Summary of Argument

No decision of this Court should be construed to provide an escape hatch that would entitle respondent to retroactively invalidate discretionary life-without-parole sentences for his heinous crimes.

In Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), the Court held only that the Eighth Amendment forbids “mandatory” sentences of life without parole for homicides committed by juveniles. Id. at 465. The sentencing schemes at issue in Miller required sentences of life without parole in all cases, irrespective of any age-related factors, and the Court’s reasoning relied on the conjunction of its juvenile-sentencing and individualized-sentencing precedents. The Court expressly limited its holding to mandatory punishments and declined to consider broader rationales that would have applied equally to discretionary sentences.

In Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016), the Court held that Miller’s rule is retroactive to sentences that became final before that rule was announced. That case, like Miller, involved a defendant who had received a mandatory sentence of life without parole, not a discretionary one. Some of the language in Montgomery, however, did not distinguish between mandatory and discretionary sentences. Accordingly, the government and lower courts have generally (though not invariably) felt constrained to understand Montgomery’s reasoning (though not its actual holding) as requiring the retroactive invalidation of both types of sentences.

This Court, however, is not so constrained, and it should take the opportunity in this case to reemphasize the express limits of Miller. One way to do so is to clarify that Montgomery’s core rationale—that retroactive application of the Miller rule was necessary to eliminate a “substantial risk” of disproportionate sentences, 136 S. Ct. at 736—applies only to mandatory sentences, not discretionary ones. Under Miller, only mandatory sentences, imposed indiscriminately on all juvenile offenders, create the degree and kind of risk that would require retroactive invalidation. Another way is to clarify that Miller’s retroactivity rests on the narrow rationale advocated by the government in Montgomery— namely, that a rule invalidating a mandatory sentencing scheme is retroactive because it alters the range of possible substantive outcomes. Under either approach, the decision below should be vacated and the case remanded so that the lower courts can determine in the first instance whether respondent was sentenced under a mandatory regime of the sort that is covered by Miller.

Summary of Argument

The Supreme Court has cautioned against interpreting its decisions as providing a basis for the retroactive invalidation of discretionary life-without-parole sentences imposed on juvenile offenders.

In Miller v. Alabama (2012), the Supreme Court ruled that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juvenile homicide offenders. The Court emphasized that its holding applied only to mandatory sentencing schemes.

In Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016), the Court extended the Miller rule retroactively, making it applicable to sentences that had become final prior to the Miller decision.

The Supreme Court has the authority to clarify the scope of Miller and emphasize its express limitations.

One approach to clarifying Miller's limits is to emphasize that the core rationale of Montgomery—the need to eliminate the substantial risk of disproportionate sentences—applies only to mandatory sentencing schemes, not discretionary ones.

Another approach is to clarify that the retroactivity of Miller is based on the narrow rationale that a rule invalidating a mandatory sentencing scheme alters the range of possible substantive outcomes for juvenile offenders.

The Supreme Court should consider clarifying the limits of Miller and its retroactivity, emphasizing that the rationale for retroactive invalidation applies only to mandatory sentencing schemes and not to discretionary life-without-parole sentences imposed on juvenile offenders.

Summary of Argument

In the case of Miller v. Alabama (2012), the Supreme Court ruled that it is unconstitutional to give mandatory life sentences without the possibility of parole to juveniles who commit murder. This decision was based on the idea that juveniles are different from adults and should be given a chance to show that they can be rehabilitated.

In Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016), the Court extended the Miller ruling to apply to sentences that were already final. However, the Court did not specifically address whether this applied to both mandatory and discretionary sentences. Discretionary sentences are those where the judge has some flexibility in deciding the punishment.

Some lower courts have interpreted Montgomery to mean that all juvenile life sentences without parole should be resentenced, even discretionary ones. However, the Supreme Court has the opportunity to clarify this issue.

One argument for limiting the application of Montgomery to mandatory sentences is that only mandatory sentences create a significant risk of unfair punishments. When a sentence is discretionary, the judge can consider the individual circumstances of the juvenile.

Another argument is that the government's rationale in Montgomery for making the Miller rule retroactive only applies to mandatory sentences. This rationale is that a rule that makes a mandatory sentencing scheme unconstitutional changes the possible punishments that can be given.

If the Supreme Court limits the application of Montgomery to mandatory sentences, it would mean that juveniles who were given discretionary life sentences without parole would not have a chance to be resentenced.

Summary of Argument

In the past, the Supreme Court ruled that it was against the Constitution to automatically sentence juveniles to life in prison without parole for murder (Miller v. Alabama). This decision only applied to cases where the sentence was required by law, not when judges had the option to choose a different sentence.

Later, the Court decided that this rule should apply to cases that were already decided (Montgomery v. Louisiana). However, some of the language in that decision seemed to suggest that it should apply to all life without parole sentences for juveniles, even those where the judge had a choice.

Now, the Supreme Court has a chance to clarify this issue. They can explain that the reasons for making the Miller rule retroactive only apply to mandatory sentences, not to sentences where the judge has discretion.

If the Court rules that the Miller rule does not apply to discretionary sentences, it means that juveniles who were sentenced to life without parole at the judge's discretion will not have their sentences automatically overturned. They would still have to go through the normal appeals process to try to get their sentences reduced.

This is important because it would ensure that juveniles who commit serious crimes are still held accountable for their actions. It would also prevent the courts from being flooded with requests for resentencing from juveniles who were sentenced to life without parole many years ago.

Summary of Argument

The highest court in the country made a law that says it's not fair to sentence kids to life in prison without the chance of getting out if they kill someone. This rule only applied to kids who had to get that sentence, no matter what.

Later, the court said that this law should also apply to kids who were already sentenced before the law was made. But in that case, the kid also had to get life in prison without the chance of getting out.

Now, the court is thinking about changing its mind. They want to say that the rule should only apply to kids who had to get that sentence. That's because when judges can choose the sentence, they can think about the kid's age and other things before deciding.

So, the court might change the rule so that kids who were sentenced to life in prison without the chance of getting out, but didn't have to get that sentence, might not have their sentences changed.