SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This is not a case about regulating homeless encampments. Instead, given the breadth of the challenged municipal ordinances, this case presents a critical issue about the criminalization of poverty: whether people experiencing involuntary homelessness in a city with no shelter beds can be punished with fines, fees, and criminal penalties if they sleep in public areas with rudimentary protection from the elements such as pillows and blankets—the unavoidable consequence of being without a home. In a country experiencing record rates of homelessness due to an affordable housing crisis and rising costs occasioned by public policy failures, the answer should be obvious. While policy solutions are needed to resolve our homelessness crisis, they cannot violate the constitutional rights of those surviving under the pressing weight of poverty.
The Eighth Amendment applies to a range of penalties and limits the conduct that can be criminalized in the first place. Enforcing the municipal ordinances at issue would constitute cruel and unusual punishment for three reasons: (1) status crimes are categorically cruel and unusual under Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) and this Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence; (2) local governments cannot circumvent Robinson through multistep civil and criminal statutory schemes that punish someone for an aspect of their status; and (3) criminalizing poverty conflicts with contemporary standards of decency. When analyzing what penalties can be imposed under the Eighth Amendment, this Court has stressed that “the sanction imposed cannot be so totally without penological justification that it results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering.” The lack of penological justification in this case cannot be more glaring. As legislators in Grants Pass have openly acknowledged, the aim of the ordinances is to banish poor people within city limits—i.e. “to make it uncomfortable enough for [unhoused persons] in our city so [sic] they will want to move on down the road.”4 A desire to make life as unpleasant as possible for people who already lack a safe place to sleep at night lacks a legitimate penological justification and “results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering” condemned by this Court.
Although Petitioner and its amici assert that affirming the lower court’s holding would leave local and state officials helpless to address homelessness, these assertions are wrong. Affirmance only prevents officials from violating the constitutional rights of those experiencing homelessness through a scheme of financial and criminal punishment. Local and state officials can still address homelessness through policy choices that do not punish individuals for their involuntary status contrary to Robinson, which is entitled to stare decisis. This case does not extend Robinson beyond its narrow holding, and falls squarely within the judicially manageable limits on criminalization of homeless individuals created by Robinson and its progeny Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
For the LGBTQI+ community in particular, whom amici represent, the impact of ordinances like the ones at bar are dire. Members of the LGBTQI+ community already experience homelessness at staggering rates due to discrimination in education, employment, and housing, among others—fueling a pernicious cycle of poverty, homelessness, and incarceration. It does not have to be this way. The heightened societal challenges faced by LGBTQI+ community members experiencing homelessness should not be exacerbated by policy choices which violate their constitutional right to not be criminalized on the basis of their status as homeless individuals.
Accordingly, amici respectfully request that this Court affirm the Ninth Circuit’s decision that “it is an Eighth Amendment violation to criminally punish involuntarily homeless persons for sleeping in public if there are no other public areas or appropriate shelters where those individuals can sleep,” Pet. App. 19a (citation omitted), consistent with the Court’s sound jurisprudence and contemporary standards of decency.