Summary of Argument
Miller must be applied to Mr. Carp and others similarly situated under federal retroactivity principles. Although it dictates that sentencers follow a certain process and, for now, allows the imposition with life without parole for juveniles, Miller primarily imposes several substantive requirements that qualify for retroactive application. The substantive aspects stem from the fact that Miller: (1) made new facts essential to the imposition of LWOP forjuveniles and governs what sentencers must find; (2) gave juveniles a substantive, Eighth Amendment guarantee of a different sentence range and presumption against LWOP; (3) altered the class of offenders and the range of conduct subject to LWOP sentences; and (4) categorically barred mandatory LWOP for juveniles, which is recognized as a specific form of punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
That Miller should apply retroactively is reflected in the Supreme Court's decision itself, which applied the new rule to Kuntrell Jackson, who came before the Court on the same issue long after his conviction was final. Under Teague v Lane, even-handed justice requires that the new rule be applied to all who are similarly situated to the party whom the rule was originally applied to, which includes Mr. Carp and all others whose convictions are final.
Finally, even if it could be appropriately labelled as purely procedural, Miller represents a watershed change in the law that requires retroactive application under Teague v Lane. Miller recognized that most LWOP sentences are disproportionate and therefore grossly inaccurate when imposed without consideration of mitigating factors. Failure to apply Miller wouldseriously diminish the likelihood of obtaining accurate sentences for juveniles. Furthermore, Miller marks a sea-change in the law by applying, for the first time ever, the individualized capital-sentencing doctrine outside of the death penalty context. Doing so recognized for thefirst time that LWOP for juveniles is the same as death for adults, mandating the same substantive and procedural rules be applied in both contexts.
Applying the three criterion for retroactivity under state rules also compels application of Miller to Mr. Carp and others who are similarly situated. Miller itself indicated that juveniles subject to mandatory LWOP received cruel and unusual, and inaccurate sentences; thus its purpose implicates the integrity of the fact-finding process of sentencing in Michigan. Additionally, all juvenile lifers relied on the pre-Miller rule because they were barred across the board from presenting mitigation at their sentencing hearings. Moreover, all those juveniles received sentences that violated the Eighth Amendment and the vast majority of those would have received lesser sentences had Miller been followed. Finally, applying Miller retroactively would mean resentencing for a number of individuals that comprise less than one percent of the felony cases handled in Michigan for a single year, and the state could reap long term financial benefits from the reduced incarceration costs Miller will likely provide. Accordingly, retroactive application of Miller is required under state law as well.