatory transfer of 16- and 17-year-old youth to adult court for prosecution when there is probable cause to believe they committed a category two offense involving a firearm. This transfer scheme, bypassing any individualized assessment of amenability, is deemed to violate due process principles by failing to provide adequate procedural safeguards.

The argument rests on the fundamental requirement of procedural due process, which necessitates notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. This principle, as established in Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, mandates that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property must be preceded by adequate notice and an opportunity for a hearing.

Further, the argument highlights that due process demands not just any hearing but one that is "appropriate" and "meaningful" to the nature of the case. This principle, articulated in Bell v. Burson, emphasizes the importance of considering all relevant factors in the decision-making process.

The argument also draws on the Supreme Court's recognition of the unique characteristics of juveniles, suggesting that adult sentences are often inappropriate for them. This perspective, combined with the Supreme Court's ruling in Kent v. United States, which emphasizes the need for strong due process protections during juvenile transfer proceedings, strengthens the argument against the Ohio statutes.

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Summary of Argument

Ohio Revised Code sections 2152.10(A)(2)(b) and 2152.12(A)(1)(b) violate the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. This occurs because they mandate that 16- and 17-year old youth are transferred to adult court for prosecution if there is probable cause to believe they committed a category two offense with a firearm. This system fails to offer individualized determinations of amenability and deprives youth of their due process rights by transferring them based solely on their age and the crime with which they are charged. The Constitution requires that individuals receive notice and an opportunity to be heard before they are subjected to a deprivation of liberty. In addition, this transfer scheme violates Supreme Court precedent in Kent v. United States, which requires strong due process protections for youth, and it fails to account for juvenile characteristics that make adult sentences often inappropriate. The Supreme Court has also affirmed that the requirements of due process include an appropriate hearing that considers all necessary elements.

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Summary of Argument

Ohio laws 2152.10(A)(2)(b) and 2152.12(A)(1)(b) require that 16- and 17-year-old kids be tried as adults if there’s good reason to believe they used a gun to commit a serious crime. This process denies these young people their due process rights because it doesn’t allow for a case-by-case examination of whether an adult trial is appropriate. This argument is based on the U.S. Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, which guarantees due process, and Supreme Court rulings like Kent v. United States (1966), which recognize the special protections needed for kids in the legal system.

Due process means that a person should be given fair treatment and a chance to be heard before being deprived of their rights. It’s a basic principle that applies to everyone, but the Supreme Court has made it clear that kids require extra due process protections because they are still developing and may not be fully responsible for their actions. The current law in Ohio doesn’t take this into account. It automatically sends kids to adult court just because of their age and the crime they’re accused of, without considering their individual circumstances. This doesn’t meet the requirements of due process, which demands that judges take a careful look at each case before making such a serious decision.

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Summary of Argument

This argument says that Ohio laws about sending 16- and 17-year-olds to adult court are unfair. These laws automatically send kids and teens to adult court if they're accused of a serious crime with a gun, even if they haven't had a chance to explain themselves. This is wrong because kids deserve a chance to be heard and have a fair trial. The argument says that these laws violate the Constitution because they don't give kids their rights.

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Footnotes and Citation

Cite

Brief of Amici Curiae Juvenile Law Center and National Juvenile Defender Center in Support of Appellant Matthew Aalim, State v. Aalim, No. 2015-0677 (Ohio Jan. 11, 2016).

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