Amended Merit Brief of Amicus Curiae Ohio Attorney General Michael Dewine in Support of Appellee State of Ohio
Stephen P. Hardwick
Michael DeWine
Joseph T. Deters
Ronald W. Springman
Alexandra T. Schwimmer
SimpleOriginal

Summary

The Eighth Amendment does not require a sentencer to state that it considered an offender's youth before imposing a sentence of life without parole.

2013 | State Juristiction

Amended Merit Brief of Amicus Curiae Ohio Attorney General Michael Dewine in Support of Appellee State of Ohio

Keywords Eighth Amendment (U.S.); discretionary sentence; LWOP; life without parole; discretionary life without parole; mandatory life without parole; Miller; youth; homicide; mitigating effects of youth
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Summary of Argument

Ninety-seven days before Eric Long's eighteenth birthday, he and two companions murdered Scott Neblett and Keith Cobb. The aggravated murders were part of a run of criminal behavior that would also result in three felonious-assault charges and several weapons charges for Long. Given the seriousness of the offenses and the likelihood that Long would commit future crimes, the trial court exercised its discretion to sentence Long to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. After his sentencing, the United States Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. _, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), which held that "mandatory life- without-parole sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment." Id at 2464. Long believes that Miller renders his sentence unconstitutional and entitles him to a new sentencing hearing. He is wrong for three reasons.

First, Long did not receive his life-without-parole sentence under a mandatory scheme. Instead, Ohio law vested the trial court with discretion to sentence Long either to life without the possibility of parole or to life with the possibility of parole after a definite term. The fact that the trial court had discretion in sentencing Long-and that a life sentence was not mandatory-takes Long's sentence outside the scope of Miller, which "h[e]ld that mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes" violates the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 2460 (emphasis added). Miller simply does not govern here.

Second, Long misreads Miller as additionally requiring a trial court to discuss a juvenile offender's youth on the record before sentcncing him to life without parole. Miller requires sentencers to "consider[] an offender's youth and attendant characteristics" before imposing a life-without-parole sentence, at least where the offender raises the issue. Id. at 2471. But it does not require-nor does any other United States Supreme Court case require-consideration on the record. What is more, Miller drew much of its reasoning from the Supreme Court's capital sentencing cases. Those cases, too, establish no requirement of on-the-record consideration. In brief, Long has absolutely no authority for his theory that sentencers must address juvenile homicide offenders' youth explicitly on the record.

Third, in any event, the record in this case plainly shows that the trial court did consider the mitigating effects of Long's youth before imposing sentence. For starters, Ohio law presumes that sentencers have considered all relevant arguments unless the defendant presents clear evidence to the contrary. Here, Long offers no indication that the trial court misapprehended his argument or misunderstood its relevance. Furthermore, the record is full of evidence that the court considered his youth. Long's sentencing came after the trial judge had presided over his trial for four weeks, which itself suggests that she knew Long was 17 when he committed the two aggravated murders. In case his age was somehow lost on the trial court, Long devoted every word of his sentencing memorandum to the mitigating effects of youth. The memorandum contained no other mitigating arguments. The State, for its part, also acknowledged Long's youth in its sentencing memorandum, arguing that although Long was a

juvenile at the time of the murders, the seriousness of his crimes and his likelihood of recidivism outweighed the mitigating force of his youth. At the sentencing hearing, both Long's counsel and the State orally discussed Long's youth as a mitigating factor. And the trial judge said that she had considered Long's "history, character and condition" before imposing a life-without- parole sentence. Beyond any doubt, the trial court considered Long's youth before sentencing him.

Because Long's sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment, the Court should affirm.

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Summary of Argument

Eric Long was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Long argues that his sentence is unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama, which held that mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment. This argument is flawed for several reasons.

First, Long’s sentence was not mandatory. Ohio law vested the trial court with discretion to sentence Long either to life without the possibility of parole or to life with the possibility of parole after a definite term. Miller only prohibits mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles. Because Long’s sentence was not mandatory, Miller is inapplicable.

Second, Miller does not require a trial court to explicitly discuss a juvenile offender's youth on the record before imposing a life-without-parole sentence. While Miller requires sentencers to consider an offender's youth and attendant characteristics, it does not require an explicit on-the-record discussion. The requirement to consider a juvenile offender's youth was derived from the Supreme Court’s capital sentencing cases. However, none of these cases require on-the-record consideration.

Third, the record shows that the trial court considered Long’s youth before sentencing him. Ohio law presumes that sentencers have considered all relevant arguments unless the defendant presents clear evidence to the contrary. Long offers no evidence that the trial court misunderstood his argument. The trial court presided over Long’s trial for four weeks, which suggests that the court was aware of Long’s age. Additionally, Long devoted his entire sentencing memorandum to the mitigating effects of youth. The State also acknowledged Long’s youth in its sentencing memorandum. Finally, both Long’s counsel and the State orally discussed Long’s youth as a mitigating factor at the sentencing hearing. The trial judge stated that she considered Long's "history, character and condition" before imposing a life-without-parole sentence.

Therefore, the Court should affirm Long’s sentence because it does not violate the Eighth Amendment.

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Summary of Argument

Eric Long was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for aggravated murder, despite his age of 17 at the time of the offense. Long argues that his sentence is unconstitutional based on the Supreme Court case Miller v. Alabama, which prohibits mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles. However, Long's sentence is not unconstitutional for three reasons.

First, Long's sentence was not imposed under a mandatory scheme. Ohio law grants the trial court discretion to sentence individuals to either life without parole or life with parole after a definite term. Miller only applies to mandatory sentencing schemes, not situations where the court has discretion. Therefore, Miller does not govern Long's case.

Second, Long misinterprets Miller as requiring a discussion on the record regarding the offender's youth. Miller mandates that courts consider an offender's youth and attendant characteristics before imposing a life-without-parole sentence, but does not require this consideration to be explicitly stated on the record. This interpretation is supported by the Supreme Court's capital sentencing cases, which also lack a requirement for on-the-record consideration.

Third, the record in Long's case demonstrates that the trial court considered the mitigating effects of his youth before sentencing. Ohio law presumes that sentencers consider all relevant arguments unless proven otherwise, and Long offers no evidence of the trial court's misapprehension. The record provides ample evidence of the court's consideration of Long's youth, including the trial judge's four-week trial experience with Long, Long's extensive sentencing memorandum focused on his youth, the State's acknowledgement of his age, and the trial judge's statement that she considered Long's "history, character and condition" before sentencing.

Therefore, because Long's sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment, the Court should affirm.

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Summary of Argument

Eric Long was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for two murders committed 97 days before his 18th birthday. He argues that his sentence is unconstitutional because of the Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. Alabama, which ruled against mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles. This argument is flawed for three reasons.

First, Long's sentence was not mandatory. Miller only applies to cases where a life-without-parole sentence is mandatory. In Ohio, the trial court had the discretion to sentence Long to life with or without the possibility of parole. Therefore, Miller does not apply to his case.

Second, Miller does not require on-the-record consideration of youth. Long incorrectly argues that Miller requires judges to explicitly discuss a juvenile's youth on the record before sentencing them to life without parole. While the case does state that judges must consider youth and other factors, it does not require any specific form of consideration or documentation.

Third, the trial court considered Long's youth. The record shows that the trial court considered Long's youth before imposing sentence. Ohio law assumes that judges have considered all relevant factors unless there is clear evidence to the contrary. Long did not provide any evidence that the court misunderstood his argument or the significance of his youth. The trial judge had presided over his trial for four weeks, Long devoted his entire sentencing memorandum to the mitigating effects of his youth, and both the defense and prosecution addressed his youth during the sentencing hearing. The trial judge also stated that she had considered Long's "history, character and condition."

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Summary of Argument

Eric Long was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for murdering two people when he was 17 years old. He wants to go back to court to get a new sentence because he says the law has changed. However, the law hasn't changed in a way that affects his case.

First, Eric's sentence was not mandatory.The judge had the choice to sentence him to life in prison with or without the possibility of parole. This means his case is different from the Supreme Court case that said it's against the law to automatically sentence young people to life in prison without parole.

Second, Eric is wrong about what the law says. The law only says judges have to think about a young person's age when they're making a sentence. It doesn't say judges have to say out loud that they've thought about it.

Third, the judge did think about Eric's age. The judge had a lot of information about Eric, including the fact that he was 17 years old when he committed the murders. Eric's lawyer even said that Eric's age should make a difference. The judge said she thought about all of this before she sentenced Eric.

Because the judge thought about Eric's age and the law hasn't changed in a way that would affect his sentence, the court should keep the original sentence.

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Footnotes and Citation

Cite

Amended Merit Brief of Amicus Curiae Ohio Attorney General Michael DeWine in Support of Appellee, State v. Long, No. 2012-1410 (Ohio Apr. 26, 2013).

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