Amici urge the Court to read New York Executive Law §§ 296(15) and 296(6) broadly so people with conviction histories are protected not only from discrimination by their direct employers but also from controlling third parties—such as clients, franchisors, parent companies, staffing firms, and background-check vendors—that impose blanket “no-hire” rules. Since 1976, § 296(15) and Article 23-A have prohibited automatic bans and required individualized assessments; limiting § 296(15) to “employers” would contradict its text (“any person…”) and the Human Rights Law’s mandate of liberal construction. Even if “employer” were required, it should include entities that dictate discriminatory policies to the direct employer. Widespread practices—client contracts, staffing arrangements, and matrix-based screening—routinely sidestep the statute’s protections, as shown by multiple enforcement actions. Independently, § 296(6) makes a third party liable for aiding, abetting, compelling, or attempting to cause discrimination; under NOW, that provision is read expansively and reaches policies that require violations even absent proof of a specific instance. Applied here, Allied/Sirva’s contractual no-hire rule for workers with certain convictions unlawfully displaced New York’s individualized assessment requirement and renders Allied liable under both §§ 296(15) and 296(6). The Court should answer the first certified question no, and the second and third yes.

Summary

Organizations advocating for the rights of individuals with conviction histories urge the Court to interpret New York Executive Law Sections 296(15) and 296(6) broadly. This interpretation aims to protect individuals not only from discrimination by their direct employers but also from influential third parties—such as clients, franchisors, parent companies, staffing agencies, and background-check providers—that enforce blanket "no-hire" policies. Since 1976, Section 296(15) and Article 23-A have mandated individualized assessments instead of automatic bans; therefore, limiting Section 296(15) only to direct "employers" would contradict its language, which refers to "any person," and the Human Rights Law's requirement for generous interpretation. Even if the term "employer" were strictly applied, it should encompass entities that dictate discriminatory hiring policies to the direct employer. Various common practices, including client contracts, staffing arrangements, and standardized screening processes, are observed to circumvent these statutory protections, as evidenced by multiple enforcement actions. Separately, Section 296(6) holds third parties accountable for assisting, encouraging, compelling, or attempting to cause discrimination. Under established legal interpretation, this provision is applied broadly, extending to policies that necessitate discriminatory actions, even without proof of a specific instance of discrimination. In the specific case at hand, Allied/Sirva's contractual rule, which prohibits hiring workers with certain convictions, improperly replaces New York’s requirement for individualized assessment. Consequently, Allied becomes liable under both Sections 296(15) and 296(6). The Court is therefore advised to answer the first certified question in the negative, and the second and third questions in the affirmative.

Summary

Advocates argue that New York's Executive Law, specifically sections 296(15) and 296(6), should broadly protect individuals with past criminal convictions from hiring discrimination. This protection should extend beyond direct employers to include third parties that control hiring decisions, such as clients, parent companies, staffing firms, or background-check vendors. These third parties often impose blanket rules that automatically ban individuals with certain convictions. However, New York law, since 1976, has required an individualized assessment for each applicant, prohibiting automatic bans. Interpreting Section 296(15) to cover "any person" involved in discrimination, not just direct employers, aligns with the law's intent. Even if the term "employer" is strictly used, it should include entities that dictate discriminatory policies. Current practices, such as client contracts and specific screening methods, frequently bypass these legal protections. Furthermore, Section 296(6) holds third parties accountable for aiding or causing discrimination, covering policies that require discriminatory actions. In the Allied/Sirva case, a contractual no-hire rule for workers with certain convictions unlawfully ignored New York's individualized assessment requirement, making Allied liable under both sections of the law. The Court is urged to support a broad interpretation of these protections.

Summary

Supporters are asking the Court to interpret New York Executive Law sections 296(15) and 296(6) broadly. This broader reading would ensure individuals with past convictions are protected from discrimination. This protection would extend not only to direct employers but also to powerful third parties, such as clients or background-check services. These third parties sometimes create general rules that prevent hiring anyone with a conviction.

Since 1976, New York law has required individualized reviews for job applicants with conviction histories, rather than automatic bans. Limiting section 296(15) only to direct employers would go against the law's own wording, which refers to "any person." It would also contradict the instruction to interpret human rights laws widely. Even if the law strictly refers to "employers," it should still include any entity that dictates discriminatory policies to a direct employer. Many common business practices, such as client contracts, often allow companies to sidestep these legal protections, as shown by past enforcement actions.

Separately, section 296(6) holds a third party responsible for helping, forcing, or attempting to cause discrimination. This part of the law is understood to cover policies that lead to discrimination, even without proof of a specific harmful event. In this specific case, Allied/Sirva's contractual rule against hiring workers with certain convictions illegally bypassed New York’s requirement for individual assessments. This action makes Allied responsible under both sections 296(15) and 296(6). The Court should therefore answer the first certified question no, and the second and third questions yes.

Summary

Supporters of this case ask the Court to understand New York's anti-discrimination laws (Sections 296(15) and 296(6)) in a broad way. This would protect adults with past criminal records from unfair treatment. The protection should come not just from their direct bosses, but also from other powerful companies. These other companies might be clients, parent companies, or staffing firms that make rules to stop people with certain pasts from being hired. Since 1976, these laws have said that companies cannot automatically ban people and must look at each person's situation carefully. If the law only applied to direct bosses, it would go against the law's own words and the goal of human rights laws.

Even if the law usually applies to "employers," it should include any company that tells a direct boss to use unfair hiring rules. Many common ways of working, like client deals or using temporary staff, often get around these protections. Also, Section 296(6) says a company can be responsible if it helps or causes unfair treatment. This applies even if a company's rules lead to unfairness, without a single proven case. For example, Allied/Sirva had a contract rule that stopped workers with certain past convictions from being hired. This rule wrongly took the place of New York's law that requires looking at each person individually. Because of this, Allied is responsible under both sections of the law. The Court should answer the first main question "no," and the second and third main questions "yes."