Summary of Argument

Youthful offender parole is authorized by age at the time of the offense – under 26 years – in line with the Supreme Court’s recognition that the attributes of youth are not “crime-specific.” (Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 473.) Eligible youths may earn release by demonstrating rehabilitation, even if the sentence exceeds their natural lifetime. (In re Jones (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 477, 486-487, concurring opn. of Pollak, P. J.) Adolescent persons sentenced to Life Without the Possibility of Parole (“LWOP”), however, are ineligible for relief from incarceration for offenses committed before age 26, even if completely rehabilitated today. These youths are unfairly “condemned to live virtually [their] entire life in ignominious confinement, stripped of any opportunity or motive to redeem [themself] for an act attributable to the rash and immature judgment of youth.” (People v. Davis (1981) 29 Cal.3d 814, 832, fn. 10.) The disparate treatment of youthful persons under Penal Code section 3051 was remedied in People v. Hardin (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 273, 289-90, where the Second District Court of Appeal correctly recognized “that any purported legislatively recognized distinction in culpability between individuals serving a parole-eligible indeterminate life sentence and those sentenced to life without parole is illusory.” On review, the Attorney General argues that the dual purposes of “culpability” and “punishment” demonstrate “that young adult offenders who commit the most serious offenses should have no opportunity for relief from lifetime incarceration.” (Respondent’s Reply Brief (“Reply Brief”), at p. 7.) The State is wrong – similarly situated persons convicted of the most serious crimes in Santa Clara County are not receiving “like treatment” under section 3051. (See, infra, Declarations by Mara Hickey, P.I.; Dr. Kathryn Albrecht; and Drs. Rahn Minagawa, Francesca Lehman, and Carl Osborn [Attached as Exhibits A-C], infra.) There are at least three factors demonstrating that section 3051 does not apply in equal fashion by excluding those (1) most subject to socioeconomic disparities during childhood; (2) who end up in prison for life in their youth; but (3) are granted no opportunity for parole despite equal capacity for rehabilitation. Distinguishing against such youthful persons without regard to the factors leading to their imprisonment, but instead solely on “crime-specific” reasons, is unequal protection. Nor would equal application of section 3051 undo most LWOP sentences, as this Court has recognized. “The Legislature did not envision that the original sentences of eligible youth offenders would be vacated and that new sentences would be imposed to reflect parole eligibility during the 15th, 20th, or 25th year of incarceration.” (People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 278.) Thus, youthful offender parole, like senior parole, merely offers a small number of rehabilitated people the opportunity for release – not to assess “culpability” or impose “punishment” – but “‘to account for neuroscience research that the human brain—especially those portions responsible for judgment and decision making— continues to develop into a person’s mid-20's.’” (Hardin, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 287, citation omitted.) “The continued operation of the original sentence is evident from the fact that an inmate remains bound by that sentence.” (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 278.) Mr. Hardin correctly challenges section 3051, subdivision (h), for failing in its purpose of “rehabilitation.” (Answering Brief, at p. 32.) The Attorney General’s contrary analysis would have the Court disregard the historical, racial, and scientific disparities undergirding the unequal exclusion of some youths from parole based on “fictional approach[es] to statutory purpose.” (Brown v. Merlo (1973) 8 Cal.3d 855, 865, fn. 7.) This brief – through the lens of Santa Clara County – provides a more “serious and genuine judicial inquiry into the correspondence between the classification and the legislative goals.” (Newland v. Board of Governors (1977) 19 Cal.3d 705, 711, citation omitted.) The decision in Hardin must be affirmed to equally protect all similarly situated young persons under Article I, section 7 of the California Constitution, and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Summary of Argument

The argument presented critiques the California Penal Code section 3051, which authorizes youthful offender parole based on age at the time of the offense, but excludes those sentenced to Life Without the Possibility of Parole (LWOP) for offenses committed before age 26. This exclusion, it is argued, violates the equal protection clause of the California Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment, as it unfairly condemns youthful offenders to life imprisonment despite their potential for rehabilitation.

The author contends that section 3051's disparate treatment of youthful offenders sentenced to LWOP is unjust, as it disregards the developmental attributes of youth and fails to account for the possibility of rehabilitation. They cite the Supreme Court's recognition in Miller v. Alabama that the attributes of youth are not "crime-specific" and that even those sentenced to life should be eligible for parole if they demonstrate rehabilitation.

The author argues that section 3051's exclusion of LWOP offenders from parole eligibility is not only unjust but also violates the principle of equal protection by creating a distinction between similarly situated individuals. This distinction is based solely on the severity of the crime, disregarding the social and developmental factors that contribute to youthful offending.

The author emphasizes that the primary purpose of section 3051 should be rehabilitation, as recognized by the court in People v. Hardin. They argue that the State's focus on "culpability" and "punishment" disregards the neuroscience research that demonstrates the ongoing brain development of young adults and their capacity for change. They further advocate for a "serious and genuine judicial inquiry" into the correspondence between the classification and the legislative goals, urging the court to affirm the Hardin decision to ensure equal protection for all similarly situated youthful offenders.

Summary of Argument

The disparity in treatment of youthful offenders under Penal Code section 3051, particularly for those sentenced to Life Without the Possibility of Parole (LWOP), is a significant issue regarding equal protection under both the California and US Constitutions. This disparity is evident in the case of People v. Hardin (2022), where the Second District Court of Appeal found the distinction in culpability between those eligible for parole and those sentenced to LWOP illusory.

The State's argument that the dual purposes of "culpability" and "punishment" justify the exclusion of LWOP offenders from parole eligibility overlooks the socioeconomic disparities that contribute to youthful offenses, as well as the scientific evidence demonstrating brain development continues into a person's mid-20s.

This brief, focusing on the perspective of Santa Clara County, examines the unequal application of section 3051, highlighting the exclusion of youth offenders who are most vulnerable to socioeconomic disparities, sentenced to LWOP in their youth, and denied the opportunity for parole despite potential rehabilitation. It emphasizes the need for an equal application of section 3051, recognizing that youthful offender parole serves the purpose of rehabilitation, not punishment or culpability assessment.

This brief argues that the decision in Hardin must be affirmed to uphold the equal protection rights of all similarly situated young individuals under the California and US Constitutions, ensuring fair treatment and opportunities for redemption regardless of the severity of their offense.

Summary of Argument

The current system of parole for young offenders in California, as outlined in Penal Code section 3051, is unfair to people sentenced to life without parole (LWOP) for crimes committed before the age of 26. While youthful offenders sentenced to life with the possibility of parole can earn their release by demonstrating rehabilitation, those sentenced to LWOP are ineligible for parole, regardless of their progress.

This difference in treatment is unfair because the Supreme Court has acknowledged that youthful offenders have different characteristics than adults, including a lack of maturity and the inability to fully grasp the consequences of their actions.

This unequal treatment violates the principle of equal protection under the law, as it discriminates against young people who are most susceptible to socioeconomic disparities and who are sentenced to life imprisonment at a young age.

The Attorney General argues that the purpose of section 3051 is to punish and assess culpability, but this argument is flawed. The real purpose of youthful offender parole, as recognized by the court in People v. Hardin, is to provide an opportunity for rehabilitation and to account for the scientific understanding of brain development, which continues into a person's mid-20s.

The court in Hardin recognized that there is no logical difference in culpability between individuals sentenced to life with parole and those sentenced to LWOP, and that section 3051 should apply equally to both. Therefore, the decision in Hardin must be upheld to ensure that all young people are treated fairly under the law.

Summary of Argument

This document talks about how some young people who were sentenced to life in prison without parole are being treated unfairly.

The Supreme Court says that young people’s brains are still developing until they are about 25 years old. This means that they might not understand the consequences of their actions the same way adults do.

In California, young people who committed crimes before they turned 26 can be released from prison early if they show that they have changed. But young people who were sentenced to life in prison without parole cannot get out, even if they change.

This is unfair because it means that some young people are treated differently based only on the type of crime they committed, not on how they have changed. This is against the law.