Summary of Argument

Recent neuroscience and precedent from the United States Supreme Court demonstrate that young people have different characteristics relevant to mitigation which should be considered during criminal sentencing. While not all youth will be eligible for a downward departure, the Sentencing Reform Act, RCW 9.94A.535(1)(e), grants courts the authority to consider whether a particular defendant's youth mitigated his individual culpability for a crime, even if, like Mr. O'Dell, the young person has reached his 18th birthday.

In the last decade, the United States Supreme Court has handed down four landmark decisions profoundly altering the treatment of youth in the criminal justice system: Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2005) (abolishing the death penalty for all youth under the age of 18); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010) (life without parole sentences for youth who commit non-homicide crimes ruled unconstitutional),· J.D.B. v. North Carolina,_ U.S._, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 180 L. Ed. 2d 310 (2011) (holding that the Miranda custody take into account the age of a juvenile); and Miller v. Alabama,_ U.S._, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012) (mandatory life without parole sentence for juveniles convicted of homicide crimes is unconstitutional). Each of these cases was premised on the scientific fact that adolescents as a group are neurologically, significantly different than adults and therefore generally less culpable for their crimes.

As the United States Supreme Court recognized in these cases, neurological development affects how young people think and act. That development impacts their understanding of consequences, their abilities to control their emotions, the relative influence of peers, and their decision-making. Recent neuroscience has proven that these transformational processes continue well into a young person's twenties. These scientific facts render many youth less culpable than adults due to the innate qualities of their age and the manner in which those qualities affect them.

Undoubtedly, a defendant's youth will not always result in a downward departure- youth is not an excuse for criminal behavior. However, it is relevant to a young person's culpability for a particular crime and to the proportionality of the sentence.

Proportionate punishment for culpable behavior lies at the core of the criminal justice system generally, and the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) specifically. See RCW 9.94A.010. The SRA allows a court to grant an exceptional sentence downward when "[t]he defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct, or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements ofthe law, was significantly impaired." RCW 9.94A.535(1 )(e).

This case illustrates this point. Because Mr. O'Dell was 10 days beyond his 181h birthday at the time of the offense, his possible sentence went from a maximum sentence of 36 weeks as a juvenile to a potential life sentence. Nonetheless, the sentencing court felt that it could not consider Mr. O'Dell's youth or the science discussed herein when it sentenced him. In fact, the SRA grants courts the discretion to evaluate the particular individual circumstances in cases like Sean O'Dell's in order to reach a decision that reflects modern science and achieves a proportionate, just outcome.

In the past, Washington courts have rejected the argument that youth is a valid mitigating factor in cases that predate the scientific breakthroughs in juvenile neuroscience discussed herein and the Roper/Graham/Miller line of cases. See e.g., Ha'mim 132 Wn.2d at 836 (young age at time of offense not a valid basis for a downward departure). This Court should reexamine those holdings and reach. a result more in keeping with the language and intent ofthe SRA and one that accommodates modern science and more recent legal thinking.

While a defendant's youth and its impact on his culpability for a particular crime is one factor that courts should be able to consider during sentencing, there are others as well. As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, a defendant's intellectual disability may require a lesser sentence than would otherwise be imposed. See e.g. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 153 L. Ed. 2d 335 (2002) (death penalty may not be imposed upon person with intellectual disabilities and IQ of 70 or below). The SRA reflects this principle and allows courts the discretion necessary to reach a proportionate and just sentence in particular circumstances.

In this brief, amici first offer an examination of the effects of youthfulness on culpability. Second, amici show how the SRA allows youth to be considered at sentencing on a case by case basis. Third, amici discuss how other individual attributes, like the presence of an intellectual disability, should also be the basis for a downward departure in particular circumstances.

Summary of Argument

This brief examines the relevance of youth as a mitigating factor during criminal sentencing, advocating for a reinterpretation of legal precedent to align with contemporary neuroscience and Supreme Court rulings.

Recent advancements in neuroscience and the landmark decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in cases like Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, J.D.B. v. North Carolina, and Miller v. Alabama underscore the developmental differences between adolescents and adults, particularly concerning culpability in criminal matters. These cases established the principle that youthful offenders, due to their ongoing brain development, possess diminished capacity to comprehend consequences, control impulses, resist peer influence, and engage in rational decision-making.

The Sentencing Reform Act (SRA), specifically RCW 9.94A.535(1)(e), empowers courts to consider a defendant's diminished capacity to understand the wrongfulness of their actions or to conform their behavior to legal requirements as a mitigating factor. This provision, coupled with the scientific understanding of adolescent brain development, suggests that courts should have the discretion to assess the individual culpability of young offenders, even those who have reached the age of 18.

The principle of proportionate punishment, fundamental to the criminal justice system, aligns with the SRA's mandate for individualized sentencing. This approach requires courts to consider the unique circumstances of each case, including a defendant's age, developmental stage, and other relevant factors that might influence their culpability. Failing to acknowledge the impact of youth on culpability can lead to disproportionate sentences that fail to consider the distinct characteristics of young offenders.

While youth is a critical factor in assessing culpability, other individual characteristics, such as intellectual disability, should also be considered in determining appropriate sentencing. The Supreme Court's decision in Atkins v. Virginia recognized the diminished culpability of individuals with intellectual disabilities, and the SRA provides the legal framework for considering such mitigating circumstances. By acknowledging the complexity of human development and individual variation, courts can ensure more just and proportionate sentencing outcomes.

This brief advocates for a more nuanced understanding of youthful offenders' culpability, urging courts to utilize the SRA's provisions to consider age-related mitigating factors and individual circumstances during sentencing. This approach will promote a fairer and more just application of the law, aligning with scientific understanding and the evolving jurisprudence regarding youthful offenders.

Summary of Argument

This brief argues that a defendant's youth should be considered a mitigating factor in criminal sentencing. While not all youth will be eligible for a reduced sentence, the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) gives courts the authority to consider whether a defendant's youth mitigated their culpability for the crime, even if they are over 18. This argument is supported by recent neuroscience research and precedent from the United States Supreme Court.

Recent neuroscience research demonstrates that adolescents are neurologically different from adults. This difference affects their decision-making, understanding of consequences, emotional control, and susceptibility to peer influence. These developmental processes continue into a young person's twenties, rendering them less culpable for their crimes than adults.

The SRA allows for a downward departure in sentencing if a defendant's "capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct, or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of the law, was significantly impaired." This provision allows courts to consider a defendant's youth in determining culpability and sentencing.

Proportionate punishment is a cornerstone of the criminal justice system. The SRA recognizes that individual circumstances should be considered when determining the appropriate sentence. This includes factors such as youth and intellectual disability, which may mitigate culpability.

The brief concludes by urging the court to recognize the validity of youth as a mitigating factor in sentencing. It also argues that the court should consider other individual attributes, such as intellectual disability, when determining a just and proportionate sentence. The court should reexamine past rulings and incorporate modern science and legal thinking into its sentencing practices.

Summary of Argument

This argument outlines the importance of considering a young person's age and developmental stage during criminal sentencing. It emphasizes that young people, particularly those just over the age of 18, may not be as fully developed in terms of judgment, decision-making, and emotional control as adults.

The argument draws on recent neuroscience research and Supreme Court decisions that highlight the significant differences in brain development between adolescents and adults. This research supports the idea that young people are not always as culpable for their actions as adults. While acknowledging that youth is not an excuse for criminal behavior, the argument emphasizes its relevance in determining a fair and proportionate sentence.

The Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) provides courts the authority to consider a defendant's diminished capacity to understand the wrongfulness of their actions or to control their behavior as a mitigating factor. This allows for a downward departure from the standard sentence in cases where a young person's developmental stage is relevant to their level of culpability.

The argument uses the case of Mr. O'Dell, who was just over 18 at the time of the offense, as an example of how the SRA could be applied. His potential sentence was significantly increased because he was legally an adult, despite his age and the impact of his developmental stage on his actions. This case exemplifies the need for courts to consider a defendant's age and its implications for their level of culpability.

The argument concludes by suggesting that courts should reexamine previous decisions that have disregarded youth as a mitigating factor in sentencing. It advocates for a more modern approach that incorporates scientific understanding of brain development and recognizes the unique challenges faced by young people. The argument further emphasizes the importance of considering other individual attributes, such as intellectual disability, in determining a just and proportionate sentence.

Summary of Argument

The United States Supreme Court has said that young people are different from adults. They are still growing and learning, and they may not be able to think about the consequences of their actions as well as adults. So, a judge can take a young person's age into account when deciding what their punishment will be.

A recent law, called the Sentencing Reform Act, lets judges consider a young person's age when deciding their punishment. This law allows for a shorter sentence if the young person was not able to understand the wrongfulness of their actions. This law is important because it helps make sure that punishments fit the crime. The law also recognizes that young people may not be as responsible for their actions as adults.

The document also talks about other things that judges should consider when deciding a punishment. For example, they should think about whether the person has any special needs, like a learning disability.