SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Gregory Bolin’s conviction was largely based on a form of evidence that scientific researchers have consistently found to be among the most fallible and yet among the most persuasive for jurors: eyewitness identification. Analyses of “false convictions have led to a consensus among legal scholars that mistaken eyewitness identification is one of the primary causes of wrongful convictions in the United States.” Steven E. Clark, Blackstone and the Balance of Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 74 Alb. L. Rev. 1105, 1106 (2011). The outsized influence of eyewitness evidence has also been shown to affect jurors’ reasoning where experimenters have controlled for guilt and innocence such that innocence is not a starting point for the analysis: One study found that “mock jurors were unable to distinguish between correct and incorrect witnesses, believing them 80% of the time when they were correct and 80% of the time when they were incorrect.” Id. at 1148. As implied by these findings, jurors place disproportionate weight on eyewitness testimony, overestimating its accuracy and ignoring countervailing circumstances strongly correlated with inaccuracy such as limited viewing angle, poor lighting conditions, and cross-racial identification. All these indicators of inaccuracy are present in this case.
Eyewitness identification evidence was not only crucial to the state’s case against Bolin, but, as wielded by the state, it bore the very markers of fallibility that lead to wrongful convictions. The eyewitness evidence presented at trial suffered from nearly every key indicator of unreliability recognized by the Supreme Court in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972). Because of the acknowledged power of mistaken eyewitness identifications, see United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228-29 (1967), special care must be taken to assess an identification’s reliability, particularly where, as here, the identification resulted from an inherently suggestive procedure involving a single-suspect, show-up presentation; leading instructions and suggestive comments; and police pressure to make an identification. And, none of the circumstances that promote reliability— such as an unhindered opportunity to view the suspect, a high degree of attention paid, an accurate description that followed, or a high level of certainty about the identification at the time it was first made—was present here. This evidence was particularly destructive given that jurors place inordinate weight on eyewitness identification evidence.
This Court should accordingly reverse the district court’s decision.