SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Supreme Court has long recognized the dangers of eyewitness testimony: “the influence of improper suggestion upon identifying witnesses probably accounts for more miscarriages of justice than any other single factor.” United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 229 (1967). Because mistaken eyewitness identifications contribute so frequently to wrongful convictions, special care must be taken to assess the reliability of such evidence. This is particularly important where, as here, the testimony of a single eyewitness is the sole evidence of a defendant’s guilt.
The in-court identification that is critical to the prosecution’s case here is inherently unreliable. The witness was a victim of a violent, nighttime home invasion, during which her wheelchair-bound husband was threatened with an ax. RA74-75. The perpetrator wore a disguise that covered his entire body, and most of his face, except for his eyes. RA75. Immediately after the account, the witness was unable to describe the perpetrator in any but the most general terms, and she was entirely unable to assist the police in creating a composite image of the perpetrator. Id. She was then unable to make any identification from a photographic lineup (which contained a photograph of Mr. Young, who did not match the witness’s initial general description of the perpetrator), further demonstrating her poor opportunity to view the perpetrator during the crime. Id. It was only after police conducted a lineup tainted by an illegal arrest that the witness finally identified Mr. Young.
In these circumstances, the eyewitness’s in-court identification had no independent basis and could only have been based on the illegal lineup. The district court correctly found that the state court erred in concluding that there was an independent source for the identification, and that the state court’s decision was contrary to established federal law. The district court’s finding is amply supported by substantial scientific research that makes clear that an identification based on this witness’s opportunity to view the perpetrator during the crime is unlikely to be accurate. Consequently, there is a substantial danger that the courtroom identification was wrong. Such research has been accepted by the scientific community and by state and federal courts in legal proceedings to determine the admissibility of eyewitness testimony.
The scientific research confirms the district court’s conclusion that the state court decision (that Mrs. Sykes’s in-court identification of Mr. Young was independent of the unconstitutional lineup) was an unreasonable application of federal law. This research strongly suggests that the illegal lineup contaminated Mrs. Sykes’s memories of the event. Indeed, Mrs. Sykes’s inability to identify Petitioner-Appellee during a photo array immediately after the event is a telling indication that her later identifications were tainted. The scientific research also affirms that the particular circumstances surrounding the robbery here impaired Mrs. Sykes’s ability to accurately process and remember the event and the intruder. These include the passage of time between observation and identification, the perpetrator’s disguise, the fact that the identification was cross-racial, the presence of a weapon, and the highly stressful circumstances of the crime. The research regarding the presence of these factors thus further confirms the district court’s decision that the state court erred in finding Mrs. Sykes had an independent basis for giving her in-court identification.
In addition, the district court correctly determined that the state court’s admission of the in-court identification was not harmless error. Studies have shown that eyewitness testimony affects jurors to an extent that may not be warranted. Jurors overbelieve eyewitness testimony, overestimate the likely accuracy of eyewitness testimony, and confound certainty and accuracy. Because Mrs. Sykes’s testimony was crucial to the prosecution and thus the jury verdict, the admission of the tainted in-court identification was not harmless error.
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the district court’s decision.