Summary of Argument

This case concerns the scope of the constitutional rule announced in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and held applicable on collateral review in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). Respondent Lee Boyd Malvo, who was sentenced to life without parole for crimes committed as a juvenile, maintains that Miller established a substantive rule that renders life without parole disproportionate for the vast majority of juveniles in light of their “diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change,” and that he is therefore entitled to a new sentencing proceeding at which his youth will be considered to implement that substantive rule. Miller, 567 U.S. at 479. The substantive character of this rule is precisely why this Court in Montgomery held the Miller rule applied on collateral review under the retroactivity rules set forth in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307, 311 (1989), and its progeny.

To conform to Miller, a sentencing scheme must require the sentencing authority to separate juveniles in the class who cannot be subjected to life without parole (juveniles whose crimes reflect “transient immaturity”) from the rare juveniles who fall outside that class (those whose crimes reflect “irreparable corruption”) and who may therefore receive that sentence. Miller, 567 U.S. at 479-80 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005)). Because Virginia’s sentencing scheme offered no assurance that life without parole would be imposed only on the rare irreparably corrupt juveniles, Malvo’s sentence is unconstitutional.

The argument advanced by the warden and the United States as amicus treats Miller as applying only to “mandatory” life-without-parole sentences. They maintain that any discretion at all to impose a lesser sentence automatically takes a sentencing scheme outside Miller’s strictures. But that position fails to account for Miller’s reasoning or Montgomery’s holding that Miller is substantive precisely because it identifies a class of juveniles whom the state cannot condemn to life without parole. If all Miller required was a discretionary rather than a mandatory process, it would be a procedural rule, and likely would not have been given retroactive effect by Montgomery.

The warden’s view misunderstands not just Miller and Montgomery, but the very concept of a substantive rule set forth by Teague and its progeny. Teague established that most new constitutional rules are not applicable on collateral review, i.e. after a criminal conviction has been rendered final through direct appeal. 489 U.S. at 307, 311. But it recognized two exceptions to that general rule: (1) for “watershed” procedural rules; and (2) for “substantive” rules, including those that place certain penalties beyond the state’s power to impose, because of either the nature of the offense or the offender. Id. at 311. Montgomery properly held that Miller announced a substantive rule, and therefore is applicable on collateral review.

The argument advanced by the warden and the United States cannot be squared with the distinction between substantive and procedural rules. This Court’s precedents treat a rule as substantive, and therefore applicable to collateral proceedings regardless of when a conviction became final, where it prohibits the imposition of a particular punishment on a category of offenders. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004). Montgomery held that the rule announced in Miller was substantive because it prohibits a life-without-parole sentence for a class of offenders (juveniles) and allows it only in aberrant cases of “the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.” Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 479-80).

The framework under which Malvo was sentenced does not ensure that the sentencing authority performs the necessary sorting function. Virginia’s applicable statutes make no distinctions between juveniles and adults, let alone between those juveniles who can and cannot be sentenced to life without parole. The warden nonetheless contends that the trial court could have considered Malvo’s youth and related factors if Malvo had requested that the court suspend his sentence.

This argument fails. It distorts the purpose of a proceeding on the propriety of suspending a sentence, and, most important, it misses the point of the sentencing hearing that Miller demands. The salient objective of the hearing that comports with Miller is to isolate the exceedingly rare juvenile who is “permanently incorrigible” from the class of juvenile offenders who cannot constitutionally be given a life-without-parole sentence. The warden makes no assertion that the sentencing judge in fact engaged in the sorting required by Miller; he apparently argues that it is sufficient that it could have happened, even if it never did. The mere formal availability of suspension in no way assures that that determination was made in Malvo’s case.

Summary of Argument

In Malvo v. Mathena, the Court examined the scope of the constitutional rule established in Miller v. Alabama (2012) and its applicability on collateral review as held in Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016). This article analyzes the Court's reasoning in holding that the Miller rule is substantive and therefore retroactive, rendering life without parole sentences unconstitutional for most juvenile offenders.

The Miller Rule and its Substantive Character

Miller established that life without parole sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The Court recognized the "diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change" of juveniles and held that such sentences are disproportionate for the vast majority of them. This rule was deemed substantive because it prohibits the imposition of a specific punishment on a category of offenders (juveniles).

Retroactivity of the Miller Rule

In Montgomery, the Court held that the Miller rule applied on collateral review, meaning that it could be applied to cases where the conviction had become final. This decision was based on the substantive nature of the rule, which falls under the second exception to the general rule of non-retroactivity established in Teague v. Lane (1989).

The Warden's Argument and its Flaws

The warden argued that Miller only applied to mandatory life without parole sentences and that any discretion in sentencing removed a case from its purview. However, this argument fails to account for the fact that Miller identifies a class of juveniles who cannot be sentenced to life without parole. The mere presence of discretion does not negate the substantive nature of the rule.

The Importance of Individualized Sentencing

The Court emphasized that Miller requires sentencing authorities to distinguish between juveniles who exhibit "transient immaturity" and the rare cases of "irreparable corruption." Virginia's sentencing scheme, which did not differentiate between juveniles and adults, failed to meet this requirement.

The Suspension Argument

The warden argued that the trial court could have considered Malvo's youth in a suspension hearing. However, this argument misses the point that Miller requires a specific hearing to determine whether a juvenile is "permanently incorrigible." The mere availability of suspension does not ensure that such a determination was made in Malvo's case.

Conclusion

The Court's decision in Malvo v. Mathena reaffirms the substantive nature of the Miller rule and its applicability on collateral review. It highlights the importance of individualized sentencing for juvenile offenders, ensuring that life without parole sentences are reserved only for the rarest cases where the juvenile's actions reflect irreparable corruption.

Summary of Argument

In the case of Miller v. Alabama (2012), the Supreme Court ruled that it is unconstitutional to sentence juveniles to life without parole without considering their youth and potential for rehabilitation. This rule was later made retroactive in Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016), meaning that it applies to cases where the conviction was already final.

Malvo's Case:

Lee Boyd Malvo was sentenced to life without parole for crimes he committed as a juvenile. He argues that his sentence violates the rule established in Miller because it did not take into account his youth and capacity for change.

Substantive vs. Procedural Rules:

The Supreme Court has established that certain constitutional rules are "substantive," meaning that they prohibit the government from imposing certain punishments on certain categories of people. These rules apply retroactively, even to cases where the conviction was final before the rule was announced.

Virginia's Sentencing Scheme:

Malvo was sentenced under Virginia's sentencing scheme, which did not distinguish between juveniles and adults or between juveniles who could and could not be sentenced to life without parole.

The Warden's Argument:

The warden argues that Malvo's sentence is constitutional because the trial court had the discretion to consider his youth and suspend his sentence.

Malvo's Counterargument:

Malvo argues that the mere possibility of suspension is not enough to satisfy the requirements of Miller. The sentencing hearing must specifically consider whether the juvenile is "permanently incorrigible" and therefore eligible for life without parole. Malvo claims that this determination was not made in his case.

Summary of Argument

Lee Boyd Malvo was a teenager when he was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. He argued that his sentence was unfair because the Supreme Court had ruled in a case called Miller v. Alabama that most juveniles should not be sentenced to life without parole.

What the Supreme Court Said in Miller v. Alabama

The Supreme Court said that juveniles are different from adults because they are:

• Less responsible for their actions

• More likely to change and grow

Because of these differences, the Court ruled that it is unconstitutional to sentence most juveniles to life without parole.

Why Malvo Believes He Deserves a New Sentence

Malvo believes that the rule from Miller v. Alabama should apply to him, even though his case was already final. He argues that the rule is "substantive," meaning that it prohibits a certain type of punishment for a certain group of people (juveniles).

The Government's Argument

The government argues that Malvo's sentence is not unconstitutional because the judge had the option to give him a lesser sentence. They say that Miller v. Alabama only applies to cases where life without parole is the only possible sentence.

The Importance of Separating Juveniles

The Supreme Court has said that sentencing courts must separate juveniles who cannot be sentenced to life without parole from the rare juveniles who can. This is because most juveniles have the potential to change, while some do not.

Malvo's Case

Malvo's case shows that the sentencing process for juveniles is not always fair. The judge in his case did not consider his youth or the possibility that he could change. As a result, Malvo was sentenced to life without parole, even though he may not have deserved it.

Summary of Argument

A man named Lee Boyd Malvo was given a life sentence in prison without the chance of getting out when he was a teenager. He says that's not fair because young people are different from adults. They don't always understand the consequences of their actions and they can change for the better.

The law says that most young people who commit crimes shouldn't get life in prison without parole. Only the very worst ones, who will never change, should get that punishment.

Malvo says that the way he was sentenced didn't follow this law. The people in charge of the prison say that Malvo's sentence is okay because the judge could have given him a shorter sentence if he wanted to. But Malvo says that's not enough. The judge should have been required to think about his age and whether he could change before giving him such a harsh punishment.