Brief and Argument of Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner-Appellee
Shobha L. Mahadev
Scott F. Main
SummaryOriginal

Summary

The Illinois sentencing structure does not consider youth as required by Miller and Montgomery.

2018 | State Juristiction

Brief and Argument of Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner-Appellee

Keywords sentencing enhancements; Eighth Amendment (U.S.); Miller; Montgomery; JLWOP; juvenile life without parole
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Summary of Argument

Any sentence imposed on a youth under the age of 18 that precludes a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release” is unconstitutional because children are redeemable. Because incarceration is particularly harmful to children, lengthy sentences that fail to provide meaningful opportunity for release based on demonstrated maturity are constitutionally disproportionate. Juveniles are more likely to be rehabilitated before the end of their lengthy sentences, diminishing the underlying justifications for imposing such sentences on youth. Illinois should join its sister states and conclude that sentences like Mr. Buffer’s 50 years, imposed on a 16-year-old, violates the protections of the 8th Amendment.

Illinois’ sentencing structure – which, at the time of this offense, treated a 16-year-old the same as an adult – is contrary to the core principles of Miller and Montgomery. By abandoning indeterminate sentencing, eliminating the ability to earn day-for-day good time credit against such sentences, and requiring an additional 25 years-to-life for use of a firearm during the course of the offense on top of a mandatory minimum, Illinois has made irrelevant the meaningful consideration of youth in imposing impermissibly – and now unconstitutionally – long sentences. The Illinois legislature has failed to create a meaningful opportunity for review of a juvenile’s sentence. Accordingly, this Court must act in the resultant void and overturn Mr. Buffer’s sentence.

Absent this Court’s intervention, Illinois will remain an outlier among courts and legislatures throughout the nation that have recognized that, in the wake of Montgomery, Miller, and Graham, lengthy sentences with no mechanism for release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation are inappropriate for youthful offenders. Without a system of review, lengthy sentences, such as Mr. Buffer’s, are unconstitutional under Graham, Miller, and Montgomery. As a result, this Court should affirm the appellate court’s decision remanding Mr. Buffer’s case for a resentencing hearing

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Summary of Argument

The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment prohibits the imposition of lengthy sentences upon juveniles without a meaningful opportunity for release. Juvenile offenders are more likely to be rehabilitated than adults, and long sentences without the possibility of release based on demonstrated maturity violate the principles of proportionality and rehabilitation.

The Illinois sentencing scheme, which treats 16-year-olds as adults, fails to incorporate the principles of Miller and Montgomery and is inconsistent with the Eighth Amendment. The legislature's failure to provide a meaningful opportunity for review of a juvenile's sentence creates a constitutional void that requires judicial intervention.

Illinois's sentencing structure, which lacks a system for review, stands in contrast to the practices of other states that have recognized the need for individualized assessments of juvenile offenders. Without a meaningful opportunity for release, lengthy sentences imposed upon youth violate the Eighth Amendment, as established in Miller, Montgomery, and Graham. Therefore, the court should affirm the appellate court's decision to remand Mr. Buffer's case for resentencing.

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Summary of Argument

The argument presented in this case centers on the constitutionality of lengthy sentences imposed on juveniles, specifically in the context of Illinois’ sentencing structure. The core contention is that such sentences, lacking meaningful opportunities for release based on demonstrated maturity, violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.

The author argues that the Eighth Amendment requires consideration of a juvenile offender’s capacity for rehabilitation and that lengthy sentences without mechanisms for release based on demonstrated maturity are disproportionate and thus unconstitutional. The current Illinois sentencing structure, which fails to provide such mechanisms, is deemed incompatible with the principles established in the landmark Supreme Court cases of Miller, Montgomery, and Graham. These cases emphasized the unique characteristics of juvenile offenders, including their immaturity, impulsivity, and capacity for rehabilitation.

The author further argues that Illinois has created a sentencing system that effectively ignores these factors, leading to the imposition of excessively long sentences on young offenders. The absence of meaningful opportunities for review and release based on rehabilitation renders these sentences unconstitutional. By upholding the appellate court’s decision to remand Mr. Buffer’s case for resentencing, this court has the opportunity to align Illinois with national trends and ensure that juvenile sentencing practices reflect the principles established in Miller, Montgomery, and Graham.

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Summary of Argument

Sentencing a young person under 18 to a lengthy prison term that prevents them from having a chance to be released is against the Constitution. This is because young people can change and grow, and being in prison for a long time is especially damaging to them. Long sentences for young people are too harsh and don't account for the fact that they can improve before their sentence is over. Illinois should follow other states and declare that sentences like Mr. Buffer's 50 years, imposed when he was just 16, are unconstitutional.

Illinois's sentencing laws used to treat 16-year-olds like adults, which goes against the rulings in Miller and Montgomery. Illinois made it impossible to review sentences for young people, meaning that long sentences, like Mr. Buffer's, are now unconstitutional. The court should agree with the lower court's decision and send Mr. Buffer's case back to be sentenced again.

If the court doesn't step in, Illinois will be the only state that doesn't recognize that long sentences with no chance for release are wrong for young offenders. Without a system for reviewing these sentences, they are against the Constitution. The court should confirm the lower court's decision to send Mr. Buffer's case back for a new sentencing hearing.

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Summary of Argument

A young person under 18 years old shouldn't get a sentence that keeps them locked up forever without a chance to get out. Youth can change, and it's not right to treat them the same as adults. Long prison sentences are especially bad for kids because they can get better over time. Illinois law makes it hard for young people to get out of prison, even if they change.

If the court doesn't change something, Illinois will be the only state that doesn't see that long sentences with no chance for release are wrong for young offenders, and they are going against the Constitution.

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Footnotes and Citation

Cite

Brief for Amici Curiae Children and Family Justice Center, Juvenile Justice Initiative, and Juvenile Law Center in Support of Petitioner-Appellee, People v. Buffer, No. 122327 (Ill. Nov. 2, 2018).

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