Summary of Argument

The legislature of this Commonwealth has never amended the sentencing scheme for the offense of first degree murder that existed in 2006, even for homicides committed by a juvenile. The legislature fixed Pennsylvania’s “Miller problem” prospectively in October 2012, but expressly refused in that legislation to address the issue with respect to cases originally sentenced prior to June 25, 2012, including that of Qu’eed Batts. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102.1(a) (applicable only to those “convicted after June 24, 2012”).

The unconstitutional features of the current statutory scheme cannot be severed under 1 Pa.C.S. § 1925, because the provisions that would remain would be contrary to legislative intent and not capable of fulfillment without impermissible judicial elaboration or emendation. Under our state Constitution’s separation of powers, the function of assigning a punishment to statutory criminal conduct is purely legislative. Commonwealth v. Wolfe, No. 68 MAP 2015 (Pa., June 21, 2016) (J-24-2016, at 19-20); Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 117 A.3d 247, 261 (Pa. 2015); Commw. ex rel. Varronne v. Cunningham, 365 Pa. 68, 71, 73 A.2d 705, 706 (1950). Moreover, the function of assigning a “missing” penalty cannot be exercised by the judiciary in the course of an appeal, as a matter of federal Fourteenth Amendment Due Process. See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979). As noted, the Legislature has expressly refused to exercise its authority in cases such as this one, leaving the only available punishment for Batts’ most serious offense one that is unconstitutional. As a result, this Court has no choice but to order that upon resentencing, Mr. Batts not be sentenced for first degree murder at all, but only for any other or lesser offense for which he may have been convicted and for which a lawful penalty is available.

This Court reached a different conclusion on this question of judicial authority and separation of powers when the present case was formerly before the Court. See Commonwealth v. Batts, 620 Pa. 115, 66 A.3d 286, 294-96 (2013) (“Batts I”). Because the reasoning of that decision does not survive Montgomery’s explanation of Miller (and because the Court in Batts I did not consider or address the controlling authorities presented in this brief for amicus curiae and is irreconcilable with both earlier and later precedent, that is, Varronne, Hopkins and Wolfe), the issue should be reconsidered at this time. To say that a given sentence would not be unconstitutional (were it actually to be authorized by law), is not to say that such a sentence has in fact been authorized. Yet just such a fallacy underlies the decision on this point in Batts I. Accordingly, that question should be reopened and reconsidered. The question discussed in this brief is necessarily prior to, and an essential foundation for, the procedural issues on which allowance of appeal was expressly granted.

Summary of Argument

The Pennsylvania legislature has not amended the sentencing scheme for first-degree murder since 2006, even for juveniles. In 2012, the legislature addressed the issue of mandatory life sentences for juveniles prospectively, but declined to address cases sentenced before June 25, 2012.

The current statutory scheme has been deemed unconstitutional because it does not provide for individualized sentencing for juveniles convicted of first-degree murder. Severing the unconstitutional provisions is not possible, as it would contravene legislative intent and require impermissible judicial intervention.

Under Pennsylvania's separation of powers, the legislature is responsible for assigning punishments for criminal conduct. The judiciary cannot assign a "missing" penalty in the course of an appeal, as it would violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court previously reached a different conclusion in Commonwealth v. Batts I (2013), holding that courts could impose a sentence that would not be unconstitutional if authorized by law. However, this reasoning is inconsistent with subsequent precedent and fails to consider the separation of powers doctrine.

Due to the legislature's inaction, courts are left with no choice but to order that juveniles convicted of first-degree murder prior to June 25, 2012, not be sentenced for that offense. This is because the only available punishment, mandatory life without parole, is unconstitutional. The court suggests that the issue of judicial authority and separation of powers should be reconsidered in light of the evolving legal landscape.

Summary of Argument

In Pennsylvania, the laws for sentencing people convicted of first-degree murder have not changed since 2006, even for juveniles. In 2012, the state fixed this issue for future cases, but it did not address cases that were sentenced before June 25, 2012.

The Problem

The current sentencing laws are unconstitutional because they do not allow for individualized sentencing of juveniles. This means that juveniles who commit first-degree murder must be sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole, even if there are factors that should be considered in their favor, such as their age or mental health.

Legal Arguments

Under Pennsylvania law, the legislature is responsible for setting punishments for crimes. The courts cannot create new punishments or change existing ones.

In this case, the legislature has refused to change the sentencing laws for juveniles who were convicted of first-degree murder before June 25, 2012. This means that the only available punishment for these individuals is life in prison without parole, which is unconstitutional.

Conclusion

As a result, the court has ruled that juveniles who were convicted of first-degree murder before June 25, 2012, cannot be sentenced for that crime. They can only be sentenced for lesser offenses that have legal punishments available.

This decision overturns a previous ruling by the same court. The court believes that the previous ruling was incorrect and that it is now necessary to reconsider the issue in light of recent legal developments.

Summary of Argument

In Pennsylvania, young people who commit murder are still sentenced the same way they were in 2006, which is life in prison without the possibility of parole. This is a problem because the Supreme Court has ruled that this sentence is unconstitutional for juveniles.

The Legislature's Response:

In 2012, the Pennsylvania legislature changed the sentencing rules for future cases, but they did not fix the problem for people who were already sentenced.

The Court's Dilemma:

The court cannot simply change the sentence because that is the job of the legislature. However, the court also cannot leave the unconstitutional sentence in place.

The Solution:

The court has decided that the only option is to release the person from prison for the murder charge. They can still be sentenced for any other crimes they may have committed.

Why This Matters:

The court's decision is based on the idea that it is not fair to punish young people as harshly as adults. The court also believes that it is important to follow the Supreme Court's ruling.

Summary of Argument

In Pennsylvania, the rules for punishing people who commit serious crimes haven't changed since 2006, even for kids who do these things. The lawmakers fixed this problem for future cases in 2012, but they said they wouldn't change the rules for people who were already sentenced before that date.

There are some problems with the current rules that make them unfair. But the rules can't be changed just a little bit, because that would go against what the lawmakers wanted. And it's not the job of the judges to make new rules. Only the lawmakers can do that.

In this case, the lawmakers have said they don't want to change the rules for people who were sentenced before 2012. So, the only punishment that can be given to the person in this case is one that is unfair. Because of this, the court has decided that this person should not be punished for the most serious crime they did, but only for the other crimes they were found guilty of.

The court had a different idea about this before, but they changed their mind because of a new rule that came out. They think it's important to look at this issue again because the old decision doesn't make sense anymore.